2024-12-20
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(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, an Indigenous man with significant cognitive difficulties, repeatedly sexually assaulted a worker at the group home where he resided. He remained in custody pending trial, including a period of detention in a psychiatric facility while temporarily unfit to stand trial. After resiling from three agreements to plead guilty, the appellant did so the fourth time. From charge to conviction, nearly four years elapsed.The sentencing judge imposed a nine-year custodial term. This term was lengthier than the one requested by the appellant, in part because his cognitive difficulties increase the amount of time required for rehabilitative programming. The sentencing judge considered the appellant’s repeated abandonment of agreements to plead guilty to be wrongful conduct and disallowed enhanced pre-sentence custodial credit for part of the appellant’s detention. The sentencing judge also relied on the relatively favourable conditions of detention in the psychiatric facility as a basis to deny enhanced credit.The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal in part, due to an error in calculating the number of days the appellant spent in custody, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. It found that the length of time required to complete rehabilitative programming was one of multiple factors that the sentencing judge considered, and that she was entitled to do so. Furthermore, there was an evidentiary basis to conclude that the appellant’s repeated abandonment of guilty pleas was wrongful conduct, and that the appellant’s conditions of detention did not warrant enhanced credit for his entire period of pre-sentence custody. Argued Date 2024-12-03 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether anticipated time to complete rehabilitative programming may be considered when determining length of custodial sentence outside of dangerous offender regime — Whether delay caused by offender is wrongful conduct justifying denial of enhanced custodial credit — Whether offenders detained in mental health facilities prior to sentencing entitled to enhanced credit for those periods Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 2024-12-20
(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant, Tammy Marion Bouvette, was babysitting a 19-month old baby who died while having a bath. An autopsy was conducted by Dr. Evan Matshes. The appellant was charged with second degree murder. The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death. The British Columbia Court of Appeal concluded that a body of relevant information was within the possession of the Crown and/or police and was not disclosed to the appellant’s counsel. Most significantly, the undisclosed evidence pertained to the reliability of the evidence and opinions of Dr. Matshes. The Court of Appeal held that the conviction must be set aside as the product of a miscarriage of justice, as the evidence and circumstances establish a reasonable possibility that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death had full disclosure been made. The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, allowed the appeal, vacated the guilty plea, set aside the conviction and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-11-14 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Powers of the Court of Appeal — Setting aside guilty plea when there has been a miscarriage of justice — Scope of appellate courts’ remedial discretion under s. 686(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to enter an acquittal — Did the Court of Appeal err in finding that the entirety of the record as amplified on appeal admits the reasonable possibility of a conviction on a theoretical retrial? — If there remains a reasonable possibility of a conviction on a retrial, does s. 686(2)(a) nevertheless permit a court of appeal to enter an acquittal and, if so, in what circumstances? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:33:342024-12-19
The appellant, Opsis Airport Services Inc., is a federal company that operates the emergency call dispatch centre at Pierre Elliot Trudeau International Airport. The respondent the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions charged Opsis with operating an enterprise that carried on private security activities without holding an agency licence of the appropriate class, contrary to ss. 4 and 114 of the Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5 (“PSA”). Opsis admitted that, without holding an agency licence, it was carrying on activities related to electronic security systems, which are normally subject to the PSA. However, it challenged the PSA’s constitutional applicability.The Court of Québec held that the PSA applied to Opsis and therefore accepted the guilty pleas, convicted Opsis of the offences as charged and imposed fines on it. The court found that the PSA did not intrude on the core of a federal head of power because the PSA had no impact or only a very small impact on Opsis’s operations. The Superior Court allowed Opsis’s appeal, declared the PSA inapplicable to Opsis’s activities related to the operation of the emergency call centre pursuant to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, quashed the convictions and acquitted Opsis of the offences charged. The judge held that the PSA intruded on the core of the federal aeronautics power, which included airport security, and that the intrusion constituted an impairment of the core of the federal power. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the Superior Court’s judgment and affirmed the convictions entered by the Court of Québec. Although Opsis’s activities fell within the core of Parliament’s aeronautics power, the application of the PSA did not cause any actual impairment. A purely speculative or hypothetical impairment did not suffice. Ruel J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. He was of the view that if the PSA were applicable to Opsis’s operations, the provisions would impair the core of federal jurisdiction over aeronautics safety and security. Argued Date 2024-12-11 Keywords Constitutional law — Interjurisdictional immunity — Impairment — Evidence — Federal paramountcy — Conflict of purposes — Provincial offences — Licences — Application of provincial statute to airport security activities — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inapplicable to appellant pursuant to doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity on ground that it impairs Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act must be declared constitutionally inoperative in relation to appellant pursuant to doctrine of federal paramountcy on ground that there is conflict of purposes between it and federal legislative scheme relating to aeronautics — Whether Private Security Act and associated regulations apply to appellant’s airport security activities, which are essentially public and governmental in nature — Private Security Act, CQLR, c. S-3.5. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:39:122024-12-18
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Mr. Kinamore, when he was 22-years old, and the complainant, when she was 16-years old, met at a motorcycle shop and they exchanged messages for a few months. They met for dinner and a movie at Mr. Kinmore’s apartment. Afterwards, Mr. Kinamore was charged with sexual assault. Both the complainant and Mr. Kinamore testified at trial. The complainant described a sexual assault. Mr. Kinamore described a consensual sexual encounter. Both the Crown and the defence tendered evidence of prior messages between the complainant and Mr. Kinamore. In many text messages, the complainant repeatedly stated that she did not intend to have a sexual relationship with Mr. Kinamore. However, the defence led evidence of communications of a sexual nature and some prior communications entered into evidence by Crown counsel contain content that was sexual in nature or that the defence argued was sexual in nature. No voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by Crown counsel and no application was made pursuant to s. 276 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to determine the admissibility of any evidence led by the defence. Mr. Kinamore was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2024-12-05 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Complainant’s sexual activity — Text messages — Accused charged with sexual assault — Whether prior text messages between accused and complainant were of a sexual nature — If so, whether voir dire was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by Crown counsel — Whether application under s. 276 of Criminal Code was required to determine admissibility of any evidence of prior communications of a sexual nature that was led by defence counsel — Whether complainant’s prior text messages were relevant to whether she consented to sexual activity? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:42:112024-12-09
The parties were married in June 2015. They lived in Japan until 2016 when they moved to the United Arab Emirates. They separated for a period in 2017, but reconciled in 2018 and then lived together in Oman until March 2020 when they travelled to Ontario for a number of reasons, including to visit Mr. Dunmore’s parents. They had planned to return to Oman in early April 2020 however, the pandemic precluded them from doing so and they stayed with Mr. Dunmore’s parents in Ontario until January 2021. In the meantime, Ms. Mehralian became pregnant and their son M was born in Ontario in December 2020. The parties and M returned to Oman in January 2021 but came back to Ontario in April 2021. The parties then separated in May 2021. Mr. Dunmore moved to the United Arab Emirates and later Oman, while Ms. Mehralian remained in Ontario with M.Ms. Mehralian commenced proceedings in Ontario in June 2021, seeking a divorce, corollary relief and equalization of property. At the same time, Mr. Dunmore commenced a court proceeding in Oman seeking a divorce and joint custody. Ms. Mehralian contested the jurisdiction of the Omani courts, but in March 2022, the Omani Court of Appeal found that Oman had jurisdiction. In subsequent litigation in which both parties participated, an Omani lower court as well as the Omani Court of Appeal found that the parties had been validly divorced in accordance with Omani law and awarded primary custody of M to Ms. Mehralian.Mr. Dunmore brought a motion in the Ontario Superior Court seeking an order recognizing the validity of the Omani divorce in Ontario and an order returning M to Oman. The two issues were heard separately by two different judges. One judge found that the Omani divorce should be recognized in Ontario. The second judge found that M should not be ordered returned to Oman. Ms. Mehralian appealed the first order and Mr. Dunmore appealed the second. Both appeals were dismissed. Argued Date 2024-12-09 Keywords Family law — Custody — Habitual residence — How should Canadian courts determine the habitual residence of children allegedly abducted from or withheld from a non-Hague Convention signatory state — How should courts balance the countervailing policy objectives outlined in s. 19 of Ontario’s Children’s Law Reform Act — Whether the statutory definition of habitual residence should apply to cases involving non-Hague Convention signatory countries or should the reformulated hybrid test for habitual residence set out in Office of the Children’s Lawyer v. Balev apply — If the statutory definition applies, whether shared parental intention should be the focus of the analysis — Whether the lower courts erred in finding that Ontario has jurisdiction — Whether the lower courts erred in law in exercising jurisdiction over the child in the face of the respondent’s attornment to the jurisdiction of the Omani courts — Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:17:002024-12-06
In 2015, the appellant was charged with the second degree murder of his spouse. Before his trial, a Quebec Superior Court judge allowed his motion for the trial to take place before a judge alone, in accordance with s. 473(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, despite the absence of consent from the respondent prosecutor. The judge was of the opinion that a prosecutor’s decision to consent to a trial before a judge alone does not fall within the core of prosecutorial discretion but is instead a tactical decision subject to a court’s authority to control its own processes. Considering the particularities of the case, the judge was of the view that the accused had discharged his burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor’s decision was unreasonable or unfair in the circumstances. After a trial without jury, the accused was acquitted of second degree murder, but he was convicted of manslaughter.The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent prosecutor’s appeal and ordered, among other things, that a new trial be held before a jury on the charge of second degree murder. The court was of the opinion that the trial judge had erred by applying the unreasonableness standard in her review of the prosecutor’s refusal to consent despite the fact that the accused had to prove that this refusal constituted an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal found that the accused had failed to prove this and that the impugned judgment was therefore vitiated by an error of law that had the effect of granting the Superior Court jurisdiction that it did not have. The accused’s trial was therefore a nullity. Argued Date 2024-12-06 Keywords Criminal law — Courts — Jurisdiction — Procedure — Trial — Trial without jury — Trial judge allowing appellant’s motion for trial without jury despite absence of consent of prosecutor — Discretion of prosecutor to consent to trial without jury — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in finding that trial judge had held appellant’s trial “without jurisdiction” — Whether prosecutor’s appeal of order made by trial judge was governed by s. 676(1)(a) of Criminal Code — If trial was held without jurisdiction, whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in finding that irregularity could not be corrected through application of s. 686(4) of Criminal Code while denying stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 686(8) — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 473, 686(4), (8). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:25:352024-12-04
Section 63(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) provides foreign nationals who hold a permanent resident visa with the right to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division (“IAD”) against a decision to make a removal order against them made under s. 44(2) or made at an admissibility hearing.In March 2018, the appellant, Dorinela Pepa, came to Canada while in possession of a permanent resident visa as an accompanying dependent child of her father. However, before she came to Canada, Ms. Pepa married. On her arrival in Canada, she advised the point of entry officer of her marriage. Because of the change in her circumstances, Ms. Pepa was admitted for further examination and was not landed. The further examination occurred in the next month, followed by two reports under s. 44 of the IRPA. An admissibility hearing before the Immigration Division (“ID”) of the Immigration and Refugee Board commenced in September 2018. Her visa had expired earlier that month. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ID issued an exclusion order against her. She appealed the decision to the IAD, but the IAD concluded that she had no right to appeal under s. 63(2) because, when the removal order was issued, her visa had expired and so was no longer valid. Ms. Pepa’s application to the Federal Court and appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal were dismissed, with those courts concluding that the IAD’s decision was reasonable. Argued Date 2024-12-04 Keywords Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Immigration and Refugee Board, Immigration Appeal Division – Permanent resident visa expiring after its holder arrived in Canada without being landed but before removal order issued — Visa holder appealing to Immigration Appeal Division — Immigration Appeal Division interpreting statutory provision at issue as not conferring it jurisdiction — Application for judicial review to Federal Court and appeal to Federal Court of Appeal dismissed on basis that interpretation by Immigration Appeal Division was reasonable — What is the appropriate standard of review to the decision of the Immigration Appeal Division regarding the statutory right of appeal under statutory provision at issue? — Whether the Immigration Appeal Division erred in construing statutory provision at issue by determining that the appellant lost her right of appeal because the validity date of her permanent resident visa had passed prior to the issuance of the exclusion order — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 63(2). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:23:462024-11-12
Two people robbed a restaurant with their faces completely covered. The incident was captured on security cameras. The crime remained unsolved for several years until an unsavoury third-party witness implicated the appellant as one of the robbers. The appellant was charged with robbery and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence under the Criminal Code. The appellant elected to be tried by a provincial court judge.The sole issue at trial was the appellant’s identity, and the Crown’s evidence on that element was limited to evidence of the unsavoury witness. The trial judge determined that the witness was able to provide recognition evidence. The witness then testified to multiple ways he was able to identify the appellant in the video despite his face being covered. The trial judge accepted the witness’s evidence and concluded that some of the evidence at trial corroborated his testimony. The trial judge convicted the appellant of robbery and having his face masked while committing an indictable offence.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal from his conviction and affirmed the conviction. A majority of the Court of Appeal held that there was no error in the trial judge’s application of Vetrovec. The trial judge recognized the dangers of relying on the unsavoury witness’s evidence and provided reasons that explained how those challenges were resolved. The dissenting justice would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She concluded that the trial judge had erred in the treatment of the evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness. The trial judge’s Vetrovec errors were errors of law that warranted appellate intervention. Argued Date 2024-11-08 Keywords Criminal Law — Evidence — Assessment —Unsavoury Crown witnesses — Sufficiency of Vetrovec scrutiny — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s reliance on the identification evidence of the Crown’s unsavoury witness — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by affirming the trial judge’s application of the principles set out in Vetrovec v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:10:492024-11-08
The appellants, Duncan and Michelle Sinclair, and their son were on a European holiday and were injured in an accident in Venice, Italy. They were passengers on a water taxi that crashed into a wooden structure. The appellants were both injured.The appellants had arranged their travels through Amex Canada Inc., operating under the name Centurion Travel Service which engages third-party travel suppliers for the provision of travel services such as car services, flights and hotel accommodations, at the request and on behalf of Centurion Card members. The day before flying to Venice, Mr. Sinclair booked transportation from the airport in Venice to their hotel, which included a water taxi ride. The water taxi was dispatched by the respondent, Venizia Turismo, and owned by the respondent, Venice Limousine S.R.L.After returning to Canada, the appellants commenced an action seeking damages arising out of the accident. The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the action against them for want of jurisdiction. The motion judge dismissed the motion. The respondents appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. A majority of the court found that there was no Ontario contract connecting the dispute to Ontario and allowed the appeal, staying the appellants’ action. Argued Date 2024-11-07 Keywords Private international law — Jurisdiction — Presumptive connecting factors — Whether the court below failed to identify the operative contracts — Was the majority right to overturn the motion judge’s finding of a connection with an Ontario contract — Was the Court of Appeal right to rule that the connection was rebutted? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:58:462024-11-07
The respondents, Métis Nation – Saskatchewan, and Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariate Inc. (collectively, “the Métis respondents” or “MNS”), have long claimed Aboriginal title and rights (including commercial rights) to large areas of the Province of Saskatchewan. The appellant, Government of Saskatchewan, has consistently opposed the existence or recognition of such rights.In 1994, MNS (along with other plaintiffs) brought an action against Saskatchewan and Canada, seeking declarations that the Métis respondents have existing title and rights within the claimed land area, including use of resources for commercial purposes (the “1994 Action”). In 2005, Justice Koch stayed the 1994 Action, in response to a dispute between the parties with respect to the disclosure of certain documents, but granted permission to the MNS to apply for leave to lift the stay in future; to date, MNS has not applied to have the stay lifted.In 2020, MNS commenced a second action against Saskatchewan, challenging a 2010 policy document issued by the Province which had reiterated that claims to Aboriginal title and commercial rights would not be “accepted” by the provincial government, and would not be subject to the Crown’s duty to consult (the “2020 Action”). This action remains ongoing.In March 2021, a resource company (NexGen Energy Ltd.) applied to the Government of Saskatchewan for permits to complete a field mineral exploration program on certain lands that fell within the MNS claim area. In May 2021 and during the early summer of 2021, Saskatchewan met with MNS to consult the Métis about the NexGen permit applications. In July 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan issued three uranium exploration permits to NexGen. In August 2021, MNS filed an originating application for judicial review of the decision of the Minister of Environment to grant the permits. In December 2021, Saskatchewan filed a notice of application for an order to strike portions of MNS’s originating application for judicial review, relying on Rules 1-4(3) and 7-9(2)(b) of The Queen’s Bench Rules, and arguing that certain paragraphs of the originating application should be struck as vexatious or an abuse of process, given that they addressed matters already covered by the 1994 Action and the 2020 Action. The chambers judge granted the application. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Métis respondents’ appeal, reinstating the impugned paragraphs in MNS’s originating application. Argued Date 2024-11-06 Keywords Aboriginal law — Aboriginal rights — Aboriginal title — Crown’s duty to consult — Civil procedure — Abuse of process — Aboriginal group bringing application for judicial review of provincial government decision to issue mining permits to resource company — Aboriginal group alleging failure to fulfill duty to consult — Provincial government moving to strike portions of originating application in light of two other ongoing actions involving same Aboriginal rights and title claims — Chambers judge striking portions of originating application, based on abuse of process doctrine — Court of Appeal setting aside chambers judge’s decision — Whether it is an abuse of process for a claimant to bring multiple actions against the Crown raising the same legal issue in relation to the duty to consult — Whether Haida Nation decision allows claimants to bring duty to consult claims against the Crown based on asserted rights without pursuing the proof of those rights — Queen’s Bench Rules (Saskatchewan), rr. 1-4, 7-9. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:21:202024-11-06
Between September 1987 and October 1994, the appellant, Izabela Piekut, obtained a series of student loans through a federal government program. She graduated in 1994 and obtained her teaching diploma the following year. The appellant received two further student loans in 2002 and 2003, when she earned a master’s degree. In 2008, the appellant enrolled in part-time studies, earning her second master’s degree in 2009. That time, she funded her studies herself, with no student loan. In October 2013, the appellant made a consumer proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A certificate of full performance of that proposal was granted. In June 2019, the appellant applied to the court for a declaration that, by operation of law, she had been released from all debt and interest associated with her government student loans. Her application was dismissed. Her subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Argued Date 2024-11-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Procedure — Appellant seeking to have student loan debt released through the proposal process — What is the correct interplay between the phrase “date on which the bankrupt ceased to be a full- or part-time student” under BIA s. 178(1)(g)(i) and the scheme of the regulations under the CSLA and/or the CSFAA specifically noting that under those regulations it is specifically contemplated that a student may cease to be full- or part-time numerous times throughout studies, or afterward, and then apply to be reinstated to that status — Whether, or when she may have been reinstated to that status, or when she again ceased to have that status never to be reinstated to it, the courts below lacked a basis in fact on which to fix a date under s. 178(1)(g)(i) for purposes of determining whether BIA s. 178(1)(g) applied to her consumer proposal or not — Whether a creditor has the onus to prove by evidence that a person who has had a consumer proposal approved by her creditor and the court is by BIA s. 66.28 nevertheless subject to s. 178(1)(g). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:33:222024-11-04
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The appellant participated in a planned robbery with intent to steal a firearm from a seventeen year old youth. He and his co-assailants attacked the victim outside his residence. They beat him and stabbed him. Their victim died from his wounds. The appellant and his co-assailants then entered the victim’s home, pistol-whipped the victim’s mother, and searched the home for firearms. The appellant was charged with first degree murder. He was seventeen years old at the time of the offence and was tried before a jury in Youth Justice Court. He conceded at trial that he was guilty of manslaughter because he willingly participated in a planned robbery. The jury convicted the appellant of first degree murder. The Crown applied to have the appellant sentenced as an adult. The sentencing judge granted the application and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 10 years. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentencing decision. Argued Date 2024-10-15 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Young person sentenced as adult — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in sentencing a young person as an adult on the basis that Crown counsel rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:13:252024-10-17
Armed men entered the home of Jennifer Pan and her parents. They shot and killed Mrs. Pan. They shot and seriously injured Mr. Pan. Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mylvaganam and Mr. Carty were charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. They were tried before a jury. Mid-trial, proceedings against Mr. Carty were severed. The jury convicted Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Mylvaganam on both counts. They appealed from their convictions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals from the convictions for the attempted murder of Mr. Pan. It allowed the appeals from the convictions for the first degree murder of Mrs. Pan and ordered a new trial in relation to her death. Argued Date 2024-10-17 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Evidence — Remitting counts for retrial — Jurors — What is the test for placing alternative theories of liability for a homicide to a jury, what deference is due to trial judge’s determination of whether an alternative has an air of reality, and whether the curative proviso ought to have been applied to decision not to put alternatives to the jury — Whether appellate courts should remit associated counts for retrial where doing otherwise risks inconsistent trial verdicts, whether the tainting doctrine is part of the test for remittance or for application of curative proviso, and which party bears the onus for establishing tainting and remittance — Scope of the trial judge’s duty in a multi-person complex prosecution to tailor to an accused instructions to the jury on use of evidence of a co-accused’s propensity for violence — Whether trial judge failed to properly assess evidence in considering reasonable apprehension of bias or appearance of unfairness arising from juror interference, sufficiency of inquiry into juror issues and deference due to trial judge’s decisions on juror issues — Admissibility and use of presentations summarizing evidence, what rules and procedural requirements apply to determine admissibility and use by a jury of aids summarizing evidence supporting Crown counsel’s case, and whether PowerPoint presentation supporting Crown counsel’s case was improperly allowed to go into jury room? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:50:062024-10-16
In February 2019, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC” or “Commission”), issued Telecom Notice of Consultation 2019-57 for the purpose of initiating a broad review of mobile wireless services and their associated regulatory framework. The Commission indicated that the review would focus on three key areas, including the future of mobile wireless services in Canada, with a focus on reducing barriers to infrastructure deployment. In inviting comments on the matter, an access issue arose which asked whether the CRTC’s jurisdiction over access to municipal infrastructure extended to the installation of 5G small cells. This required the Commission to interpret the term “transmission line” in s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. The term “transmission line” is found in the Act’s access regime. The access regime authorizes carriers like the appellants to go onto public property to construct, maintain, or operate “transmission lines” with the consent of municipalities. Where terms of access cannot be agreed upon, s. 43(5) accords the CRTC the essentially adjudicative role of considering applications from, and providing redress to, public service providers who cannot gain access to the supporting structure of a transmission line on terms acceptable to them. In the CRTC’s view, “transmission line” could not include small cells or any technologies that transmit telecommunications wirelessly such that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes in this area by way of the access regime. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed this interpretation, and dismissed the appeal brought by Telus Communications Inc. Argued Date 2024-10-16 Keywords Administrative law — Appeals — Boards and tribunals — Regulatory boards — Jurisdiction — Wireless services — Deployment of 5G network — Access regime to public and other property — Transmission lines — CRTC determining that it lacks jurisdiction over carriers’ access to municipal infrastructure for the installation of 5G small cells — Application of access regime to 5G small cells turning on interpretation of “transmission line” under Act — Does wireless transmission infrastructure (e.g., 5G small cells) constitute, or is it an integral part of, a “transmission line” within the meaning of s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c. 38? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:30:072024-10-11
During a search incident to arrest, a man told police that he had a firearm in his backpack. The officers subsequently seized a loaded prohibited firearm. The Crown ultimately stayed the charges from the initial arrest and proceeded to trial on firearms offences only.In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the police had breached the man’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights and that his arrest and the subsequent search were unlawful. However, under s. 24(2), she found that the officers would have had a legal basis to detain the man for investigative purposes and that the firearm would have been discoverable during a search incident to such a detention. The discoverability of the firearm mitigated the seriousness of the breaches. She admitted the firearm into evidence and the man was convicted.A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan held that the trial judge erred in concluding that there was a reasonable suspicion that would justify an investigative detention, which is a question of law reviewable on a standard of correctness. That error undermined the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis. The majority conducted the s. 24(2) analysis afresh, excluded the firearm from evidence and substituted an acquittal. In dissent, Tholl J.A. would have dismissed the appeal and would have held that there was no error in the trial judge’s conclusions with respect to a reasonable suspicion for investigative detention. Argued Date 2024-10-11 Keywords Criminal Law – Charter of Rights – Arrest – Investigative detention – Search and Seizure – Whether arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to detain for investigative purposes – Whether concealed firearm was discoverable – Whether evidence of the firearm seized incident to arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter – Whether the Court of Appeal afforded the correct degree of deference to the trial judge’s conclusions – Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8, 9, 24(2). Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0058:552024-10-11
After several years of deteriorating mental health, the appellant moved into a basement apartment with other tenants. Five days later, the appellant attacked one of the other tenants by striking her with a fireplace poker and then strangling her to death. The appellant called 9-1-1 saying that he wanted to turn himself in because he had just “killed a girl.” When police arrived at the scene, he reiterated his desire to turn himself in, surrendered into custody, and he was interrogated by police. He admitted to killing the victim and explained how he had hit and strangled her. In May 2016, a jury found the appellant unfit to stand trial and he was sent to an in-patient treatment facility to see if he could become fit. At a second hearing in August 2016, after spending over three months in hospital, a second jury reversed the first, finding the appellant fit to stand trial. After a trial by judge and jury, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction appeal was dismissed. Argued Date 2024-10-10 Keywords Criminal law — Defence — Unfit to stand trial — Not criminally responsible — Under s. 2 “unfit to stand trial” of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, should the test articulated in R. v. Taylor (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 323, be replaced by a test that requires that a mentally disordered defendant have the ability to make rational decisions in the conduct of their defence? — Under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code, what is the proper meaning of the test in R. v. Oommen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507, in regard to the inability of a mentally disordered defendant to apply their knowledge of moral wrongfulness? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:48:472024-10-09
When an inmate is charged with a disciplinary offence in a Saskatchewan provincial correctional centre or remand centre, s. 68 of The Correctional Services Regulations requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the inmate committed that offence in order to find them responsible. Some of the penalties imposed may deprive inmates of their liberty as that term is used in s. 7 of the Charter. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan sought an order declaring that s. 68 of the Regulations is contrary to s. 7 of the Charter as it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan dismissed the application, holding that s. 68 of the Regulations does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2024-10-09 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to liberty — Fundamental justice — Inmate discipline hearings — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that provincial legislation mandating that inmate discipline hearings operate on a balance of probabilities complies with s. 7 of the Charter — Whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings — The Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, R.R.S. c. C-39.2 Reg 1, s. 68. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:00:072024-10-08
When an inmate is charged with a disciplinary offence in a Saskatchewan provincial correctional centre or remand centre, s. 68 of The Correctional Services Regulations requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the inmate committed that offence in order to find them responsible. Some of the penalties imposed may deprive inmates of their liberty as that term is used in s. 7 of the Charter. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan sought an order declaring that s. 68 of the Regulations is contrary to s. 7 of the Charter as it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan dismissed the application, holding that s. 68 of the Regulations does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2024-10-08 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to liberty — Fundamental justice — Inmate discipline hearings — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that provincial legislation mandating that inmate discipline hearings operate on a balance of probabilities complies with s. 7 of the Charter — Whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings — The Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, R.R.S. c. C-39.2 Reg 1, s. 68. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:03:092024-09-18
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Mr. Agpoon was charged in December 2018 with offences relating to human trafficking in minors, possession of fentanyl, and a firearms offence. Mr. Flemmings was added to the Indictment in December 2019 on counts related to human trafficking and possession of fentanyl. The case came before the Ontario Court of Justice before the COVID-19 pandemic closed all Ontario courts on March 17, 2020 and thereafter led to varying province-wide and regional closures, capacity restrictions and operational limitations. The Crown preferred a direct indictment on May 19, 2021. Mr. Agpoon and Mr. Flemmings applied to stay proceedings on the basis of delay. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the application and stayed all charges. The Court of Appeal granted an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2024-05-22 Keywords Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Criminal law — What test should trial judges apply under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when deciding whether delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is reasonable? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0032:382024-05-31
(Publication ban in case)The appellant, Emanuel Lozada, along with other individuals, participated in two fights, the second of which resulted in the fatal stabbing of the victim. At the appellant’s trial for manslaughter, the Crown argued that the appellant was liable for manslaughter either as a co-principal with the man alleged to have stabbed the victim, or as an aider and abettor of the stabber. The jury found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed the manslaughter conviction. He alleged, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on the law of causation with respect to co-principal liability. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It concluded that read as a whole, the jury instructions accurately put the law of causation as it applied to the appellant. Paciocco J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. He found that the trial judge twice misdirected jurors by understating the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” they could use in determining whether the appellant’s unlawful act amounted to a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death. Argued Date 2024-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Co-principal liability — Law of causation — Whether the trial judge erred by misdirecting the jury with respect to the “causation” element of unlawful act manslaughter — Whether the doctrine of “intervening act” applies in the context of a group assault — Criminal Code, s. 21(1)(a) Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:16:092024-05-31
(Publication ban in case)In July 2019, in two separate cases, the respondents appeared in the Court of Québec to answer charges for indictable offences that were punishable by a maximum of 14 years of imprisonment, but that had been punishable by a maximum of 10 years of imprisonment at the time they were allegedly committed. The respondents were thus entitled to a preliminary inquiry. On September 19, 2019, s. 535 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Cr. C.”), was amended and the right to a preliminary inquiry was abolished for an accused charged with an indictable offence punishable by less than 14 years of imprisonment. The respondents both requested a preliminary inquiry after September 19, 2019. Both requests were denied by the Court of Québec on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction followed the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. The Quebec Superior Court denied judicial review in each case. The Quebec Court of Appeal determined that the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. applies prospectively; it allowed both appeals and referred each case back to the Court of Québec for a preliminary inquiry. Argued Date 2024-02-14 Keywords Criminal law — Preliminary inquiry — Legislation — Prospective application of legislative amendments to preliminary inquiry rules — Interpretation — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that right to preliminary inquiry depends on law in force at time of commission of offence with which accused is charged — Whether accused charged with indictable offence has right to preliminary inquiry even if not personally liable to 14 years or more of imprisonment — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 535. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:41:052024-05-24
In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-24 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:22:012024-05-24
In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-23 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:00:102024-05-23
This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter.The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings.In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers.In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1.In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3.The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-22 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:37:202024-05-23
This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter.The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings.In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers.In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1.In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3.The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-21 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:05:562024-04-25
Appellants TransAlta Generation Partnership and TransAlta Generation (Keephills 3) (collectively, “TransAlta”) own coal-fired electrical power generation facilities in Alberta. The value of those properties is assessed as “linear property” for municipal taxation purposes. The Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, defines the term “linear property” and authorizes the Minister of Municipal Affairs to establish guidelines for assessing its value.In 2016, TransAlta entered into off-coal agreements with the province pursuant to which they agreed to cease coal-fired emissions by December 31, 2030; in exchange, the province agreed to pay TransAlta substantial sums annually for 14 years.On December 19, 2017, the Minister established the 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines (the “Linear Guidelines”), which set out the procedure for calculating all linear property assessments. The Linear Guidelines do not allow for off-coal agreements to be considered in assessing depreciation. TransAlta applied for judicial review which, among other things, challenged provisions of the Linear Guidelines that prevented the off-coal agreements from being considered in the assessment of depreciation as being ultra vires.The application judge found that the Linear Guidelines, including the impugned provisions, were within the Minister’s authority and lawfully enacted. She dismissed the application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal dismissed TransAlta’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-04-25 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Whether 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines discriminate without statutory authority — Either way, whether they are consistent with intent of Municipal Government Act, as required by s. 322(1)(i) — What standard of review applies — Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, ss. 322, 322.1. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:23:422024-04-24
The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-24 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:23:002024-04-23
The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-23 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:07:032024-04-11
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent, T.J.F., was charged with human trafficking and obtaining a financial or material benefit from human trafficking during a period from 2006 through 2011. The trial judge accepted that the respondent had engaged in threats, intimidation and injury towards the complainant; he characterized this as “past discreditable conduct” but not part of the actus reus of the offences alleged. The complainant testimony included evidence of exploitation and attempted exploitation, but the trial judge did not accept the complainant’s evidence due to issues with her credibility. The respondent was acquitted. On appeal by the Crown, a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred in treating the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct,” but it held that the error had no impact on the acquittal because exploitation and attempted exploitation depended upon the complainant’s testimony which the judge did not accept. The appeal was therefore dismissed.The dissenting judge would have held that the trial judge erred in law by misapprehending critical evidence and also concluded that the Crown would have been able to rely on the evidentiary presumption in s. 279.01(3), which was enacted in 2019. The dissenting judge concluded that there is a reasonable degree of certainty the verdict would not have been the same but for the judge’s error. She would have allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-03-27 Keywords Criminal Law — Offences — Evidence — Trafficking and obtaining financial or material benefit from trafficking — Credibility — Evidentiary presumption — Temporal application — Whether the trial judge’s erroneous characterization of the respondent’s violent conduct as “past discreditable conduct” rather than part of the actus reus raised a reasonable certainty that the verdict would not have been the same but for the error — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would be triggered in this case — Whether the evidentiary presumption in section 279.01(3) of the Criminal Code would apply retrospectively — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 279.01, 279.02, 279.04. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:05:142024-03-26
After consuming alcohol, Mr. Wolfe drove his vehicle on the wrong side of a divided highway for a considerable distance at night. He caused a head-on collision that seriously injured Mrs. Niazi and killed her husband and daughter. Mr. Wolfe was convicted on two counts of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 220(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and on one count of criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 221 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of incarceration with a global term of six years. The sentencing judge additionally ordered a driving prohibition for 10 years for each count of criminal negligence causing death and a driving prohibition for 7 years for the count of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the sentence. Argued Date 2024-03-26 Keywords Criminal law — Sentencing — Driving prohibition — Can a driving prohibition be imposed following conviction for criminal negligence causing death through the operation of a conveyance or criminal negligence causing bodily harm through the operation of a conveyance? Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:55:252024-03-26
This case involves a challenge to the validity of regulations adopted by the Agency to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in the course of international air travel.Parliament adopted the Transportation Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 10 (“TMA”), which amended the CTA by creating the new s. 86.11. This new provision requires the Agency, after consulting with the Minister of Transport, to make regulations imposing certain obligations on air carriers, notably in relation to flight delays, flight cancellations, denial of boarding, and loss of or damage to baggage.Pursuant to s. 86.11(2) of the CTA, the Minister issued the Direction Respecting Tarmac Delays of Three Hours or Less, S.O.R./2019-110 (the Direction) requiring the Agency to adopt regulations imposing obligations on air carriers to provide timely information and assistance to passengers in cases of tarmac delays of three hours or less.Around the same time, the Agency adopted the Regulations, imposing obligations, including liability, on air carriers with respect to tarmac delays, flight cancellations, flight delays, denial of boarding and damage or loss of baggage in the context of domestic and international air travel.The appellant airlines challenged numerous provisions of the new Regulations on the basis that they exceed the Agency’s authority under the CTA. They claim that the Regulations contravene Canada’s international obligations, in particular the Montreal Convention and many of the Regulations’ provisions are ultra vires because they have impermissible extraterritorial effects, which violate fundamental notions of international law.These matters went directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. It dismissed the appeal, except with respect to s. 23(2) of the Regulations which it found ultra vires of the CTA (this section deals with liability for temporary loss of baggage). Argued Date 2024-03-25 Keywords Transportation law — Air transport — Validity of Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (“Regulations”) adopted by Canadian Transportation Agency (“Agency”) to compensate air passengers for various delays, losses and inconveniences experienced in course of international air travel — Whether liability provisions of Regulations, when applied to international carriage by air, are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”), and ultra vires Agency’s regulation-making power under s. 86.11 of Canada Transportation Act, S.C. 1996, c. 10 (“CTA”), and therefore invalid — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred by deciding that expert evidence on issues of international law is inadmissible as a matter of law, and by striking those parts of appellants’ expert evidence addressing whether “state practice” relied upon by Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”) is “in the application of”, and consistent with Montreal Convention? Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:29:342024-03-22
Police seized a cellphone during a search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer. The phone was displaying incoming text messages on its screen. The police believed the messages revealed a transaction for heroin, which would likely be laced with fentanyl, was in progress.The police impersonated the drug dealer by responding to the text messages, and arranged to have the drugs delivered to the dealer’s residence. Applicant Dwayne Alexander Campbell arrived at the residence and was arrested. Mr. Campbell was charged under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). At trial, Mr. Campbell brought a motion to exclude evidence, claiming that his rights under s. 8 of the Charter had been infringed by the police action in using the dealer’s phone to communicate with him. The trial judge rejected Mr. Campbell’s claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages, and concluded that the likelihood that the drugs were laced with fentanyl created exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless use of the drug dealer’s cellphone. Mr. Campbell was convicted and sentenced.The Court of Appeal held that Mr. Campbell did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electronic communications, but that the police action was justified by the exigent circumstances doctrine. Consequently, there was no breach of Mr. Campbell’s s. 8 rights. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Campbell’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-03-21 Keywords Charter of Rights — Search and seizure (s. 8) — Enforcement (s. 24) — Exigent circumstances — Police seizing cellphone in search incident to the arrest of a known drug dealer — Incoming text messages from appellant visible on its screen — Police believing messages concerned impending drug deal involving fentanyl — Police impersonating drug dealer, facilitating drug transaction with the appellant via text message — Whether police breached appellant’s s. 8 rights by warrantless use of drug dealer’s cellphone to impersonate drug dealer and engage in electronic conversation with accused — Whether police action justified by exigent circumstances because the police reasonably believed the drug transaction may have involved fentanyl — Whether police breached the appellant’s s. 8 rights by intercepting private communications without authorization — Whether evidence obtained by s. 8 breaches should have been excluded — Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 11; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part VI Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:54:122024-03-20
Following a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Gabriel Boudreau, was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm as a result of a collision between him and the complainant. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge had erred by finding that he had taken part in a race with another driver, by improperly assessing the complainant’s testimony and by failing to consider some of the evidence. The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, as it was of the view that the verdict was not unreasonable, illogical or irrational. The trial judge, who had direct evidence on some aspects and circumstantial evidence on others, could convict the appellant of the offence based on that evidence.The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. In her view, the trial judge had made two errors that undermined the reasonableness of the verdict. She had rejected the testimony on the basis of an illogical inference even though the appellant’s version was consistent with the site of the damage and was confirmed by the complainant’s testimony. In addition, the judge’s finding that the complainant had been driving in the left lane well before the impact was contradicted by the complainant’s testimony. Argued Date 2024-03-20 Keywords Criminal law — Appeals — Unreasonable verdict — Evidence — Whether trial judge arrived at unreasonable verdict by drawing illogical inferences and by drawing inferences that were clearly contradicted by evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:02:132024-03-05
The appellant, Trevor Ian James Lindsay, is a constable with the Calgary Police Service. While processing an arrestee, an altercation occurred between the appellant and the arrestee that left the latter with serious injuries. The appellant was charged with aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code. At trial, the appellant’s defence included s. 25 of the Criminal Code, which protects peace officers from liability related to their lawful use of force. The trial judge concluded that s. 25 did not protect the appellant from criminal liability for his actions. A majority of the Court of Appeal agreed. However, Wakeling J.A., in dissent, would have held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant’s actions constituted an assault, and also that the trial judge erred in concluding that s. 25 did not apply. Wakeling J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-12-14 Keywords Criminal Law — Defences — Use of force by peace officer — Protection of peace officers — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that s. 25 of the Criminal Code did not protect the appellant from criminal liability — Whether the majority of the Court of the Appeal erred in upholding the trial judge’s decision that the prosecution had proven the elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt — Criminal Code, s. 25. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:06:262024-03-04
The appellant engaged in a sexual encounter with two other men in a park. A number of hours later, the body of one of those men was found in the park; he had died due to external neck compression. The appellant had mental health difficulties and had consumed both psychiatric medication and alcohol around the time he was in the park with the victim and the third man. The appellant had made several statements both before and after the victim’s death that he wanted to harm and kill gay men, and that he had at times carried a rope and a knife to do so. In the days following the killing, the appellant searched the internet for news with respect to the discovery of a body in the park.A jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree murder. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury had been appropriate. In dissent, Nordheimer J.A. would have allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the appellant’s mental health as it relates to the intent required for murder and (2) that the trial judge failed to provide a limiting instruction on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence. Nordheimer J.A. would have ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-12-15 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Non-direction amounting to misdirection — Need to review mental health evidence with jury — Need to include limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence — Whether Court of Appeal erred by holding that trial judge did not err in not relating mental health evidence to intent required for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred by holding that the trial judge did not err in not providing a limiting instruction for after-the-fact conduct evidence Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:15:472024-02-20
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, a police officer, was temporarily off work because of medical problems. During a meeting with a physician-arbitrator who was to determine whether his disability was permanent, the appellant misrepresented his work activities with his former spouse’s travel agencies. The physician-arbitrator found that his disability was permanent, and the appellant was therefore entitled to permanent disability benefits from his employer. The employer knew of some of the appellant’s work activities but did not tell the physician-arbitrator about them.The trial judge found that all the elements of the offence of fraud over $5,000 had been established. The appellant was convicted of one count of fraud. The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision, while the minority would have substituted a verdict of attempted fraud. Argued Date 2024-01-17 Keywords Criminal law — Offences — Elements of offence — Fraud — Deprivation — Concurrence between actus reus and mens rea — Proof of causation — Whether Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of Criminal Code — Whether majority of Court of Appeal interpreted essential element of deprivation too broadly — Whether victim’s prior knowledge of scheme prevents deprivation from being shown — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:12:472024-02-15
Appellant Daniel Hodgson was charged with second-degree murder following a death at a house party. The victim, a large man, had become aggressive towards the house owner and refused to leave. Mr. Hodgson, who had been sleeping in a nearby bedroom, was asked by a guest to help remove the victim from the house. The victim died after Mr. Hodgson applied a one-arm choke hold on him.Mr. Hodgson was acquitted at trial. The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Hodgson had the requisite intent for murder. On the lesser included offence of manslaughter, the trial judge concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hodgson did not act in self-defence pursuant to s. 34 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2024-02-15 Keywords Criminal Law — Defences — Self-Defence — Appellant charged with second-degree murder following an altercation at party — Trial judge finding no intent to murder, and Crown failing to disprove self-defence on the lesser included offence of manslaughter — Appellant acquitted — Court of Appeal setting aside acquittal and ordering new trial — Whether Court of Appeal exceeded its jurisdiction in concluding that the trial judge’s failure to infer intent for murder was a reviewable legal error — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was required to infer the intent for murder — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erroneously approached the issue of the reasonableness of the Appellant’s response from a purely subjective perspective — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 34. Notes (Nunavut) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:01:082024-02-12
(Publication ban in case)In the Court Martial, a military judge acquitted the respondent, Private D.T. Vu, of sexual assault under s. 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5 (“NDA”), that is to say, s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. It is alleged that the respondent performed a sex act on the complainant who was incapable of consenting to the act by reason of advanced intoxication. The judge concluded that the Crown did not prove part of the actus reus (being a lack of subjective consent) beyond a reasonable doubt.The appellant Crown appealed to the Court Martial Appeal Court. It submitted that the military judge erred in finding that the prosecution failed to prove a lack of consent or capacity to consent. Its submission rested on the proposition recognized in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, that the judge committed a legal error by failing to consider the entirety and cumulative effect of the evidence in reaching his conclusion on the issue. A majority of the appeal court (per Bell C.J. and Trotter J.A.) dismissed the appeal. It held the military judge did not err in law in his analysis leading to the respondent’s acquittal. Any findings the military judge made that the majority took issue with were held to have no bearing on the verdict reached. The majority further held that in the event it was incorrect on this point, it would rely upon s. 241 of the NDA, which states that “[n]otwithstanding anything in this Division, the Court Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice”. In dissent, McVeigh J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In her view, the military judge erred in law by failing to consider all of the evidence cumulatively, which led him to speculate improperly about alternative theories. These errors might have reasonably had a material bearing on the verdict. Further, the military judge erred by relying on improper inferences which, in effect, amounted to an insistence that the complainant’s intoxication had to be corroborated beyond the available evidence in this case. Argued Date 2024-01-16 Keywords Criminal law — Armed forces — Military Offences —Sexual Assault — Evidence — Whether the military judge failed to consider all of the evidence cumulatively — Whether the military judge assessed the evidence based on the wrong legal principles. Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:00:122024-02-12
After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Yves Caleb Jr. Charles, was convicted of assault with a weapon, using an imitation firearm in the commission of assault, and uttering threats. During the trial, a prosecution witness refused to cooperate, and the trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce an out of court statement made by the witness into evidence as hearsay. In the judge’s view, the statement had features of substantive reliability in light of the corroborative evidence and the circumstances in which the statement had been made. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons of Doyon and Cournoyer JJ.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, as he was of the view that the out of court statement in issue did not satisfy the threshold reliability requirement for being admitted into evidence. He found that the corroborative evidence was not relevant in analyzing the threshold reliability of the assertion made by the witness concerning the appellant’s conduct and words, and that the circumstances in which the statement had been made did not provide sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability. Argued Date 2024-01-18 Keywords Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Out-of-court statement — Corroborative evidence — Circumstances in which statement made — Whether results of search were considered as corroborative evidence, in accordance with principles enunciated in R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, for purpose of admitting K.A.’s statement into evidence — Whether circumstances of K.A.’s statement provided sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:05:132023-12-12
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)On March 23, 2022, the Quebec Court of Appeal issued a redacted version of its reasons, which it had originally delivered on February 28, 2022, allowing the respondent Named Person’s conviction appeal and staying the criminal proceedings brought against Named Person, a police informer. The trial judgment under appeal had not been made public, and all the details of the proceedings, which were held in camera, were unknown to the public. The Court of Appeal ordered that the original version of its judgment and all information in its record be sealed.After the Court of Appeal issued the redacted judgment, the media appellants filed a motion to have the confidentiality orders concerning the appeal record and the trial record lifted in whole or in part. The appellant the Attorney General of Quebec filed a motion to vary the sealing order applicable to the appeal record. The Court of Appeal dismissed the motions. Argued Date 2023-12-12 Keywords Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Procedure - Criminal law — Charter of Rights — Procedure — Informer privilege — Order that proceedings be held in camera and sealing order — Whether trial judge can proceed outside justice system, completely and totally in camera, without putting together record or revealing very existence of court proceedings, contrary to open court principle protected by s. 2(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether, even though police informer privilege is absolute, its unrestrained interpretation may displace constitutional principle of open court proceedings, as Court of Appeal suggested — In addition to identity and list of information that would automatically identify informer, for which there is absolute protection, what test and framework should apply to permit adversarial proceeding in order to decide what other information might identify police informer — When determining facts that may be published while still protecting police informer’s identity, whether judge who hears application should order that interested third parties be notified and have opportunity to be heard on these matters — Whether Court of Appeal erred in refusing to partially unseal its record on ground that this exercise seemed unworkable. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:17:292023-12-08
Respondent Joseph Power was convicted of two criminal offences in the 1990s. He served a term of imprisonment.In 2010 Mr. Power made inquiries about the process to obtain a pardon, but did not apply for one.In 2011, Mr. Power’s employer learned of his criminal record. He was suspended from work.Mr. Power applied for a pardon — now called a record suspension — in 2013 in order to continue working in his chosen field. However, two enactments since 2010 — the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act — had amended the Criminal Records Act. Transitional provisions in both of the amending acts gave them retrospective application to offences that had occurred before their coming into force. The combined effect of these enactments and their transitional provisions was to render Mr. Power permanently ineligible for a record suspension.Mr. Power lost his job and became ineligible for membership with provincial bodies governing his field of employment.The transitional provisions of both the Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act and the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which gave them retrospective application to offences committed prior to their enactment, were later declared unconstitutional.Mr. Power brought an action against the Crown, alleging that the adoption and application of the transitional provisions constituted conduct that was clearly wrong, undertaken in bad faith, and abusive of government power. He sought damages pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.Prior to trial, the appellant Attorney General of Canada sought a determination of questions of law, concerning whether the Crown could ever be held liable in damages in respect of the enactment of legislation that is later declared unconstitutional.The Court of Appeal of New Brunswick upheld the application judge’s determination of those questions, and dismissed the Attorney General’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Remedy (s. 24), Damages - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Remedy (s. 24) — Damages — Respondent convicted of criminal offences prior to certain amendments to regime for obtaining pardons, but transitional provisions applied the amendments retrospectively — Respondent seeking pardon after employer learned of criminal record, but amendments rendered respondent permanently ineligible for a pardon — Respondent losing his employment — Respondent seeking damages after transitional provisions declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for government officials and Ministers preparing and drafting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Whether the Crown may be held liable in damages for Parliament enacting legislation that is later declared unconstitutional — Limiting Pardons for Serious Crimes Act, S.C. 2010, c. 5 — Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1 — Criminal Records Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-47. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:09:312023-12-08
The respondent, British Columbia Securities Commission found that the appellants, Thalbinder Singh Poonian and Shailu Poonian, breached the Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, by engaging in conduct that resulted in the misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, a corporation’s shares. It then imposed both a disgorgement order and an administrative penalty against the Poonians.The Commission applied to the BCSC for an order declaring that the amounts owed to it by the Poonians were debts that would not be released by an order of discharge under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. The BCSC granted the Commission’s application. It concluded that the debts fell within two exemptions to the discharge of debts outlined at s. 178(1) of the BIA: the debts were fines, penalties or restitution orders imposed by a court (s. 178(1)(a)) and they resulted from obtaining property or services by false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation (s. 178(1)(e)). The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal. While it disagreed that the sanctions had been imposed by a court, it concluded that the BCSC had not erred in finding that the sanctions in this case fell within the exemption defined in s. 178(1)(e) of the BIA. The fact that the misrepresentation was not made to the creditor, in this case, the Commission, did not preclude the Commission from relying on the exemption. Argued Date 2023-12-06 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Securities - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Debts not released by discharge — Securities Commission finding appellants breached Securities Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 418, and imposing disgorgement order and administrative penalties — Courts below granting declaration that amounts appellants owe Securities Commission are not to be released by any order or discharge granted under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding Commission’s administrative monetary penalties and disgorgement orders survived Poonian’s discharge from bankruptcy — If so, whether Court of Appeal erred in finding creditors seeking to avail themselves of s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act did not have to prove they were same party debtor made direct representations to by fraud or fraudulent pretense — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 178(1). Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:07:172023-12-06
The appellant, John Aquino, was the directing mind of Bondfield Construction Company Limited (“BCCL”) and its affiliate, 1033803 Ontario Inc., commonly known as Forma-Con (“debtor companies”). He and the other appellants carried out a false invoicing scheme over a number of years by which they siphoned off tens of millions of dollars from both debtor companies. The respondents challenged the false invoicing scheme and sought to recover some of the money under s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and s. 36.1 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36. They asserted that the false invoicing scheme was implemented by means of transfers at undervalue by which Mr. Aquino and the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor. The appellants asserted that the principles of the common law doctrine of corporate attribution set out in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, did not permit the imputation of Mr. Aquino’s intention to either debtor company. The application judge imputed the fraudulent intention of Mr. Aquino to the corporate debtors. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeals. Argued Date 2023-12-05 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Doctrine of corporate attribution — Interpretation of requirement that debtor have intent to defraud, defeat or delay creditor, set out in provision of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that permits courts to declare transfers at undervalue void — Courts below holding intent requirement met by attributing intent of companies’ directing mind to the corporate debtors — Whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to reframe the common law corporate attribution doctrine, as formulated in Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662, and its progeny, within the bankruptcy context — Whether the Court of Appeal made an extricable error in law when it upheld the applications judge’s ruling to the effect that the true financial condition of the corporate debtors, at the time of the impugned transactions, was not “determinative” of whether its directing mind, as a matter of fact, had the requisite intent to defraud, defeat or delay the third-party creditors — Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 96. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:30:172023-12-05
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Mr. Tayo Tompouba was charged with sexual assault. On his first appearance, he was not advised of his right to apply for a trial in French, despite the court’s obligation to inform him of that right under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code. He was convicted following a trial in English. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that not advising Mr. Tayo Tompouba of his right was an error, but it applied the curative proviso to dismiss his appeal. It held that the right provided for in s. 530(3) is a procedural right, not a substantive right. Argued Date 2023-10-11 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Language of accused — French-speaking accused not advised of his right to be tried in official language of his choice — Whether curative proviso in s. 686 of Criminal Code can apply to violation of s. 530(3) of Criminal Code — Whether new trial must be ordered — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 530(3), 686(1)(b). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:31:362023-11-29
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed Forces who had various charges laid against them. They each filed a preliminary application in the Court Martial seeking a stay of proceedings because of an alleged infringement of their constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They argued that their right was infringed by an order by the Chief of Defence Staff dated October 2, 2019 regarding the designation of a commanding officer for purposes of considering disciplinary matters for military judges (“impugned order”). Captain Crépeau, in her application, also asked the tribunal to declare ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act to be of no force or effect, alleging that their combined effect was to allow the Chief of Defence Staff to issue an order, like the impugned order, relating directly to discipline for military judges and thus to permit the military hierarchy to exert pressure on a military judge presiding at a court martial. In a series of decisions, military judges concluded that there was an infringement of the accused’s right guaranteed by s. 11(d) of the Charter. In each of the proceedings, they made a similar declaration to the effect that the impugned order was an infringement of the right set out in s. 11(d) of the Charter. They also stayed the proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada allowed the Crown’s appeals, ruling that no informed person would conclude that there was an apprehension of bias or that the independence of courts martial was compromised. It dismissed Captain Crépeau’s cross-appeal.This appeal will be heard jointly with the appeals in files 39822, 40046, 40065 and 40103. Argued Date 2023-10-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Judicial independence, Armed Forces, Military offences - Charter of Rights — Right to be tried by independent and impartial tribunal — Constitutional law — Judicial independence — Courts martial — Armed forces — Military offences — Since R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, does the military status of military judges still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias? — Since Généreux, has there been significant societal change which dissipates this Court’s concern that the military status of military judges is a matter of practical necessity? — If so, does the military status of military judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter? — If so, is this violation justified under s. 1 of the Charter? — If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982? — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d) — National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, s. 165.21(1) . Notes (Federal) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:10:272023-11-16
In 1991, Newfoundland and Labrador reorganized its northeast Avalon municipalities, expanding St. John’s boundaries and triggering a new planning process for St. John’s. The Lynch property and others were zoned as “watershed” because they fall within the Broad Cove River Watershed, which feeds St. John’s municipal water supply. In 2011, the Lynches asked the City what sort of residential, agricultural, forestry or public utility uses the property could be put to. They were informed verbally that no development would be permitted. They then applied to develop a ten-lot residential subdivision. In a letter dated February 1, 2013, the City Manager rejected their application as being contrary to ss. 104 and 106 of the City of St. John’s Act and the development regulations which established the watershed zoning.The municipal water supply had been subject to statutory protection through limits on development since before the Crown Grant in 1917. In 1959, the City of St. John’s Act was amended to add the Broad Cove Watershed to the area within St. John’s control, even though it was not within the city itself. As a result, the Lynch property was subject to St. John’s pollution control and its powers of expropriation, and its use and development were restricted. Residential building was not expressly prohibited until 1964, when St. John’s amended the City of St. John’s Act to prohibit the erection of most buildings in the controlled area unless they were associated with existing private family dwellings. In 1978, these restrictions were softened to allow the City Manager to grant permission to build on the land. In 1992, St. John’s boundaries were expanded to include the Lynch property, so St. John’s general land use zoning applied to the property. The watershed zoning came into effect in 1994, and the resulting management plan, which included keeping St. John’s watersheds “as pristine as possible”, was adopted in 1996.The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal held that the City Manager’s decision to prevent any development in any manner, set out in the February 1, 2013, letter, constituted constructive expropriation: Lynch v. St. John’s (City), 2016 NLCA 35, at paras. 66-67 (“Expropriation Decision”). The Court of Appeal remitted the issue of compensation to the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities. In the course of determining compensation, the Board referred the following question to the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador under the Expropriation Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. E-19, s. 26(3), by special case:Whether the Lynches’ compensation should be assessed based on the uses permitted by the existing zoning, which are agriculture, forestry and public utility uses, or whether the existing zoning should be ignored and the value determined as if residential development were permissible.The applications judge granted compensation for constructive expropriation of property based on existing watershed zoning. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, ordering that compensation be determined without reference to watershed zoning. Argued Date 2023-11-16 Keywords Expropriation - Expropriation — Constructive expropriation — Compensation — Causation — How compensation for constructive expropriation should be assessed — Proper causation analysis for determining loss to landowner — Pointe Gourde principle — Whether regulations sufficiently linked to expropriation of property to justify application of Pointe Gourde principle. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:41:112023-11-16
Appellant Ummugulsum Yatar was injured in a motor vehicle accident. Ms. Yatar applied to her insurer, TD Insurance Meloche Monnex (hereafter, “TD”) for housekeeping and home maintenance benefits, as well as income replacement benefits (IRB). TD initially paid those benefits.About a year later, following insurance medical examinations, TD denied Ms. Yatar’s claim for housekeeping and home maintenance benefits. Several months after that, TD denied her IRB claim. Ms. Yatar brought an application before the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) to challenge the denial of her insurance benefits claim. The application was dismissed. She requested a reconsideration of the LAT decision, which was also dismissed.Ms. Yatar then brought an appeal on questions of law and an application for judicial review of the LAT reconsideration decision before the Divisional Court. The court dismissed both the appeal and the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Yatar’s appeal from the Divisional Court’s decision. Argued Date 2023-11-15 Keywords Administrative law - Boards and tribunals, Appeals, Judicial review - Administrative law — Boards and tribunals — Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) — Appeals — Judicial review — Appellant injured in motor vehicle accident, insurer denying claim for benefits — LAT dismissing appellant’s benefits claim — Appellant simultaneously appealing on questions of law and seeking judicial review on questions of fact and mixed fact and law — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the legislature’s decision to limit the right of appeal to pure questions of law restricted the availability of judicial review concerning other questions to rare or unusual cases — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable — Licence Appeal Tribunal Act, 1999, S.O. 1999, c. 12, Sch. G — Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8 — Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:18:302023-11-15
Bombardier inc. entered into a procurement contract with the respondent branch of the Greek government (HMOD) for ten firefighting amphibious aircraft. There was also an Offsets contract by which Bombardier committed to offset programs inviting Greek suppliers as subcontractors for the work, for a total credited value of 110% of the main contract. Bombardier was to pay up to 10% of this amount as liquidated damages if the Offsets contract was not fulfilled, which was secured by a letter of guarantee with the appellant. Bombardier arranged a corresponding letter of counter-guarantee issued by National Bank of Canada in favour of the appellant.A dispute arose under the Offsets contract. Bombardier filed a request for arbitration under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris. It later amended its request to include the issue of whether the Offsets contract was null and void for violating the principle of the free movement of goods under the laws of the European Union. Although at one point HMOD made an undertaking not to seek payment under the letter of guarantee while arbitration was pending, it later demanded payment of the US $13,868,354 from the appellant under the letter of guarantee. Bombardier sought and received interim injunctions against payment from Quebec courts and through an Interim Order of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal, and the appellant obtained an interim injunction from a Greek court. When a further injunction was denied by a Greek court, and with the imminent release of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal Award, HMOD served the appellant with an Extrajudicial Invitation Protest, ordering it, under penalty of law, to make payment under the letter of guarantee. Shortly after the appellant paid HMOD, the Final Award of the ICC Arbitral Tribunal was released, ruling that the Offsets Contract, including its terms pertaining to the liquidated damages and to a letter of guarantee, violated EU law and was null and void ab initio. When National Bank refused payment to the appellant under the letter of counter-guarantee, the appellant sought recovery through the courts of Quebec.The Superior Court of Quebec confirmed its jurisdiction and rejected the appellant’s demand for payment under the letter of counter-guarantee on the basis of the fraud exception. It held that the letter of counter-guarantee was unenforceable and enjoined National Bank from paying pursuant to it. The court homologated the ICC Arbitral Tribunal Final Award and ordered the HMOD to comply with it. The Quebec Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court decision, except to strike out that part of the trial judgment ordering HMOD to comply with the Final Arbitral Award. Argued Date 2023-11-14 Keywords Commercial law - Commercial law — Banks and banking operations — Letters of credit — Bank’s obligation to pay on presentation of letter of guarantee and counter-guarantee — Fraud exception — Scope and availability of exception — Jurisdiction of Quebec courts — What are the proper limits to the fraud exception to the autonomous nature of letters of credit — Could the Quebec courts rule that the appellant’s conduct amounted to bad faith when it abided by the judgments rendered by the court of competent jurisdiction — How is risk to be apportioned between the parties to a complex commercial transaction scheme utilizing letters of credit — Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R 59. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:38:102023-11-10
In 1850, the respondents, the Anishinaabe of the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, entered into two treaties with the Crown: the Robinson-Huron Treaty and the Robinson-Superior Treaty (“Treaties”). The Treaties provided for cessation of a vast territory in northern Ontario, and for payment, in perpetuity, of an annuity to the Anishinaabe. The initial agreed-upon sum was paid and an Order-in-Council declared them ratified and confirmed. In 1875, the annuity was increased to $4 (£1) per person, and, in 1877, the Huron and Superior chiefs petitioned successfully for arrears on the increase since the conditions for increasing the annuity had been met long before the increase. The annuity has not changed since.The Huron respondents initiated an action against Canada and Ontario seeking declaratory and compensatory relief related to the interpretation, implementation and alleged breach of the annuity provisions in the Robinson-Huron Treaty; the Superior respondents made the same claims under the Robinson-Superior Treaty. The actions were tried together, split into three stages. At Stage One, the Treaties were interpreted, at Stage Two, the defences of Crown immunity and limitations were addressed, and, at Stage Three, the remaining issues (inter alia, damages and the allocation of liability) stood to be addressed. This appeal relates to Stages One and Two. Stage Three of the trial commenced in February 2023, but a settlement of that stage was reached. Argued Date 2023-11-08 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Fiduciary duty, Appeals, Standard of review - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Interpretation of treaty promises— Fiduciary duty —Appeal — Standard of review — Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 — Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 — Duty of diligent implementation — Proper approach to interpretation of treaties — Appropriate standard of review for interpretation — Proper interpretation of augmentation provision in Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 —Whether Crown’s obligation to implement augmentation promise mandates specific outcomes capable of judicial determination — Whether Crown’s failure to implement augmentation promise in accordance with honour of Crown is appropriately remedied by a declaration — How limitations legislation is to be viewed given Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 polycentric exercise of discretion — Whether fiduciary duty can coexist with duty of diligent implementation — Whether trial judge erred in finding “procedural” ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether elements of sui generis fiduciary duty present. Aboriginal law —Appropriate standard of review — Existence of fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court was correct to overturn finding of ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court erred in failing to find existence of sui generis fiduciary duty — Whether majority on appeal was correct in observing that generalized fiduciary obligation has been largely replaced by honour of Crown. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:28:292023-11-09
A corporate taxpayer requested that the Minister of National Revenue exercise her discretionary power under s. 247(10) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) (“ITA”) to adjust the value of a non-arm’s length transaction downward, which would, in turn, reduce the amount of the taxpayer’s assessment. The Minister declined to do so. The taxpayer wished to challenge the Minister’s decision, but it was unclear whether the Tax Court or Federal Court had jurisdiction to do so. The parties put a stated question to the Tax Court to determine the jurisdictional issue: Where the Minister of National Revenue has exercised her discretion pursuant to s. 247(10) of the ITA to deny a taxpayer’s request for a downward transfer pricing adjustment, is that a decision falling outside the exclusive original jurisdiction granted to the Tax Court of Canada under s. 12 of the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2 and s. 171 of the ITA?The Tax Court judge determined that the Tax Court had exclusive jurisdiction to review the Minister’s decision. She held that the decision directly affected the computation of income, and was therefore part of the assessment. Appeals of assessments are within the Tax Court’s jurisdiction.The Federal Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion and allowed the Crown’s appeal. The decision is part of the process of the assessment, and the Tax Court only has the power to hear appeals of the product of that process. Furthermore, correcting an error in the Minister’s decision requires a power to quash or issue an order of mandamus, and the Tax Court does not have those powers. Argued Date 2023-11-09 Keywords Courts - Jurisdiction, Income tax - Courts —Jurisdiction — Income tax — Whether review of exercise of Minister’s power under subsection 247(10) of Income Tax Act is within Tax Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:13:212023-11-09
In 1850, the respondents, the Anishinaabe of the northern shores of Lakes Huron and Superior, entered into two treaties with the Crown: the Robinson-Huron Treaty and the Robinson-Superior Treaty (“Treaties”). The Treaties provided for cessation of a vast territory in northern Ontario, and for payment, in perpetuity, of an annuity to the Anishinaabe. The initial agreed-upon sum was paid and an Order-in-Council declared them ratified and confirmed. In 1875, the annuity was increased to $4 (£1) per person, and, in 1877, the Huron and Superior chiefs petitioned successfully for arrears on the increase since the conditions for increasing the annuity had been met long before the increase. The annuity has not changed since.The Huron respondents initiated an action against Canada and Ontario seeking declaratory and compensatory relief related to the interpretation, implementation and alleged breach of the annuity provisions in the Robinson-Huron Treaty; the Superior respondents made the same claims under the Robinson-Superior Treaty. The actions were tried together, split into three stages. At Stage One, the Treaties were interpreted, at Stage Two, the defences of Crown immunity and limitations were addressed, and, at Stage Three, the remaining issues (inter alia, damages and the allocation of liability) stood to be addressed. This appeal relates to Stages One and Two. Stage Three of the trial commenced in February 2023, but a settlement of that stage was reached. Argued Date 2023-11-07 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Fiduciary duty, Appeals, Standard of review - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Interpretation of treaty promises— Fiduciary duty —Appeal — Standard of review — Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850 — Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 — Duty of diligent implementation — Proper approach to interpretation of treaties — Appropriate standard of review for interpretation — Proper interpretation of augmentation provision in Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 —Whether Crown’s obligation to implement augmentation promise mandates specific outcomes capable of judicial determination — Whether Crown’s failure to implement augmentation promise in accordance with honour of Crown is appropriately remedied by a declaration — How limitations legislation is to be viewed given Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 polycentric exercise of discretion — Whether fiduciary duty can coexist with duty of diligent implementation — Whether trial judge erred in finding “procedural” ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether elements of sui generis fiduciary duty present. Aboriginal law —Appropriate standard of review — Existence of fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court was correct to overturn finding of ad hoc fiduciary duty — Whether appeal court erred in failing to find existence of sui generis fiduciary duty — Whether majority on appeal was correct in observing that generalized fiduciary obligation has been largely replaced by honour of Crown. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:15:172023-10-23
The private communications of two teachers, recorded on their personal, password-protected log were read and captured by screenshots taken by their school principal, and then used by the respondent school board (“Board”) to discipline them. The union filed a grievance against the written reprimand issued to the teachers (“Grievors”) claiming the Board violated the Grievors right to privacy by assessing private digital information without reasonable cause and using that information as the basis for an investigation that led to the discipline.By the time the grievance was heard, the written reprimands had been removed from the Grievors’ records. But the parties agreed to move forward with the issue of the alleged breach of the right to privacy.The arbitrator dismissed the grievance against the Board. The majority of the Divisional Court upheld the arbitrator’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the award of the arbitrator. Argued Date 2023-10-18 Keywords Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Charter of Rights — Unreasonable search and seizure — Reasonable expectation of privacy — Private communications of teachers captured by screenshots taken by school principal and used for discipline purposes — What standard of review applies to labour arbitrator’s decision adjudicating employee’s privacy claim — Whether Charter applies to school boards — Scope and content of employee’s privacy rights in workplace, either under s. 8 of Charter or common law. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:32:502023-10-23
The appellant, Don Johnson, was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder by a jury. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed his appeal, finding that it was open to the trial judge to leave party liability with the jury. Nordheimer J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. In his view, there was an insufficient evidentiary foundation to leave the route of party liability with the jury, as there was no air of reality to the suggestion that, if the appellant was not the shooter, he aided the actual shooter in the commission of the murders. The instructions were also inadequate, as the trial judge did not adequately set out the requirements that had to be met to prove that route. Argued Date 2023-10-13 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Party liability — Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in finding that party liability was properly left to the jury as a route to conviction? — In the alternative, did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in finding that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury on party liability were adequate?. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:00:052023-10-23
Pine Valley Enterprises Inc. (“PVE”) contracted with Earthco Soil Mixtures Inc. (“Earthco”) for the supply of topsoil for use in a project. After reviewing dated test results for “R Topsoil,” it placed an order for 3,678 cubic yards of “Screened topsoil with extra Organics added.” The contract included exclusion provisions that allowed PVE to test the soil prior to shipment, and that, if PVE waives its right to testing, Earthco is not responsible for the “quality” of the material.PVE waived its right to test the soil. After delivery, testing revealed that the topsoil significantly differed from the earlier test results. PVE was forced to remove the topsoil and then sought compensation from Earthco, which in turn disclaimed responsibility because PVE had waived its right to test the soil before shipment. PVE brought an action against Earthco for damages.The trial judge found that the contract was for a “sale by description” within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.1. He held that the topsoil delivered did not correspond to the description in the contract, contrary to s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act. The trial judge also found, however, that the parties had expressly agreed to absolve Earthco of liability for variations in soil composition that amount of discrepancies in the description of the goods, as permitted by s. 53 of the SGA. Therefore, he dismissed PVE’s action.The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the contract was for a “sale by description” and that there was a discrepancy between the description of the goods in the contract and the goods delivered. However, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in using the factual matrix of the contract to determine that the exclusion clauses ousted s. 14 of the Sale of Goods Act. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed PVE’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-10-17 Keywords Sale of goods - Sale of goods — Sale by description — Implied condition as to description — Goods described with reference to quality — Whether statements as to quality can form part of an item’s description Appeals — Courts — Standard of review — Contractual interpretation — Standard of appellate review applicable to trial judge’s interpretation of exclusion clauses — Did the trial judge err in law by relying on the factual matrix of the contract to interpret the exclusion clauses? — Did the Court of Appeal err in reviewing the trial judge’s decision on a standard of correctness? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:04:562023-10-23
On September 22, 1877, the Blackfoot Confederacy and the Crown executed Treaty 7, which established Reserve No. 148, the largest reserve in Canada. It is the home of the Kainai, or Blood Tribe. Under the Treaty, the size of the reserve was to be established through a formula promising “one square mile for each family of five persons, or in that proportion for larger and smaller families”. The Blood Tribe has long claimed that the actual size of its reserve did not accord with that promised by the Treaty and, in 1980, commenced an action in the Federal Court.For decades the action sat in abeyance. In 2016, the court held phase I of the trial of the action, for the purpose of receiving oral history evidence from aging members of the Blood Tribe. Phase II commenced in 2018 to hear fact and expert witness evidence, and to make a determination on liability.At the completion of phase II, the trial judge found that the Blood Tribe’s claims were discoverable more than six years before the action was commenced in 1980 and, with the exception of a claim for breach of treaty, were therefore time-barred through the operation of The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209 and s. 39 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.The trial judge held that an action for breach of a treaty commitment could not be pursued in a Canadian court prior to the advent of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Therefore, for the purposes of the limitations statute, time for a breach of treaty claim only began to run in 1982.The trial judge found that Canada was in breach of its treaty commitment, and that the size of the Reserve was understated by 162.5 square miles. The Crown appealed. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the Federal Court’s judgment to state that all claims of the Blood Tribe were time-barred. Argued Date 2023-10-12 Keywords Aboriginal law - Treaty rights, Limitation of actions - Aboriginal law — Treaty rights — Treaty 7 — Limitation of actions — Breach of treaty as cause of action —Whether breach of treaty was actionable in Canadian courts prior to the coming into force of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Whether limitation periods for breach of treaty claims began to run prior to the passage of s. 35 — Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 . Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:15:452023-06-13
(SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)A journalist with the CBC made an application under the Act for disclosure of the mandate letters addressed from the Premier of Ontario to each minister setting out’s the Premier’s policy priorities for the minister’s mandate. The Cabinet Office opposed the disclosure on the basis of s. 12(1) of the Act, the introductory language of which provides that a government head shall refuse to disclose a record where the disclosure would reveal the substance of deliberations of the Executive Council or its committees.In Order PO-3973, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario ordered disclosure of the mandate letters to the CBC. He determined that a record not listed at subparagraphs (a) to (f) will qualify under the opening words of s. 12(1) if the context or other information would permit accurate inferences to be drawn as to actual Cabinet deliberations at a specific Cabinet meeting. The words do not encompass the outcome of the deliberative process, such as policy choices. The Commissioner found that Cabinet Office must provide sufficient evidence to establish a linkage between the content of the record and the actual substance of Cabinet deliberations, and concluded that neither the content and context of the letters nor the evidence and representations of Cabinet Office met the test under section 12(1). The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review and the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, with Lauwers J.A. dissenting. Argued Date 2023-04-18 Keywords Access to information - Exemptions, Mandate, Legislation, Interpretation - Access to Information – Access to records – Exemptions – Cabinet records – Mandate letters – Legislation – Interpretation – Whether confidential communications in respect of policy initiatives and development, prepared by the Premier of Ontario for his Cabinet ministers, are protected by the Cabinet records exemption – Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F. 31, s. 12(1). Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:38:512023-06-13
(PUBLICATION BAN)After a trial in the Court of Québec, the respondent, Olivier Chatillon, was convicted of one count of sexual assault of a child. The trial judge held that the prosecution’s case could be based on the admissions made to the professionals who had assessed him, although he had met with them during an entirely voluntary therapeutic process to receive treatment for problems associated with substance abuse and sexual deviance. The Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Vauclair J.A. and concurred in by Healy J.A., granted the motion for leave to appeal, allowed the appeal and acquitted the respondent. It declared that the admissions were inadmissible in evidence based on its analysis of the Wigmore criteria for privilege. Mainville J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the respondent’s appeal on the ground that the admissions were admissible because they were not privileged. By consenting to the disclosure of his admissions, the respondent had expressly waived their confidentiality. Argued Date 2023-03-15 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Admissions — Wigmore test — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in finding respondent’s admissions inadmissible on ground that they were privileged under Wigmore test. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:26:342023-06-13
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Following a judge-alone trial, the appellant, Mr. Hay, was acquitted of one count of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The appellant conceded that the complainant did not consent to anal intercourse on September 13, 2019. The only issue on appeal was whether Mr. Hay had an honest but mistaken belief in the complainant’s communicated consent. Following a s. 276 voir dire, the trial judge admitted evidence of a previous sexual encounter on August 24, 2019.The trial judge found there was an air of reality to the appellant’s defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. She concluded that the Crown had failed to prove the necessary mens rea and acquitted him. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, quashed the acquittal and entered a conviction for sexual assault. It found the trial judge erred in law both by admitting the evidence of previous sexual conduct and by finding there was an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent. Argued Date 2023-05-19 Keywords Criminal law - Offences, Evidence, Defences - Criminal law — Offences — Sexual assault — Consent — Evidence — Defence — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by conflating the actus reus for sexual assault (consent) with the mens rea (belief in communicated consent or a mistaken belief in communicated consent) — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by reversing the trial judge’s decision admitting evidence of previous sexual acts on the s. 276 application — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by reversing the criminal standard of proof to place an onus on the appellant to establish his innocence — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in substituting its own view of the facts contrary to the trial judge’s findings in relation to the testimony of the appellant — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred by requiring proof of explicit consent as a prerequisite for the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent to apply. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:05:182023-06-13
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The complainant was intoxicated, and eventually passed out or fell asleep in the respondent’s bedroom. She testified that she woke up to find the respondent on top of her with his penis inside her vagina. The respondent denied having sex with the complainant. The respondent was convicted of sexual assault. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2023-05-18 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Judgments — Sexual assault — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge relied on speculative reasoning in accepting the complainant’s evidence — Whether there was no merit to the respondent’s alternate argument regarding alleged misapprehensions of evidence, and the appropriate remedy was to restore the conviction. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:37:152023-05-17
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)An accused was charged with several offences. Before the jury selection process began, a ban on publication was imposed on all pre-trial applications in the proceedings pursuant to s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code. A consortium of major media outlets applied to have the ban clarified and declared applicable only after the jury is empaneled. The motion judge dismissed the application. Argued Date 2023-05-17 Keywords Criminal law - Publication bans - Criminal law — Publication bans — Whether a publication ban pursuant to s. 648 of the Criminal Code applies to proceedings before a jury is empaneled? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:10:182023-05-16
(CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The respondent Frédérick Silva was charged with four counts of murder and one count of attempted murder based on incidents that occurred on February 21, 2017, and December 20, 2018. On November 22, 2019, the prosecution laid five charges by direct indictment. On August 2 and October 15, 2021, respectively, the Superior Court dismissed Mr. Silva’s motion for a stay of proceedings and Garofoli motion. It also made orders under s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Cr. C.), prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to the two judgments. Further to those judgments, and by consent of the parties, Mr. Silva was tried by a judge alone, without a jury, on four of the five counts. On November 16, 2021, he formally recognized that the prosecution had discharged its burden on each essential element of the four offences through a nolo contendere proceeding. On January 27, 2022, Mr. Silva was convicted on the four counts. The parties agreed that the last count, which was for second degree murder, would be separated from the indictment and that Mr. Silva would have a trial by judge and jury on that count in May 2022. Before the trial began, La Presse brought a motion to lift the orders prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to the two judgments. On March 11, 2022, the Superior Court dismissed the motion. On May 6, 2022, Mr. Silva filed a nolo contendere proceeding on the last count, leading to the cancellation of the jury trial. Argued Date 2023-05-16 Keywords Criminal law - Publication bans - Criminal law ? Publication ban ? Orders prohibiting publication, broadcasting and transmission in relation to judgments on voir dire ? Whether s. 648 of Criminal Code applies prior to jury selection ? Whether Superior Court erred in applying Dagenais/Mentuck test ? Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 648. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:11:032023-05-15
The appellant, George Zacharias, was convicted under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, for possession of 101.5 pounds of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking. The main issue at trial was whether Cst. MacPhail, who conducted a traffic stop of Mr. Zacharias’ truck, had reasonable suspicion to enter into an investigative detention and deploy a sniffer dog. The trial judge found that the initial investigative detention and the sniffer dog search were unlawful and breached the ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights of Mr. Zacharias to be free from unreasonable search and arbitrary detention. Applying the test in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, the trial judge then found that the first two factors did not strongly favour exclusion of the evidence and that the third one favoured inclusion. The evidence was therefore admitted.A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Zacharias’ appeal, declining to consider his arguments regarding the additional breaches that were neither included in his Charter notice nor argued at trial, as it would have been unfair for an appellate court to make findings of fact of new breach arguments. Further, the majority concluded that while the trial judge did not expressly include the s. 9 Charter breach in her consideration of the second stage of the Grant analysis, her failure to do so did not affect the result. In dissent, Khullar J.A. would have allowed Mr. Zacharias’ appeal, excluded the drug evidence and other evidence seized, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal. In her view, while there was no reviewable error at the first and third stage of the Grant test, the second Grant factor strongly favoured exclusion of the evidence. The trial judge only considered the exterior search of the vehicle by the sniffer dog, but there were several more Charter breaches. Balancing the three factors together, Khullar J.A. found that admitting the evidence would undermine the reputation of the criminal justice system in the eyes of a reasonable person informed of all the relevant circumstances. Argued Date 2023-05-15 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Arbitrary detention (s. 9), Search and seizure (s. 8), Enforcement (s. 24) - Constitutional Law — Charter of Rights — Arbitrary detention — Search and seizure — Enforcement — Exclusion of evidence — Whether the trial judge properly considered all the relevant Charter-infringing state conduct. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:18:352023-04-21
The respondent, the Association des cadres de la Société des casinos du Québec (Association), was formed in 1997 under the Professional Syndicates Act, CQLR, c. S-40. Seventy percent of the operations supervisors assigned to the gaming tables at Casino de Montréal are members of the Association. The supervisors are the fifth level of management and are front-line managers at the appellant employer, Société des casinos du Québec inc. (Société). The Société is a subsidiary of the Société des loteries du Québec responsible for four casinos, including Casino de Montréal. Given that each casino’s operations are divided into three areas — gaming tables, slot machines and poker rooms — the Association’s members make up a majority of the supervisors in all three areas combined. Since its creation, the Association’s goal has been to secure recognition from the employer so that it can represent the supervisors and negotiate their conditions of employment. In November 2009, the Association filed a petition for certification with the Commission des relations du travail (which in 2016 became the Administrative Labour Tribunal (ALT)) under ss. 25 et seq. of the Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27. The filing of that petition allegedly arose out of numerous failed attempts by the parties to negotiate changes to a memorandum of understanding entered into in 2001. In the petition, the Association also asked that the exclusion of managers from the definition of “employee” in s. 1(l)(1) of the Labour Code be declared constitutionally inoperable against the Association and its members on the ground that the provision infringed the freedom of association guaranteed in s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 (Quebec Charter). The ALT declared that s. 1(l)(1) infringed the freedom of association guaranteed by the two charters to the persons covered by the Association’s petition for certification and that the section was of no force or effect in the context of the petition.The Superior Court allowed the application for judicial review filed by the Société, and the Court of Appeal allowed the Association’s appeal. Argued Date 2023-04-20 Keywords Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Freedom of association, Labour relations, Certification - Charters of Rights - Freedom of association - Labour relations - Certification - Association of managers - Casino - Definition of employee in Labour Code of province of Quebec - Whether s. 1(l)(1) of Labour Code infringes s. 2(d) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and s. 3 of Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12 (Quebec Charter) - If so, whether infringement constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society within meaning of s. 1 of Canadian Charter and s. 9.1 of Quebec Charter - Whether reviewing court must defer to administrative tribunal’s findings of mixed fact and law where constitutional validity of statute is challenged - Labour Code, CQLR, c. C-27, s. 1(l)(1) - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(d) - Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, ss. 3, 9.1. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:57:182023-04-19
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual interference committed against a minor under the age of 16 between August 1, 2013 and July 19, 2015. During that period, he and the complainant had full sexual intercourse four times. He also pleaded guilty to a charge of child luring arising from interaction with the complainant on social media between February 25 and September 13, 2015. The trial judge sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 10 months on the count of sexual interference and for 5 months concurrent on the count of child luring. She also found that the mandatory minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. for the offence of child luring was disproportionate in view of the circumstances in which it had been committed in this case and the respondent’s own circumstances, and that it was therefore contrary to s. 12 of the Charter. As a result, she declared it to be of no force or effect with respect to the respondent. The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the sentence of imprisonment for child luring and from the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Levesque J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, increased the sentence for child luring from 5 to 12 months and set aside the declaration that the minimum sentence was of no force or effect. Argued Date 2023-02-15 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred in law in downplaying gravity of offence of child luring based on considerations not relevant for sentencing purposes — Whether majority erred in law in finding that once underlying offence (in this case sexual interference) has been committed, subsequent interaction is less serious, even though it has same objective — Whether s. 172.1(2)(a) Cr. C. is contrary to s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it is appropriate and reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society in accordance with s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(a). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:23:332023-04-17
On December 24, 2015, the appellant was charged with crimes relating to the shooting of two individuals. The appellant’s jury trial for second degree murder, attempted murder and assorted firearm charges was scheduled to commence on November 5, 2018. However, it was adjourned to October 28, 2019. The appellant applied for a stay of proceedings for violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The trial judge dismissed his application holding that, although the net delay exceeded the ceiling of 30 months under Jordan, it was justified because this was a transitional case where the transitional exceptional circumstance applied. The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter in connection with the victim who died. He was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of discharging a firearm with intent to wound in connection with the second victim and of possession of a restricted firearm without a license. The appellant appealed the convictions and alleged that the trial judge erred in dismissing the s. 11(b) application and in his instructions to the jury on how they should approach the evidence in this case. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It found that the delay was justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance and that the trial judge’s assessment of the entire delay under the Morin framework was required as part of the transitional exceptional circumstance analysis. Further, the majority concluded that the impugned passages of the jury charge did not reveal error. Nordheimer J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a stay of proceedings. He found that the trial judge erred on his reliance of the transitional exceptional circumstance to excuse the delay and that the Crown had ample time to adapt to the Jordan framework. Moreover, he found that there was a serious error in the trial judge’s instructions to the jury. Argued Date 2023-04-17 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Charge to jury - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Trial delay — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Transitional exceptional circumstance — Charge to jury — Whether the trial judge erred by concluding that the transitional exceptional circumstance justified the presumptively unreasonable delay in the appellant’s trial — Whether the trial judge misdirected the jury with respect to the presumption of innocence and burden of proof — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:09:052023-03-26
The Government of Alberta sought the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1 (“IAA”) (found in Part 1 of Bill C 69, entitled An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28) and one of its associated regulations, the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”). The questions posed via Order in Council 160/2019 were as follows:1. Is Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28, unconstitutional in whole or in part, as being beyond the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?2. Is the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285, unconstitutional in whole or in part by virtue of purporting to apply to certain activities listed in Schedule 2 thereof that relate to matters entirely within the legislative authority of the Provinces under the Constitution of Canada?The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta was of the opinion that the IAA is ultra vires Parliament, and that the IAA and Regulations are unconstitutional. Greckol J.A., dissenting, was of the opinion that the IAA and Regulations are a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate on the matter of the environment. Argued Date 2023-03-22 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Environmental law - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Environment — Whether Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (“IAA”), is intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”), are intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its characterization of the pith and substance of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its classification of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to disapply the IAA and Regulations. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:55:132023-03-26
The Government of Alberta sought the Court of Appeal of Alberta’s opinion on the constitutionality of the Impact Assessment Act, S.C. 2019, c. 28, s. 1 (“IAA”) (found in Part 1 of Bill C 69, entitled An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28) and one of its associated regulations, the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”). The questions posed via Order in Council 160/2019 were as follows:1. Is Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28, unconstitutional in whole or in part, as being beyond the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?2. Is the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285, unconstitutional in whole or in part by virtue of purporting to apply to certain activities listed in Schedule 2 thereof that relate to matters entirely within the legislative authority of the Provinces under the Constitution of Canada?The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta was of the opinion that the IAA is ultra vires Parliament, and that the IAA and Regulations are unconstitutional. Greckol J.A., dissenting, was of the opinion that the IAA and Regulations are a valid exercise of Parliament’s authority to legislate on the matter of the environment. Argued Date 2023-03-21 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Environmental law - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Environment — Whether Part 1 of An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (“IAA”), is intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019 285 (“Regulations”), are intra vires the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1867 — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its characterization of the pith and substance of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its classification of the IAA and Regulations — Whether the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in its application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to disapply the IAA and Regulations. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:11:552023-03-22
(PUBLICATION BAN)The respondent was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, two offences perpetrated on the complainant when she was between six and eight years old. The convictions were based on the complainant’s unsworn, videotaped police statement, which the trial judge admitted into evidence by application of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, based on the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, concluding that the trial judge erred in law by admitting the out-of-court statement into evidence. MacPherson J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal from conviction. Argued Date 2023-01-10 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law – Evidence – Admissibility – Hearsay – Videotaped out-of-court statement given by complainant – Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out-of-court statement by (i) finding that the statement met the requirements of threshold reliability; and (ii) finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate the allegations. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:22:452023-03-20
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The respondent, H.V., pleaded guilty to a child luring offence committed between July 31 and August 9, 2017, which was prosecuted summarily. During sentencing, the respondent argued that the 6-month mandatory minimum sentence provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, was unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In his view, a sentence of imprisonment would be unjustified. The prosecution sought a term of imprisonment of between 9 and 12 months along with probation.The Court of Québec declared that the 6-month mandatory minimum sentence was of no force or effect in relation to the accused, suspended the passing of sentence and imposed 2 years of probation with an obligation to perform 150 hours of community service.The Superior Court allowed the appeal and affirmed that the mandatory minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) Cr. C. was of no force or effect in relation to the accused under s. 12 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1; it declared the mandatory minimum sentence to be invalid and of no force or effect and set aside the sentence imposed at trial. It sentenced the accused to 90 days’ imprisonment to be served intermittently and 3 years of probation, including 150 hours of community service. It maintained the other terms and conditions imposed and orders made at trial.The Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal, upholding the 90-day sentence of imprisonment and the declaration that the minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment provided for in s. 172.1(2)(b) Cr. C. was invalid. It held that the Superior Court had not imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence that did not reflect the objective and subjective seriousness of the crime committed and that the Superior Court had not erred in law in finding s. 172.1(2)(b) to be constitutionally invalid. Argued Date 2023-02-16 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Child luring — Whether s. 172.1(2)(b) of Criminal Code infringes s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Charter — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 172.1(2)(b) — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 12. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:58:342023-03-20
At trial, the appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree murder. The appellant had refused to retain counsel subsequent to the preliminary inquiry and was adamant that he wanted to represent himself. Two separate amicus curiae were appointed to assist the court at different times; however, he refused to co-operate with either. The appellant appealed the convictions and alleged that the perceived fairness of the proceedings had been tainted due to the trial judge’s failure to appoint a partisan amicus curiae at an early stage of proceedings, with instructions to take on the key responsibilities of defence counsel. A majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta found that there was no trial unfairness arising from the role of the amicus curiae in this case, and dismissed the appeal. It held that the appellant made the full answer and defence he wanted to. In dissent, O’Ferrall J.A. found that there was a miscarriage of justice. He would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial at which the appellant would be represented by defence counsel or an amicus curiae conferred with sufficient authority to advocate on his behalf, independent of the appellant’s wishes. Argued Date 2023-03-14 Keywords Criminal law - Trial - Criminal law — Trial — Appointment of amicus curiae — Role of amicus curiae — Self-represented accused — Trial fairness — Did the trial judge’s failure to appoint amicus curiae with a sufficient adversarial mandate result in a miscarriage of justice. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:46:392023-02-14
The appellant was charged with multiple offences in relation to a home invasion robbery that took place on or about June 24, 2017. After stealing the homeowner’s possessions, the intruders drove off in his truck. The truck was located 11 hours later. A cigarette butt was seized by police from underneath the driver’s seat and tested for DNA, which returned a single profile matching the appellant. The trial judge convicted the appellant of breaking and entering to steal a firearm, two counts of robbery, and disguise with intent. Various other charges were conditionally stayed. The appellant appealed the convictions, but the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed his appeal. The majority held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence related to the appellant’s recent possession of the stolen truck, or err in relying on the doctrine of recent possession to infer the appellant’s guilt for the home invasion robbery. It also held that the verdicts of guilt were reasonable. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and substituted verdicts of acquittals on all counts. She concluded that the trial judge erred in his application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession and that the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable. Argued Date 2023-02-14 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Assessment, Reasonable verdict - Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Doctrine of recent possession — Reasonable verdict — Whether the verdicts of guilt were unreasonable — Whether the lower courts erred in the application of the law of the doctrine of recent possession — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta erred in law in drawing a negative inference on appeal because the appellant did not testify at trial. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:09:242023-02-10
In 2018 and 2019, the Minister of Education, Culture and Employment of the Northwest Territories denied six applications for admission to French-language schools made by non-rights holder parents. The ineligibility of their children was assessed according to the criteria established in the Ministerial Directive — Enrolment of Students in French First Language Education Programs developed by the government of the Territories. Because none of the criteria in the Directive applied in the circumstances, the parents asked the Minister to exercise her residual discretion to authorize the admission of the six children concerned, which was denied. The non-rights holder parents and the school board applied for judicial review of the Minister’s decisions. In two judgments, the Northwest Territories Supreme Court set aside the Minister’s decisions on the ground that there had been no proportionate balancing of the protections guaranteed by s. 23 of the Charter and the government’s interests. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeals and restored her decisions. The court found that the chambers judge’s reasoning on constitutional values had proceeded on the mistaken assumption that the case involved constitutional rights. The families in question did not qualify under s. 23 because they were not rights holders, and they therefore had no legal or statutory right or expectation to have their children attend the French-language schools. Argued Date 2023-02-09 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Administrative law - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Minority language educational rights — Ministerial directive — Administrative law — Discretion — Right to use French in court proceedings — Simultaneous interpretation — Children of non-rights holder parents — Minister denying applications for admission to French-language minority schools — Decisions set aside at first instance but restored on appeal — Whether Minister had to consider purpose of s. 23 in her decision-making process — Whether Minister’s denials were reasonable — Whether there was infringement of right to use French in courts protected by s. 19(1) of Charter and s. 9(1) of OLA — In alternative, whether right to natural justice was breached — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 19(1) and 23 — Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. O-1, s. 9(1). Notes (Northwest Territories) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:13:152023-02-10
The appellants, who were charged with various offences related to the large scale trafficking of cannabis, were arrested at the same time in more than one judicial district. They were divided into four different groups for separate trials. The appellants in the first group brought a motion for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process based on a series of infringements of the rights of the accused, and primarily their right to counsel.On August 27, 2018, Dumas J. of the Superior Court entered a stay of proceedings on the ground that the police conduct had undermined the integrity of the justice system. He noted that the infringement of the right to counsel was the most serious infringement. On May 7, 2019, at a hearing before Dumas J., the parties agreed that the decision rendered concerning group 1 would apply to the accused in the other groups. The proceedings against all the other accused were therefore stayed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of August 27, 2018 and May 7, 2019 staying the court proceedings, and ordered a new trial. It found that the trial judge necessarily had to assess the situation of each accused individually, since a remedy could be granted only to a person whose own constitutional rights had been infringed. That error in itself justified a new hearing. Argued Date 2023-02-08 Keywords Constitutional law - Charter of Rights, Enforcement (s. 24), Abuse of process - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement — Stay of proceedings — Abuse of process — Residual category — Standing — Infringement of right to counsel — Given that infringement of personal right is not determinative in application for stay of proceedings based on residual category, what standing is required to seek remedy in this category through s. 24(1) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether Crown can appeal conclusion of judgment that ends proceedings even though Crown specifically asked trial judge to reach such conclusion. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:46:452023-02-08
The appellant, Cindy Dickson, is a member of the respondent Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation (“VGFN”) in the Yukon Territory; she resides in Whitehorse, instead of the VGFN’s Settlement Lands, approximately 800km away, for family medical reasons and other socio-economic reasons. Ms. Dickson sought to stand for election to the Council of the VGFN. However, the VGFN constitution specifies that any Councillor must reside on the Settlement Land (the “residency requirement”); it also states that if an eligible candidate for Chief or Councillor does not reside on Settlement Lands during the election, and wins their desired seat, they must relocate to the Settlement Lands within 14 days of election day. Given that Ms. Dickson was unwilling to move to the Settlement Lands, the VGFN Council declined to remove the residency requirement from the constitution, and rejected Ms. Dickson’s candidacy for the position of Councillor. Ms. Dickson then sought a declaration in the Yukon Supreme Court that the residency requirement was inconsistent with her right to equality protected and guaranteed by s. 15(1) of the Charter, could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter, and was therefore of no force or effect.The chambers judge issued a number of declarations, concluding that while the Charter applies to the VGFN Council and to the residency requirement in the VGFN constitution, the residency requirement at its core does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter. However, the time limit for relocation specified in the residency requirement — “within 14 days” — does infringe s. 15(1), and should be severed from the requirement and declared to be of no force and effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the declaration of invalidity was suspended for 18 months).Alternatively, if this was incorrect and the residency requirement does infringe the s. 15(1) equality right, even without the time limit, the chambers judge concluded that s. 25 of the Charter would apply so as to “shield” the residency requirement (albeit with severance of the words “within 14 days”) from a finding of infringement. Argued Date 2023-02-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Non-criminal), Application (s. 32), Right to equality (s. 15), Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Treaty rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Charter of rights — Application — Right to equality — Discrimination based on aboriginality-residence — Aboriginal peoples — Treaty rights — Self-government — First Nation constitution requiring elected Band councillors to relocate to settlement lands within 14 days of election — Appellant’s candidacy for councillor rejected for refusing to relocate if elected — Appellant challenging constitutional validity of residency requirement — Various declarations issued, including that Charter applies to First Nation’s residency requirement, that time limit in requirement infringes right to equality, but that s. 25 of Charter operates so as to shield requirement from review — Whether scope of “other rights and freedoms” that “pertain to aboriginal peoples of Canada” set out in s. 25 of Charter includes residency requirement — Whether court required to conduct full analysis of Charter right engaged, including s. 1, or whether application of s. 25 means collective rights need not be balanced with other interests — Whether Charter applies to residency requirement in constitution of self-governing First Nation — Whether residency requirement inconsistent with Charter, including whether analogous ground of “aboriginality-residence” rigidly applies in all circumstances of Indigenous governance — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 15, 25, 32. Notes (Yukon Territory) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Sup 0:003:40:212023-02-01
(PUBLICATION BAN)At trial, the appellant was acquitted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault respecting the complainant, a person under the age of 16 years. A majority of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered a new trial. It held that the trial judge engaged in impermissible stereotypical reasoning when assessing the complainant’s credibility by relying on the stereotypes that a victim could not be happy to see her abuser regardless of her age and circumstances, and that a victim will exhibit avoidant behaviour around her abuser if she were truly being abused. In dissent, White J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In his view, the trial judge did not rely on any myth or stereotype about sexual assault when assessing the complainant’s credibility. Argued Date 2022-12-01 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence - Criminal law — Evidence — Credibility — Stereotypical reasoning — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in ruling that the trial judge relied upon impermissible stereotypes of victims of sexual abuse when he assessed the complainant’s credibility. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Publication ban on party) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0056:062023-01-18
In 2017, the AMF brought an action before the FMAT alleging that the appellants participated in a transnational pump and dump scheme by improperly influencing or manipulating the price of a stock in contravention of the Quebec Securities Act, CQLR, c. V-1.1.According to the AMF, the appellants, who are residents of B.C., made financial transactions through offshore companies incorporated in several countries with bank accounts in Europe. AMF alleged that they acted in concert to acquire the shares of a Nevada company (Solo), give it a legitimate face and promote its business for the purpose of fraudulently increasing the value of its shares and then selling them for a profit, for distribution among themselves. Solo’s shares are traded on an over-the-counter market in New York. The AMF alleged that at all material times, Solo was under the direction of a Québec resident and was a reporting issuer in Québec with a business address in Montreal. It also alleged that the misleading press releases and promotional materials, a portion of which originated in Montreal, were accessible to Québec residents and that approximately fifteen investors in Québec lost a total of $5,000 as a result of the activities. AMF’s action sought to have the FMAT order the appellants to cease any activity in respect of a transaction in securities; prohibit them from acting as directors or officers of an issuer, dealer, adviser or investment fund manager for five years; and impose administrative penalties on them, all pursuant to ss. 265, 273.3, 195.2, 199.1(1) and 273.1 of the Securities Act.The appellants brought preliminary motions for declinatory exceptions arguing that the FMAT was without jurisdiction. The FMAT denied the appellants’ motions and confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the action. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the application for judicial review, and the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2023-01-18 Keywords Constitutional law - Private international law, Extraterritoriality, Legislation, Interpretation, Administrative law, Boards and tribunals, Jurisdiction - Constitutional law — Constitutional applicability — Private international law — Extraterritoriality — Jurisdiction of Québec Court — Legislation — Interpretation —Administrative law — Boards and Tribunals — Jurisdiction — Did the Court of Appeal err in deciding that the provisions of the C.C.Q. setting out the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities (articles 3134 to 3145) do not apply to administrative proceedings before the Financial Markets Administrative Tribunal (FMAT) — Did the Court of Appeal err in deciding that the FMAT can assert adjudicative jurisdiction over out-of-province defendants based on legislative or territorial jurisdiction — Did the Court of Appeal err in affirming the FMAT’s jurisdiction over the application by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) against Sharp — Are the provisions of the C.C.Q. governing the International Jurisdiction of Québec Authorities applicable to administrative proceedings before a Québec tribunal in the context of disputes relating to the implementation of provincial laws concerning property and civil rights — If the provisions of the C.C.Q. are not applicable, must the Court’s jurisdiction be founded on the presence of specific and predetermined presumptive connecting factors relating to the alleged violations or is it sufficient for the Court to find some form of connection deemed sufficient between Québec and the overall context within which the violations took place — Is the test met in the circumstances of this case — Can article 3148 C.C.Q. be applied by analogy to ground the jurisdiction of Québec courts and tribunals in proceedings of a different nature than a personal action of patrimonial nature — Can article 3136 C.C.Q. apply to the present action in the absence of a request to this effect before the FMAT and in the absence of any evidence as to the impossibility that the 0:002:17:582023-01-17
In September 2017, the police commenced an investigation related to the purchase of virtual gift cards with fraudulent credit card information. The police was told that the fraudulent online transactions used two IP addresses. The police obtained warrants to search the two residences associated with the IP addresses. The appellant was arrested and charged with 33 offences relating to the possession and use of third parties’ credit cards and personal identification documents, and firearms. The appellant filed a notice alleging the breach of his rights under s. 8 of the Charter as well as other rights. The trial judge found that it was not objectively reasonable to recognize a subjective expectation of privacy in an IP address used by an individual. She concluded that there was no breach of s. 8. The appellant was eventually convicted of 13 of the original 33 counts, which he appealed. The majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed the appeal. It found that the trial judge correctly interpreted the scope of the law that governed her s. 8 analysis. The majority concluded that she applied the correct interpretation to her factual findings, which reveal no palpable or overriding error. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. She found that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP addresses and that his s. 8 rights were violated. Argued Date 2023-01-17 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Search and seizure (s. 8) - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Search and seizure — Investigation related to purchase of virtual gift cards with fraudulent credit card information — Police obtaining internet protocol (“IP”) addresses to locate residences — Whether reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to IP address — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:44:372023-01-12
The appellants, Mr. Ponce and Mr. Riopel, served as presidents of three companies grouped together under the name “Le Groupe Excellence” controlled by the respondent shareholders, Mr. Rhéaume and Mr. Beaulne. Rhéaume and Beaulne founded Excellence in the late 1970’s, but their working relationship ultimately broke down due to a revenue share dispute. A few years later, the appellants bought the respondents’ interests in Excellence. Rhéaume and Beaulne were unaware, however, that the appellants had been negotiating the sale of Excellence to a third party, Industrial Alliance. Shortly after acquiring the shares of Rhéaume and Beaulne, the appellants sold their interests in Excellence for a significant profit. The respondents allege that the sale of Excellence by the appellants stripped them of a business opportunity. They applied to the courts and claimed joint and several damages against the appellants. The Superior Court granted the respondents’ action in part. The court determined that the appellants used their roles to obtain information for their own benefit, and breached duties of good faith, integrity and loyalty owing to Rhéaume and Beaulne as shareholders. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal. Although it found that the trial judge made an error in determining that the duty of loyalty was owed to the shareholders, as opposed to the corporation, this error was not determinative since the judge also relied on the obligation of good faith and the duty to inform to conclude that the appellants were at fault towards the respondents. Argued Date 2023-01-12 Keywords Civil liability - Commercial law - Civil liability — Duty to inform — Duty of good faith — Loss of chance — Commercial law — Corporations — Directors of corporation buying out controlling shareholders — Subsequent offers by third party to buy interests of directors of corporation — Interest of third party not made known to former controlling shareholders — Former controlling shareholders alleging improper appropriation of business opportunity by directors — Scope of duties owing to controlling shareholders — Given its distinction in Quebec civil law with the duty of loyalty, whether the duty to inform, deriving from the duty to act in good faith, places the responsibility on a prospective buyer to inform a prospective seller about the market for the sale — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in upholding the award of disgorgement in the absence of a duty of loyalty — Whether the Court of Appeal of Quebec erred in awarding damages for a loss of chance to negotiate in the absence of a basis for disgorgement. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:02:152023-01-11
At trial before judge and jury, the appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi was convicted of various gun-related offences including one count of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code. The charges resulted from a police investigation dubbed “Project Traveller”.A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Brown J.A. with Trotter J.A. concurring) dismissed the three grounds the appellant raised pertaining to his conviction appeal. First, the majority rejected his argument that the trial judge erred in admitting the opinion evidence of the Somali-language translator regarding portions of intercepted communications. Second, the majority held that the trial judge did not err in failing to charge the jury adequately on the definition of “criminal organization” in s. 467.1(1) of the Criminal Code. The appellant had submitted on appeal that the charge did not provide guidance on the requisite degree of structure and continuity mentioned in R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33, to constitute a criminal organization. On this point, the majority concluded that defence counsel’s lack of objection was indicative of the legal adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions on this definition given the evidence heard by the jury and the positions taken by the parties in closing submissions. Third, the majority held the trial judge did not err in charging the jury that they could consider certain after the fact conduct.In dissent, Paciocco J.A. only disagreed on one ground of the conviction appeal: he would have concluded that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately charge the jury on the “criminal organization” definition in s. 467.1(1) and would have therefore set aside the appellant’s conviction for the count setting out the offence at s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code of “participating in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of trafficking weapons” and ordered a new trial on that charge. Argued Date 2023-01-11 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury, Offences - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Definition — Participating in activities of criminal organization for purpose of trafficking weapons — What constitutes adequate jury instruction on definition of “criminal organization” under s. 467.1 (1) of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, with respect to essential elements of structure and continuity? Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:06:232022-12-08
By Order in Council 1288 2019 of December 18, 2019, the Quebec government submitted the following question to the Quebec Court of Appeal:Is An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, ultra vires the Parliament of Canada under the Constitution of Canada?The Court of Appeal answered that the Act, which came into force on January 1, 2020, is constitutional, except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which are not. It found that the pith and substance of the Act is to ensure the well being of Indigenous children by fostering culturally appropriate services that will reduce their over representation in provincial child welfare systems. The well being of Indigenous persons is part of the essence of the federal head of power set out in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and the national principles stated in general terms in the Act are compatible with Quebec’s child welfare legislation. The Court of Appeal also held that the right of self government in relation to child and family services falls within s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Examining the framework established by the Act for circumscribing the exercise of this generic Aboriginal right, the court found that the aim of s. 21 is to make the doctrine of federal paramountcy applicable to Indigenous laws. Because this alters the fundamental architecture of the Constitution, s. 21 is ultra vires. The same is true of s. 22(3), which provides that Indigenous laws prevail over any conflicting or inconsistent provisions of provincial legislation. Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not authorize Parliament to give absolute priority to an Aboriginal right. Argued Date 2022-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers, Aboriginal peoples (s. 35), Aboriginal rights, Self-government - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Pith and substance — Aboriginal peoples — Aboriginal rights — Self government — Child and family services — Whether An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, is ultra vires Parliament of Canada under Constitution of Canada — Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) — Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:30:012022-12-06
After a trial in the Court of Québec, the appellant, Mikerlson Vernelus, was convicted of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. A vehicle with the appellant and two other individuals in it had been stopped by the police and the appellant had been arrested for possession of cannabis. During the search incident to the arrest, the police had found a firearm in a bag belonging to the appellant. Testing of that weapon had found DNA only from the vehicle’s other occupant. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s testimony, as she did not find it credible. She then held that the defence as a whole did not raise any reasonable doubt as to knowledge, control and possession of the weapon found, including the appellant’s consent. The judge also noted that the fact that the appellant was calm when the weapon was found confirmed his knowledge that the weapon was hidden in his bag, which was under his control.The Quebec Court of Appeal, for the reasons given by Moore J.A. and concurred in by Pelletier J.A., dismissed the accused’s appeal based on the unreasonableness of the verdict. The majority explained that the offence of possession of a firearm is grounded in control and knowledge. The trial judge had found from the evidence that these elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was open to her to make such a finding. First, the bag in which the weapon was found was the appellant’s bag, the weapon was not visible from the outside and was in the centre of the bag with clothing around it, and the bag was close to the appellant. These facts established the appellant’s control of the weapon. Second, the judge could infer from these indicia that the appellant knew of the weapon’s presence and thus that he was guilty. The fact that the appellant had not placed the weapon in the bag himself did not matter. The prosecution could establish, and had established here, that the weapon had not been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge. The majority explained that, at the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, a possible, speculative inference that amounts to pure conjecture is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.Schrager J.A., dissenting, would have set aside the judgment and substituted acquittals on the offences of possession of a firearm and breach of a recognizance. In his view, the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge had misapplied the third step of R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In light of the possibility that the firearm had been placed in the bag without the appellant’s knowledge, which was a reasonable inference from the evidence, the appellant had not been given the benefit of the reasonable doubt to which he was entitled because the evidence did not reasonably support the guilty verdict. Argued Date 2022-12-06 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Reasonable inference — Verdict — Unreasonable verdict — Whether majority of Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that trial judge had not made error and had not reached unreasonable verdict by finding that appellant had possession of firearm for which he was charged, even though that inference was not only reasonable one that could be drawn from evidence or from lack of evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0058:382022-12-05
The parties were married for three years. Both parties came into the marriage with considerable assets, including houses, vehicles, items of personal property, RRSPs, savings and pensions. Shortly after the parties separated, the respondent invited the applicant to a reconciliation meeting with mutual friends. At the end of the meeting, the respondent presented the applicant with a separation agreement she had drawn up. Neither party received independent legal advice, but they both signed the agreement. The agreement did not deal with all the family property issues as the family home was not specifically dealt with in a final way. Shortly thereafter, the respondent’s counsel drafted a formal interspousal agreement but the applicant refused to sign it or engage in any discussion with the respondent. The respondent issued a petition seeking a divorce and costs in December 2015 and the applicant issued a counter petition in May 2017 claiming for the first time a family property division as well as occupational rent.The trial judge ordered that the respondent pay to the applicant the sum of $62,646.98 (this being the sum of the $70,646.98 equalization of non-taxable assets less the $8,000 equitable factor regarding the agreement), and either an RRSP rollover of $37,089.69 or a further cash payment of an additional $27,817.27. The Court of Appeal set aside the trial judgment and directed that the division of the family property should be made in accordance with the December 2015 values. The applicant was thus ordered to pay the sum of $4,914.95 to the respondent to equalize the distribution of their family property. Argued Date 2022-12-05 Keywords Family law - Family law — Division of property — Agreements — Whether an analysis under Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, should be applied when considering a non binding agreement — If the Miglin analysis is applied to a non binding agreement, whether it is open to the court to find the agreement is enforceable but depart from the terms of the agreement —Whether an appellate court must apply the correct standard of review. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:10:512022-12-02
The respondent, David Edward Furey, was convicted of breaking and entering into a dwelling, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and breach of an undertaking. At trial, the judge admitted, for the truth of its contents, a videotaped out of court statement given by one of the complainants, who subsequently died of unrelated causes. The statement was given to the police soon after the altercations.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Furey’s appeal from convictions, set aside the decision of the trial judge, including the voir dire decision regarding the admissibility of the complainant’s out-of-court statement, and ordered a new trial. The majority concluded that the trial judge applied an erroneous statement of the law — that where there is greater necessity, less reliability is acceptable. As a result of her reliance on this statement, the trial judge erred in admitting the complainant’s out of court statement for the truth of its contents: she permitted the admissibility of the hearsay evidence without requiring that the requisite degree of reliability be established. In dissent, Knickle J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In her view, the trial judge committed no error in her application of the principled approach to the hearsay evidence, as she engaged in the skeptical and cautious analysis that was required before admitting the statement, including that the two criteria of necessity and reliability must be assessed in tandem and with flexibility. Argued Date 2022-12-02 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility, Hearsay - Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Videotaped out of court statement given by complainant who died before trial — Whether the majority of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing the appeal, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to apply the correct legal principles in assessing the “threshold” admissibility of an out of court statement. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0055:492022-12-01
Before the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, the appellant, Ryan David Clark, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. The main issue at trial was the identity of the person who had beaten the deceased to death.On appeal, Mr. Clark argued that the trial judge erred by failing to address the frailties of eyewitness evidence in his instructions to the jury, particularly with regard to in-court identification by two witnesses. He also argued that the trial judge erred by allowing other witnesses to provide bad character and post-offence conduct evidence and by failing to adequately caution the jury in relation to that testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The jury instructions properly equipped the jury to understand its task in evaluating all of the eyewitness identification evidence, including the in-court identification. It was adequately prepared to examine the frailties of the evidence of the two particular witnesses and to determine if it would accept their testimony as credible and reliable in accordance with the law. The trial judge also did not err in regard to post-offence conduct and bad character evidence and the verdict was not unreasonable.In dissent, Leurer J.A. would have allowed Mr. Clark’s appeal and ordered a new trial. In his view, the jury charge did not adequately equip the jurors to deal with the frailties of the in-court eyewitness identification evidence in this case. Argued Date 2022-11-30 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Eyewitness evidence — Identification — In-court identification — Caution — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution alerting jurors that a witness’s testimony had limited value for the purposes of identifying the assailant who killed the victim, and that this witness’s in court identification of the appellant had no evidentiary value — Whether the trial judge erred in not providing an adequate jury instruction or caution on the problematic nature of another witness’s in-court identification of the appellant, and that it would be dangerous to attribute to this identification any degree of certainty greater than what she had communicated to police prior — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law by concluding the instructions on eyewitness identification evidence did not give rise to reversible legal error. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:01:262022-12-01
Section 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA”) provides that permanent residents or foreign nationals are “inadmissible on security grounds” for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada”. The Minister alleged that both appellants were foreign nationals who were inadmissible under s. 34(1)(e) of the IRPA.The issue before the Immigration Board and the Immigration Appeal Division was whether s. 34(1)(e) applied only where there is a connection to national security. Both agreed with the Minister that it did not. In their view, s. 34(1)(e) operates whether or not there is a connection to national security.On judicial review, the Federal Court quashed the decisions in the two cases.Both cases were heard together at the Federal Court of Appeal. It allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Federal Court and dismissed the applications for judicial review. It found the administrative interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) was reasonable and answered the following certified question:Q.: Is it reasonable to interpret para. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in a manner that does not require proof of conduct that has a nexus with “national security” or the “security of Canada”?A. Yes. Argued Date 2022-11-29 Keywords Immigration - Judicial review - Immigration — Inadmissibility on security grounds for “engaging in acts of violence that would or might endanger the lives or safety of persons in Canada” — Judicial review — Interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) — Whether reasonable interpretation of s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA requires national security nexus — Whether s. 34(1)(e) of IRPA can apply to conduct that does not require a nexus to “national security” or “security of Canada” — How should reviewing courts determine whether a legislative provision can bear only one reasonable interpretation and what constraints will bear on this assessment — Whether Federal Court of Appeal erred in overturning Federal Court’s findings that tribunal decisions were unreasonable. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:51:062022-11-18
(Publication in case)(Sealing order)Since the 2004 agreement between Canada and the United States known as the Safe Third Country Agreement, the U.S. has been designated a safe country pursuant to s. 159.3 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002 227. As a result, claimants arriving at a land port of entry to Canada from the U.S. are deemed to be ineligible for refugee protection in Canada pursuant to s. 101(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. The individual applicants are among those claimants who were deemed ineligible. The applicants ABC and her children are from El Salvador, claiming refugee status based on gang violence and gender-based persecution. The Homsi/Al Nahass applicants are a Muslim family from Syria who left the U.S. following the issuance of the first travel ban by the U.S. government. The applicant Ms. Mustefa is a Muslim woman from Ethiopia who was detained after her attempt to enter Canada from the U.S. The applicant organizations were granted the right to participate as public interest parties. The collective applicants challenged the Canadian government’s failure to review the ongoing designation of the U.S. under s. 159.3 of the Regulations as rendering that provision ultra vires and not in conformity with s. 101(1)(a), 102(2) ad 102(3) of the Act. They also claimed that the designation and their ineligibility to claim refugee status infringed their rights guaranteed under sections 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and were not justified under s. 1.The Federal Court rejected the ultra vires argument but held that s. 159.3 of the Regulations and s. 101(1)(e) of the Act infringed s. 7 of the Charter and were not justified under s. 1. The court found it unnecessary to consider whether the provisions also infringed s. 15. The appellate court allowed the appeal, dismissed a cross-appeal on the ultra vires and s. 15 issues, set aside the Federal Court decisions, and dismissed the applications for judicial review. Argued Date 2022-10-06 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Non-criminal), Right to security of person (s. 7), Fundamental justice (s. 7), Right to equality (s. 15), Reasonable limits (s. 1), Immigration, Inadmissibility and removal, Judicial review - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to security of the person — Fundamental Justice — Right to equality — Reasonable limits — Immigration — Inadmissibility and removal — Judicial review — Appellants seeking judicial review of decisions regarding their ineligibility to claim refugee protections in Canada after arriving at a land port of entry from the United States — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in refusing to determine the constitutionality of the operative provisions — Whether the gender equality claim under s. 15 of the Charter must be adjudicated — Whether s. 159.3 of the Regulations is ultra vires — Whether the combined effect of s. 159.3 of the Regulations and s. 101(1)(e) of the Act infringe s. 7 of the Charter and violate the s. 7 rights of refugee claimants — If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter — Whether the combined effect of s. 159.3 of the Regulations and s. 101(1)(e) of the Act infringe s. 15 of the Charter — If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 and 15 — Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 101(1)(e), 102(2) and 102(3) — Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, S.O.R./2002-227, s. 159.3. Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Publication ban on party) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to th 0:003:34:142022-11-18
(PUBLICATION BAN)At trial, the respondent, Randy William Downes, was convicted of two counts of voyeurism contrary to s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. He was found to have surreptitiously taken photographs of adolescent male hockey players in stages of undress in a dressing room while he was coaching.A majority of the Court of Appeal (per Willcock J.A. with Grauer J.A. concurring), allowed Mr. Downes’ appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. The majority explained that, while it was open to the trial judge to find nudity was expected in the dressing room in which the offences were found to have occurred, the conflicts in evidence regarding whether nudity was expected at the time the photos were taken were not addressed. In dissent, Dickson J.A. would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the characterization of “a place” under s. 162(1) does not include a temporal use component. In her view, the relevant inquiry was whether the place in which the impugned conduct occurred is a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, regardless of the expected use of that place specifically when the conduct occurred. Argued Date 2022-10-13 Keywords Criminal law - Elements of offence, Evidence - Criminal law — Voyeurism — Elements of the offence — Whether the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether nudity was reasonably expected at the place and at the time where the offence was alleged to have occurred — Whether s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? — If so, is the infringement a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s. 1 of the Charter? — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 162(1)(a). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:30:122022-11-15
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE) (SEALING ORDER) (CERTAIN INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC)The respondents were found guilty of six counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. The respondents filed applications for stays of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging abuses of process due to police misconduct during the investigation, and also because of their conditions while in pre-trial custody. The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the applications. Finding that the serious nature of the offences committed by the respondents could not justify a stay of proceedings, the trial judge allowed the Crown’s applications for summary dismissal, dismissed the respondents’ applications for stays of proceedings, and entered convictions. The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the respondents’ ground of appeal relating to non-disclosure of evidence, but allowed the respondents’ appeal in part, quashed the convictions but affirmed the verdicts of guilt, and ordered that the matter be remitted to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the respondents’ applications for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process. Argued Date 2022-10-04 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Abuse of process - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Stay of proceedings — Abuse of process — Summary dismissal of applications — Whether, and to what extent, a judge is permitted to assess or weigh an applicant’s proposed evidence when determining whether to permit a full evidentiary hearing on an application for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process — Whether the Court of Appeal applied too low a threshold for determining whether a full evidentiary hearing is required on an application for a stay of proceedings for abuse of process. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:06:142022-11-09
The appellant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration that exceeded eighty milligrams of alcohol in one hundred milliliters of blood. The appellant was released from custody on an undertaking, a condition of which was that she would not operate a motor vehicle. The appellant spent the 21 months that elapsed between her initial appearance and sentencing under a driving prohibition as a condition of her release. The Provincial Court sentencing judge imposed a $1,000 fine and decided a fit punishment in the circumstances was the one-year minimum driving prohibition. He then addressed whether he could take into account her 21-month presentence driving prohibition. Deciding he could, the appellant was not subjected to any further driving prohibition. The Crown’s appeal of that decision was dismissed by the summary conviction appeal judge. A majority of the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, varied the Provincial Court decision to include a one-year driving prohibition, and stayed the execution of prohibition order. The dissenting justice would have dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2022-11-08 Keywords Criminal law - Sentencing - Criminal law – Sentencing – Mandatory minimum sentences – Did the sentencing judge commit an error of law by granting time served on a mandatory driving prohibition order – Is time served on a driving prohibition pursuant to an accused’s interim release deductible from a mandatory minimum driving prohibition on sentence that would leave the remaining time to be served on sentence below the mandatory minimum – Does this Court’s direction on the issue in Lacasse that dealt with a discretionary order on sentence which said pre-trial driving suspension must be deducted from the time on sentence apply to mandatory minimum prohibition orders? Notes (New Brunswick) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:42:162022-11-04
The appellants, Yves Des Groseillers and BMTC Group Inc., appealed assessments made by the respondent, the Agence du revenu du Québec (“ARQ”). In the course of tax audits, the ARQ added amounts to Mr. Des Groseillers’s taxable income as additional employment income. Those amounts represented the total value of the stock options donated by Mr. Des Groseillers to registered charities, for which he had claimed tax credits. The ARQ therefore added the amounts to BMTC’s payroll as well.The Court of Québec allowed Mr. Des Groseillers’s application and vacated the notices of assessment. It allowed BMTC’s application in part and referred the notices of assessment to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment. In the court’s view, although the transactions were subject to the special rules on the issuance of securities to employees, it would find that Mr. Des Groseillers had not received any benefit, because the evidence showed that he had not received any consideration for the donation and that he had not paid anything to acquire the options. The ARQ could not rely on the presumption set out in another division of the statute to the effect that the disposition of property is deemed to be made at its fair market value, because the special rules form a complete code. The Court of Appeal allowed the ARQ’s appeal, set aside the Court of Québec’s judgment and rendered the decision that ought to have been rendered, that is, it dismissed the appeals brought by Mr. Des Groseillers and BMTC from the notices of assessment. It held that the special rules do not exclude the application of the presumption. Argued Date 2022-11-03 Keywords Taxation - Income tax, Assessment - Taxation — Income tax — Assessment — Stock options — Charitable donation — Whether donation of stock options by individual to registered charity gives rise to taxable employment benefit where donor receives no actual consideration — Taxation Act, CQLR, c. I-3, ss. 48, 50, 54, 422. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:42:512022-11-02
Prior to the transactions at issue, the appellant, Deans Knight Income Corporation, was a Canadian public corporation that had approximately $90 million of unused non-capital losses and other deductions. It sought to realize the value of these tax attributes and entered into an agreement with a corporation that had expertise in arranging such transactions. From 2009 to 2012, the appellant deducted a majority of its tax attributes to reduce its tax liability. Following the issuance of reassessments to deny the deductions, the appellant successfully appealed to the Tax Court, but the decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal. Argued Date 2022-11-02 Keywords Taxation - Taxation — Corporate restart transaction — Deductible losses — Non-capital losses — General anti-avoidance rule — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in relying on the GAAR to conclude that “actual control” was Parliament’s intended test under ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1) of the ITA — Whether the Federal Court of Appeal erred in concluding, contrary to the trial judge’s findings, that the avoidance transactions resulted in an abuse of ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1) of the ITA — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), ss. 37(6.1), 111(5) and 127(9.1). Notes (Federal) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:29:202022-11-02
The respondent was driving a vehicle, had exited the public highway, and was on private property when the police officer approached him. The officer testified that they did not see any signs of impairment prior to stopping the respondent and there was nothing unusual about his driving. The officer explained that they were exercising their authority to conduct random sobriety checks pursuant to s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. At the stop, the officer spoke to the respondent, observed obvious signs of impairment, and arrested him. The respondent was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle while “over 80”. The respondent’s summary conviction appeal was allowed; the conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal. Argued Date 2022-11-01 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Arbitrary detention (s. 9) - Charter of Rights — Arbitrary detention — Exclusion of evidence —Was the police stop authorized by s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 — If there was a breach of s. 9 of the Charter, should the evidence have been excluded under s. 24(2) — ss. 9, 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:06:342022-10-15
The appellant, Glen Hansman, is a man and teacher, and at the time of the events in question, he was also the President of the British Columbia Teacher’s Federation (“BCTF”). The respondent, Barry Neufeld, is an elected public school board trustee in the Chilliwack School District in B.C.The B.C. Minister of Education, after consultations with stakeholders, published age-appropriate tools and resources for teachers of children from Kindergarten through Grade 12, with the goal of promoting inclusive environments, policies and procedures in schools regarding sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI 123”). Mr. Neufeld posted negative comments and criticisms about the implementation of SOGI 123 materials on his Facebook page. His comments attracted significant criticism and media attention. In his capacity as President of the BCTF, Mr. Hansman was interviewed about Mr. Neufeld’s post. Mr. Neufeld alleged that Mr. Hansman defamed him in that interview and in subsequent statements that were broadcast and published in the press and online. Public debate on SOGI 123 materials continued for over a year.Mr. Neufeld filed a defamation lawsuit against Mr. Hansman. Mr. Hansman applied to have Mr. Neufeld’s action dismissed under s. 4 of the Protection of Public Participation Act, S.B.C. 2019, c. 3 (“PPPA”), commonly known as anti-“SLAAP” legislation which allows for the possibility of early dismissal of “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation”.The application judge granted Mr. Hansman’s application for dismissal of Mr. Neufeld’s defamation action, finding that Mr. Hansman had established the necessary grounds for a dismissal under the PPPA and concluding that the public interest in allowing debate over this issue outweighed the public interest in allowing Mr. Neufeld to continue his defamation proceeding against Mr. Hansman. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed Mr. Neufeld’s appeal, holding that the application judge made several errors, and allowed Mr. Neufeld’s defamation action against Mr. Hansman to go forward. Argued Date 2022-10-11 Keywords Torts - Libel and slander - Torts — Libel and slander — Anti-SLAPP legislation — Appellant applying to summarily dismiss respondent’s defamation action in relation to appellant’s public statements that were published and broadcast — Did the Court of Appeal err in overturning the chambers judge’s dismissal of the action on the basis of the fair comment defence? — Did the Court of Appeal err in overturning the chambers judge’s conclusion that the public interest in continuing the proceeding did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression? — Protection of Public Participation Act, S.B.C. 2019, c. 3, s. 4. Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:58:442022-10-15
The City of Greater Sudbury contracted Interpaving Limited to repair utilities and to repave streets affected by the repairs. An employee of Interpaving Limited operating a road grader struck and killed a pedestrian who was attempting to cross a street in the construction zone. Safety measures required by legislation were not in place. The Ministry of Labour charged the City as a “constructor” and an “employer” under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.1, and Construction Projects, O. Reg. 213/9. The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted the City on all charges. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed an appeal. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal in respect of the three charges against the City as an employer and set aside the acquittals on those charges. The Crown conceded that the factual findings to determine guilt on one count had not been made at trial. The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to hear an appeal raising whether the City had established a defence of due diligence in respect of the other two charges. Argued Date 2022-10-12 Keywords Provincial offences - Provincial offences — Occupational health and safety — Whether the owner of a construction project which had contracted the construction out to a third party to act as the constructor was the employer pursuant to s. 1(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.1, and responsible for workplace safety? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:24:352022-09-15
Following the enactment in 2018 of the Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c. 5, by the federal government and the Cannabis Regulation Act, CQLR, c. C-5.3, by the province of Quebec, the appellant, Janick Murray-Hall, brought an action in the Quebec Superior Court challenging the constitutional validity of ss. 5 and 10 of the Cannabis Regulation Act, which completely prohibit the possession of cannabis plants and the cultivation of cannabis for personal purposes in Quebec. He sought a declaration that those provisions are ultra vires the provincial legislature or, in the alternative, that they are of no force or effect because of the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.The Quebec Superior Court allowed the appellant’s application and declared that ss. 5 and 10 of the Cannabis Regulation Act are constitutionally invalid. The Quebec Court of Appeal was of the view that the provisions are constitutionally valid and operative. It unanimously allowed the appeal of the Attorney General of Quebec and set aside the trial judgment. Argued Date 2022-09-15 Keywords Constitutional law - Division of powers - Constitutional law — Division of powers — Double aspect doctrine — Cooperative federalism — Doctrine of federal paramountcy — Constitutionality of Quebec statute prohibiting possession of cannabis plants and personal cultivation of cannabis for personal purposes — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal judges erred in law in finding ss. 5 and 10 of Cannabis Regulation Act, CQLR, c. C-5.3, constitutionally valid — Whether Court of Appeal’s judgment must therefore be reversed — Cannabis Regulation Act, CQLR, c. C-5.3, ss. 5, 10. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:01:012022-09-14
The respondent, Mr. Breault, refused a number of times to provide a breath sample to a peace officer who demanded that he do so at a time when an approved screening device was not in the officer’s possession. The Municipal Court found Mr. Breault guilty of failing to comply with a demand made to him by a peace officer, thereby committing the offence provided for in ss. 254(5) and 255(1) of the Criminal Code. In its view, the validity of the demand did not depend on a device being at the scene at the time when the demand was made. The Court of Appeal instead held that, because of the requirement that a breath sample be provided “forthwith”, a delay greater than is necessary to properly operate the device or obtain a reliable test in light of the facts noted by the police officer cannot be justified. The demand was therefore invalid, and the refusal that followed did not constitute a criminal offence. Argued Date 2022-09-14 Keywords Criminal law - Criminal law — Failure or refusal to provide breath sample in approved screening device — Criterion of immediacy under s. 254(2) of Criminal Code — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in interpreting standard of immediacy of s. 254(2)(b) (now 320.27(1)(b)) of Criminal Code as meaning that validity of police officer’s demand depends on possibility of officer having “immediate access” to approved screening device — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 254(2)(b) (now 320.27(1)(b)). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:11:092022-08-07
In October 2012, the respondent Mr. Comeau drove from his hometown Tracadie, in New Brunswick, to Pointe-à-la-Croix and the Listuguj First Nation Indian Reserve, in the province of Quebec. He went there to purchase alcoholic beverages. Mr. Comeau was, at the time, under police surveillance as part of an investigation into cross-border liquor transport. His vehicle was intercepted upon his return, in Campbellton, New Brunswick. Mr. Comeau was charged by way of Notice of Prosecution for “hav[ing] or keep[ing] liquor not purchased from the Corporation”, an offence under section 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor Control Act, RSNB 1973, c. L-10. The police also seized the alcoholic beverages he had purchased that day, a total of 354 bottles or cans of beer and three bottles of liquor. In his defense, Mr. Comeau claimed that section 134(b) of the Liquor Control Act was an unenforceable provincial law, of no force and effect, as it contravened section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.The trial judge declared s. 134(b) of the Liquor Control Act unconstitutional and of no force and effect. He found that s. 134(b) constitutes a trade barrier which violates section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.The Attorney General of New-Brunswick brought an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal of New-Brunswick pursuant to s. 116(3) of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act, SNB 1987, c. P-22.1. This provision allows an appeal directly to the Court of Appeal on a ground of appeal that involves a question of law alone. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed (R. v Comeau, 2016 CanLII 73665 (NB CA)). Argued Date 2017-12-07 Keywords Constitutional law - Constitutional law - Interpretation - Conflict of laws - Interprovincial trade - Notice of Prosecution for having brought alcoholic beverages into New Brunswick from Quebec - Whether section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is a free trade provision? - Whether s. 121 of the Constitution Act renders unconstitutional s. 134 of the Liquor Control Act, RSNB 1973, c. L-10, which along with s. 3 of the Importation of Intoxicating Liquor Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-3, establishes a federal-provincial regulatory scheme in respect of intoxicating liquor? - Constitution Act, 1867, s. 121 - Liquor Control Act, RSNB 1973, c. L-10, s. 134 - Importation of Intoxicating Liquor Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-3, s. 3. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:33:252022-08-07
In October 2012, the respondent Mr. Comeau drove from his hometown Tracadie, in New Brunswick, to Pointe-à-la-Croix and the Listuguj First Nation Indian Reserve, in the province of Quebec. He went there to purchase alcoholic beverages. Mr. Comeau was, at the time, under police surveillance as part of an investigation into cross-border liquor transport. His vehicle was intercepted upon his return, in Campbellton, New Brunswick. Mr. Comeau was charged by way of Notice of Prosecution for “hav[ing] or keep[ing] liquor not purchased from the Corporation”, an offence under section 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor Control Act, RSNB 1973, c. L-10. The police also seized the alcoholic beverages he had purchased that day, a total of 354 bottles or cans of beer and three bottles of liquor. In his defense, Mr. Comeau claimed that section 134(b) of the Liquor Control Act was an unenforceable provincial law, of no force and effect, as it contravened section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.The trial judge declared s. 134(b) of the Liquor Control Act unconstitutional and of no force and effect. He found that s. 134(b) constitutes a trade barrier which violates section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.The Attorney General of New-Brunswick brought an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal of New-Brunswick pursuant to s. 116(3) of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act, SNB 1987, c. P-22.1. This provision allows an appeal directly to the Court of Appeal on a ground of appeal that involves a question of law alone. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed (R. v Comeau, 2016 CanLII 73665 (NB CA)). Argued Date 2017-12-06 Keywords Constitutional law - Constitutional law - Interpretation - Conflict of laws - Interprovincial trade - Notice of Prosecution for having brought alcoholic beverages into New Brunswick from Quebec - Whether section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is a free trade provision? - Whether s. 121 of the Constitution Act renders unconstitutional s. 134 of the Liquor Control Act, RSNB 1973, c. L-10, which along with s. 3 of the Importation of Intoxicating Liquor Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-3, establishes a federal-provincial regulatory scheme in respect of intoxicating liquor? - Constitution Act, 1867, s. 121 - Liquor Control Act, RSNB 1973, c. L-10, s. 134 - Importation of Intoxicating Liquor Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-3, s. 3. Notes (New Brunswick) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:19:432022-07-05
(SEALING ORDER)In 2014, the Federal Court, in the liability phase of the trial, held that the respondents’ (collectively “Dow”) 705 Patent for fabricated products made from ethylene polymer blends was found to be valid and infringed by a product manufactured by Nova Chemicals Corporation (“Nova”). The 705 Patent issued in 2006 and expired on April 19, 2014. Dow was held to be entitled to damages under the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, and had to elect either an accounting of Nova’s profits or damages sustained by reason of Nova’s infringement under s. 55(1) of the Act. The quantum of that award was to be assessed by reference. Dow elected an accounting of profits. The reference judge was required to determine the manner in which damages payable to Dow pursuant to ss. 55(1) and 55(2) of the Act should be calculated. The principles articulated by the reference judge allowed for the calculation of the accounting of profits to be disgorged by Nova and made payable to Dow. That decision was upheld on appeal. Argued Date 2022-04-20 Keywords Intellectual property - Patents, Medicines, Damages - Intellectual property — Patents — Medicines — Damages — Respondent seeking remedy of accounting of profits following determination applicant had infringed respondent’s patent — What is the proper conceptual approach to determining how to calculate a disgorgement of profits in the patent context? — Are “springboard profits” on products sold after patent expiry available at law?. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:23:302022-06-30
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)Cpl. McGregor, a Canadian Armed Forces member, was posted to and resided in the United States. The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service suspected he committed the offences of interference and voyeurism by surreptitiously placing audio recording devices in the residence of another Canadian Armed Forces member also posted to the United States. An American police force obtained a search warrant in Virginia permitting entry into and a search of Cpl. McGregor’s residence in Virginia. Virginia law permits searching electronic devices under the authority of a warrant to search a residence. The American police entered Cpl. McGregor’s residence and invited the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service to conduct the search. Officers seized electronic devices and searched some devices during the search of the residence. They discovered evidence of the suspected offences and other offences. Electronic devices were seized, removed to Canada and searched further pursuant to warrants from the Court Martial. The Standing Court Martial dismissed a motion to exclude the evidence for breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Cpl. McGregor was convicted for sexual assault, two counts of voyeurism, possession of a device for unlawful interception, and disgraceful conduct. The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2022-05-19 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Extraterritoriality, Search and seizure (s. 8) - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Extraterritoriality — Search and seizure — Canadian Forces National Investigation Service seizing and searching contents of electronic devices during search of residence in United States of America of Canadian Armed Forces Regular Member posted to United States of America — Admissibility of evidence seized during search at Standing Court Martial in Canada — Whether Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applied to search — If yes, whether search breached right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure — If search breached s. 8 of Charter, whether evidence should be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of Charter — Whether exception of customary or international law necessitates unilateral Canadian authority in context of Canadian Armed Forces member required to be on foreign soil — Whether cooperation between states precludes exception of consent to principle of sovereignty?. Notes (Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:54:512022-06-20
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant and her former husband, the respondent, were married in Pakistan in 2012. They have two children under the age of five who are both Canadian citizens, as is the mother. The father is a Pakistani citizen. The parties resided in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) during the entire course of their marriage under a series of temporary residence visas directly linked to the father’s employment there. The mother and children were issued visas as dependents of the father, who had discretion over the renewal process. The mother advised the father shortly after arriving in Canada with the children in June 2020 to visit with her family that she would not be returning to Dubai with the children.The father initiated proceedings for divorce in Dubai, and brought an application under s. 40 of the CLRA for an order requiring the children to be returned to Dubai to have the matters of custody and access decided there, as the children’s habitual residence. The UAE is not a signatory country to the Hague Convention. The father obtained a divorce from the court in Dubai and was also granted custody and guardianship of the children. The mother did not participate in the proceedings in Dubai. The mother asked the Ontario court to assume jurisdiction in this case under ss. 22 or 23 of the CLRA to decide the parenting issues. Argued Date 2022-04-12 Keywords Family law - Custody, Parental authority, Courts, Jurisdiction - Family law — Custody — Parental authority — Courts — Jurisdiction — Mother leaving non Hague Convention country with children without father’s consent and retaining them in Ontario — Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err by affirming the trial judge’s decision to decline jurisdiction pursuant to s. 23 of the CLRA? — What factors and to what extent should the “best interests of the child” principle inform a s. 23 analysis in determining the risk of serious harm? — Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err by affirming the trial judge’s decision to return the children to the UAE pursuant to s. 40 of the CLRA? — How and to what extent should the “best interests of the child” principle inform the exercise of judicial discretion and available remedies under s. 40 of the CLRA? Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Publication ban on party) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:38:362022-06-20
An Air Canada flight from Toronto to Halifax crashed when it landed short of the runway during a snowstorm. Some of the passengers commenced a class action asserting negligence on the part of various defendants, including Air Canada, the pilot and co pilot. The appellant (Board) investigated the crash, taking into consideration the on-board cockpit voice recorder (CVR). The Board’s report on its findings was produced to the parties. The respondent Airbus S.A.S. moved for an Order requiring the Board to produce the audio data from the CVR and any transcripts. Other respondents also sought production. The CVR and transcripts are in possession of the Board, who claims a statutory privilege over the materials under the Act. It intervened to argue that the court should not exercise its discretion to order production in the face of its privilege. A judge of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia denied a motion by the Board to make further ex parte representations after his in camera review of the CVR and ordered production of the CVR and transcripts, subject to restrictions. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2022-03-17 Keywords Legislation - Interpretation, Courts - Legislation — Interpretation — Courts — Discretion to order production — Open court principle — Important public interest — Privacy — Safety — Does s. 28(6)(b) of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, S.C. 1989, c. 3 (the Act), entitle the Transportation Safety Board of Canada to make in camera submissions (not in the presence of other parties) to a court prior to any decision to release an on board recording (in this case, a cockpit voice recorder) — What is the correct test to be applied by a court when deciding whether to order production of the contents of an on board recording (in this case, a cockpit voice recorder) pursuant to s. 28(6)(c) of the Act. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:36:512022-06-20
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant plead guilty to two counts of sexual assault. The appellant and Crown made sentencing submissions, which were not joint submissions. The Crown sought a 4 6 year global sentence. The appellant sought a 3 to 3.5 year global sentence. There was no guilty plea in exchange for joint submissions on sentence. The sentencing judge did not agree with the sentencing submissions, and imposed a sentence of eight years’ imprisonment. The sentencing judge did not alert counsel that she was intending to exceed the Crown’s proposed sentence. The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal. Argued Date 2022-03-16 Keywords Criminal law - Sentencing - Criminal law — Sentencing — Guilty plea — Sentencing judge exceeding sentence proposed by Crown and failing to warn parties — Are the considerations set out in Anthony Cook applicable to non joint submissions where the Crown and the accused negotiate sentencing positions that reflect partial agreement or an agreed upon range — Whether the failure of a trial judge to alert counsel that they intend to exceed the sentencing ceiling proposed by Crown an error in principle resulting in fundamental unfairness and warranting appellate intervention. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:47:172022-06-07
(PUBLICATION BAN)The appellant, Jesse Dallas Hills, pled guilty to four charges from an incident in May 2014 where he swung a baseball bat and fired a shot with his rifle at an occupied vehicle, smashed the window of a parked vehicle and shot a few rounds into an occupied family residence. One of the charges was the intentional discharging of a firearm into or at a place, knowing that or being reckless as to whether another person is present in the place under s. 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which carries a minimum four year imprisonment sentence. Mr. Hills alleged that the minimum sentence under s. 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code violated his constitutional right to not be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment by virtue of s. 12 of the Charter.At trial, Mr. Hills presented a scenario that he claimed could reasonably occur and for which the four year mandatory minimum sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Taking into account this hypothetical case proposed by Mr. Hills where a young person intentionally fires an air powered pistol or rifle at a residence, the trial judge found that despite the minimum four year sentence not resulting in a grossly disproportionate sentence for Mr. Hills, it is reasonably foreseeable that it would result in a grossly disproportionate sentence for other potential offenders. The trial judge therefore found that the mandatory minimum sentence contravened s. 12 of the Charter and could not be saved by s. 1. As a result, he declared s. 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code to be of no force and effect. Mr. Hills was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three and a half years.The Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s finding of unconstitutionality and set aside the declaration of invalidity in a judgment containing three separate concurring reasons. Justices O’Ferrall and Wakeling were critical of the expansive usage of hypotheticals in this Court’s s. 12 Charter jurisprudence and invited this Court to abandon it. The appeal against the sentence for discharging a firearm was allowed and the sentence was increased to four years imprisonment. Argued Date 2022-03-22 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of Rights — Criminal law — Sentencing — Mandatory minimum sentence — Whether the Alberta Court of Appeal erred in finding that s. 244.2(3)(b) of the Criminal Code does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment that violates s. 12 of the Charter — Whether the Alberta Court of Appeal erred in failing to consider the appellant’s Métis status in re sentencing him — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 244.2(3)(b). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:36:302022-05-29
Aboriginal law - Self government - Land claims - Fiduciary duty - Treaty rights - Duty to consult - Whether there is a duty to consult and, where possible, accommodate First Nations’ concerns and interests in the context of a modern comprehensive land claims agreement - If there is a duty to consult, what is the scope of that duty and was it met in this case?The Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation entered into a land claims agreement (“Final Agreement”) with Canada and Yukon in 1997 after a long, intensively negotiated process.On November 2001, Larry Paulsen submitted an application for an agricultural land grant of approximately 65 hectares of Yukon Crown land. The land is within the boundaries of the Respondent Mr. Sam’s trapping concession issued to him under the Wildlife Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 229, which grants him the exclusive right to trap commercially in the area. Under s. 6.2 of the Final Agreement, all Little Salmon/Carmacks members have the right of access to Crown land for subsistence harvesting in their traditional territory except where the Crown land is subject to an agreement for sale such as would be the case if the Paulsen application was approved and the land grant made. The 65 hectares represented by the Paulsen application is approximately one third of one percent of the trapline area of Mr. Sam which totals 21 435 hectares.The Paulsen application was reviewed by the Agriculture Branch of the Yukon Department of Energy, Mines and Resources and by the Agriculture Land Application Review Committee between 2001 and 2004. Little Salmon/Carmacks was not notified of the initial review and had no opportunity to raise concerns. It was then reviewed by the Land Application Review Committee (LARC). Members of LARC include Yukon government and federal and municipal government agencies as well as Yukon First Nations including Little Salmon/Carmacks. LARC gave notice of the Paulsen application by advertising in local newspapers, mailing application material to all residents living within one kilometre of the parcel and mailing a letter and package of information to Little Salmon/Carmacks, the Selkirk First Nation and the Carmacks Renewable Resources Council. The letter and package invited comments on the application within 30 days and it included notice of a meeting date. Little Salmon/Carmacks expressed its concern with respect to the Paulsen application by letter but the Director of Little Salmon/Carmacks Lands Department who normally attends LARC meetings was unable to do so when the Paulsen application was being considered. Little Salmon/Carmacks did not ask for an adjournment. It was later provided with minutes of the meeting which reflect a discussion of the First Nation’s concerns as raised in the letter. At the end of the meeting, LARC recommended that the Paulsen application be approved. Little Salmon/Carmacks continued to express opposition. It was advised that the LARC process was used for consultation but that there was no requirement under the Final Agreement to consult with Little Salmon/Carmacks in respect of agricultural land applications and consultation took place as a matter of courtesy. Argued Date 2009-11-12 Keywords Native Law. Notes (Yukon Territory) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:31:312022-05-19
At trial the appellant, Corey Daniel Ramelson, was found guilty of three indictable offences under ss. 172.1, 172.2 and 286.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46. The appellant’s charges arose out of Project Raphael designed by the York Regional Police in Ontario — an undercover investigation that began in 2014 with the objective of reducing the demand for sexual services from juveniles in the region by targeting the “buyer side”. As part of the investigation, the police posted fake advertisements in the “escorts” section of the online classified advertising website Backpage.com. When individuals responded to the ads an undercover officer posing as an escort would disclose in the ensuing text chat that “she” was underage. Individuals who continued the chat and arranged sexual services and a price were directed to a hotel room to complete the transaction; they were then arrested and charged on their arrival.The trial judge originally dismissed the appellant’s application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment. However, after this Court released its decision in R. v. Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11, the parties were invited to address the impact of that decision on the entrapment analysis. In a second decision the trial judge found that the police actions constituted entrapment and entered a stay of proceedings on the charges.The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal from the stay of proceedings, set aside the stay and remitted the matter to the trial judge for sentencing. The court concluded that the police investigation was a bona fide police inquiry and that the police did not require reasonable suspicion that the person responding to the ad was seeking someone underage before extending offers to commit the offence of communicating to obtain for consideration the sexual services of an underage person. In conducting the investigation, the police necessarily provided persons with the opportunity to commit the rationally connected offence of communicating with a person they believed to be underage to facilitate sexual contact with them. The court concluded that the appellant was therefore not entrapped. Argued Date 2022-05-17 Keywords Criminal law - Abuse of process - Criminal law — Abuse of process — Entrapment — Luring — Whether, in light of R. v. Ahmad, 2020 SCC 11, Project Raphael was a bona fide police inquiry — What is the proper analysis to be applied in determining whether a virtual space is sufficiently precisely and narrowly defined to meet the standard of a bona fide inquiry?. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:32:262022-05-19
The appellant, Syed Adeel Safdar, and two co accused who have since discontinued their appeals, were tried for a number of offences involving the abuse of the appellant’s wife. At the end of the evidence and argument on the merits of the allegations, they brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay. While the trial judge was preparing his decision on the trial proper, he heard the s. 11(b) application, reserved his decision and then granted the stay. In the trial judge’s reasons on the s. 11(b) application, he also advised that he had completed his reserved decision on the trial proper, which he did not release, but placed under seal pending the outcome of any appeal of the stay order.The Crown appealed the stay order, arguing that following the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. K.G.K., 2020 SCC 7, the trial judge erred in including the period from the end of the evidence and argument until the release of the stay decision in his calculation of the overall delay. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal, set aside the stay order and referred the matter back to the trial judge to release his decision on the trial proper. Argued Date 2022-05-18 Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)) - Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the period of time required for applications brought pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be considered as part of verdict deliberation time and thus deducted from the calculation of net delay in an application brought under s. 11(b) of the Charter — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in failing to correct the trial judge’s characterization of delay in setting trial dates attributable to systemic limitations on court resources as defence waiver — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in failing to correct the trial judge’s characterization of delay attributed to the trial taking substantially longer than the trial estimate as a discrete exceptional circumstance — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in failing to correct the trial judge’s over allocation of delay for the discrete exceptional circumstance of illness of Crown counsel — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that below the ceiling delay of 29.25 months was not markedly longer than the trial should have taken. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:09:192022-05-16
Mr. Ray was shot after two masked men burst into his house. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, he twice identified Mr. Jacob Charles Badger as the person who had shot him. However, at trial, Mr. Ray failed to identify his assailants. The statements he had made shortly after being shot were admitted into evidence as res gestae, on the basis of the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The trial judge found Mr. Badger guilty of aggravated assault.A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan dismissed Mr. Badger’s appeal, holding that the reasoning of the trial judge did not reveal any concerns that he ignored the inherent or situation specific frailties of the identification evidence that came in the form of the spontaneous utterances or failed to properly evaluate the reliability of the spontaneous utterances. In dissent, Kalmakoff J.A. was of the view that the trial judge did not subject the identification evidence to the careful scrutiny the law requires, an error that infected the verdict. He would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2022-05-16 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Assessment - Criminal law — Evidence — Assessment — Identification — Spontaneous utterance — Whether the trial judge erred in law in his assessment of the identification evidence . Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0051:482022-04-22
The respondent was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. At the pre charge conference, both parties had agreed that there was no air of reality to a defence of provocation, and the trial judge ruled that the defence should not be put to the jury. The respondent appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial judge had erred in failing to open the defence of provocation. A majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that provocation should have been put to the jury, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial. In dissent, MacPherson J.A. would have upheld the conviction. Argued Date 2022-04-21 Keywords Criminal law - Defences, Provocation - Criminal law — Defences — Provocation — Air of reality — Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in finding an air of reality to the defence of provocation. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0053:102022-04-20
The appellant was convicted after trial before a judge alone of thirteen counts relating to various offences committed against his common law spouse. Applying the principles set out in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, the trial judge concluded that the complainant had not been motivated to lie, and that the evidence did not give rise to such an inference. The trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and found that it did not raise a reasonable doubt, and she rejected the appellant’s evidence and concluded that it also did not raise a reasonable doubt.A majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal and upheld the convictions. In the majority’s view, the trial judge did not misapply W.(D.) and she did not err in assessing the complainant’s credibility. In dissent, Bryson J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. Argued Date 2022-04-19 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence - Criminal law — Evidence — Credibility — Whether the trial judge erred in her application of the test in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 — Whether the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the Crown witness, the complainant. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:12:102022-04-05
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Criminal Law – Extradition – Judicial review of Minister’s surrender order – Surrender order set aside on basis that Minister’s acceptance of assurances from extradition partner on health and safety in custody was not reasonable – What is the appropriate scope of review under s. 7 of the Charter for alleged deficiencies in an extradition partner’s justice system? – What is the appropriate standard of review of a Minister’s decision to accept diplomatic assurances from an extradition partner? – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 7 – Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18.The respondents are the uncle and mother, respectively, of the victim. They are alleged to have planned a long-distance “honour killing” in India from Canada because the victim had married a man whom the respondents considered unsuitable. The respondents are alleged to have resorted to hostility, violence and threats, failing which they hired hitmen who tracked the couple down in the state of Punjab, killed the victim and severely beat the victim’s husband. Indian authorities charged several Indian nationals connected to the murder, three of whom have been convicted, as well as the respondents.India sought the respondents’ extradition for prosecution on the offence of conspiracy to commit murder. The respondents were committed for extradition, and the Minister proceeded to issue a surrender order. The respondents, who have health issues that require medical care in custody, placed before the Minister the record of human rights violations in India’s prison system. The Minister issued a surrender order conditional on receipt of formal assurances from India, including assurances regarding death penalty, fair trial and the respondents’ health and safety in Indian custody. Argued Date 2017-03-20 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Extradition, Judicial review. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:40:352022-03-24
On the evening of January 29, 2017, the respondent, Mr. Bissonnette, who was 27 years old at the time, left home with two firearms and ammunition and headed to the Great Mosque of Québec. On arriving there, he fired on the worshippers who were present. He pleaded guilty on 12 counts, including six of first degree murder. Before the sentencing judge, the respondent challenged the constitutional validity of s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code, a provision under which, in the event of multiple murders, a judge may, in addition to imposing a life sentence, order parole ineligibility periods, to be served consecutively, of 25 years for each murder. The sentencing judge concluded that the section in question infringes ss. 12 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that the limits on the protected rights had not been shown to be justified in a free and democratic society. He found that the appropriate remedy would be to read in a new wording that would allow a court to impose consecutive periods of less than 25 years. The Quebec Court of Appeal reached the same conclusions as regards the constitutionality of the provision, but it was of the view that the constitutional incompatibility identified by the sentencing judge goes to the very heart of the provision and that reading in is therefore not appropriate. It accordingly declared that s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code is invalid and of no force or effect. As a consequence, it ordered a total period of parole ineligibility of 25 years in this case. Argued Date 2022-03-24 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Criminal law, Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment (s. 12), Right to life, liberty and security of person (s. 7) - Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Constitutional law — Criminal law — Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment — Right to life, liberty and security of person — Accused pleading guilty on six counts of first degree murder and six counts of attempted murder — Accused challenging constitutional validity of provision allowing judge to add one 25 year period before eligibility for parole for each first degree murder — Whether s. 745.51 of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, infringes s. 7 of Charter — Whether it infringes s. 12 of Charter — If so, whether it constitutes reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in free and democratic society under s. 1 of Charter - Whether 50 year period of ineligibility for parole is just and appropriate punishment in this case — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7, 12 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 745.51. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:36:352022-03-24
In 2016, the respondent Ms. Sharma, an Indigenous woman, pled guilty to importing two kilograms of cocaine, contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”). Ms. Sharma sought a conditional sentence of imprisonment, and challenged the constitutional validity of the two year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 6(3)(a.1) of the CDSA and of ss. 742.1(b) and 742.1(c) of the Criminal Code, which make conditional sentences unavailable in certain situations. The sentencing judge found that the two year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 6(3)(a.1) of the CDSA violated s. 12 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1. The judge therefore declined to address the constitutional challenge to s. 742.1(b), and he dismissed the s. 15 challenge to s. 742.1(c). Ms. Sharma was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, less one month for pre sentence custody and other factors.Ms. Sharma appealed and, with the Crown’s consent, also brought a constitutional challenge to s. 742.1(e)(ii) of the Criminal Code. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) were found to infringe both ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter, and the infringement could not be justified under s. 1. The majority held that the appropriate sentence would have been a conditional sentence of 24 months less one day, but as the custodial sentence had already been completed, a sentence of time served was substituted. Miller J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal and upheld the sentence of imprisonment. Argued Date 2022-03-23 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Right to life, liberty and security of person, Right to equality, Discrimination based on race, Criminal law, Sentencing - Charter of rights — Right to life, liberty and security of the person — Right to equality — Discrimination based on race — Criminal law — Sentencing — Whether ss. 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) of the Criminal Code infringe the right to equality of Indigenous offenders under s. 15 of the Charter — Whether the introduction of conditional sentences in the 1996 amendments to the Criminal Code created a “benefit” for Indigenous offenders from which Parliament cannot derogate without violating s. 15 of the Charter — Whether limiting the availability of conditional sentences for serious offences as defined by their maximum penalty is overbroad in violation of s. 7 of the Charter — Whether any breach of ss. 7 or 15 can be justified under s. 1 — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, ss. 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii). Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:06:212022-03-21
Following a trial by jury, the respondent, Craig Pope, was convicted of second degree murder. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Pope’s appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial. In its view, the trial judge erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on the included offence of manslaughter. The majority was of the view that the difference between murder and manslaughter, particularly regarding the question of intent, was not explained with sufficient clarity. In dissent, Goodridge J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. First, he rejected the respondent’s argument that the decision tree prepared by the trial judge for the jury failed to define the included offence of manslaughter. Second, he rejected the argument that the example of manslaughter given to the jury by the trial judge in response to a question was misleading. Finally, he disagreed that the jury charge failed to alert the jury or provide a limiting instruction that the respondent’s flight from the scene was of no probative value in choosing between second degree murder and manslaughter. Argued Date 2022-03-21 Keywords Criminal law - Charge to jury - Criminal law — Charge to jury — Second degree murder — Lesser and included offence of manslaughter — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by finding that the position taken by counsel at trial is not a factor to be considered in assessing the trial judge’s instructions to the jury — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by finding that the trial judge’s jury instructions, including the decision tree, were deficient in relation to the elements of manslaughter — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by finding the trial judge’s answer to the jury’s question, and the example of manslaughter given to the jury, was deficient — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law by overturning the second degree murder conviction and ordering a new trial. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:07:362022-03-18
The respondent was charged with assault, aggravated assault, uttering a threat, and damage to property. On June 5, 2018, the Crown elected to proceed summarily on three hybrid offences, and the charge of aggravated assault was electable as to mode of trial. On the same date, the respondent’s counsel stated that the election was trial in the Provincial Court. The trial judge found the respondent guilty. The respondent appealed his convictions on the basis that his trial counsel had failed to obtain his informed instructions regarding his election as to the mode of his trial. He alleged that he had not been informed that he had a right to elect the mode of trial, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. A majority of the Court of Appeal for Newfoundland and Labrador allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial. In dissent, Hoegg J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. Argued Date 2022-03-18 Keywords Criminal law - Procedure - Criminal law — Procedure — Trial fairness — Election of mode of trial — Accused alleging he was not informed of his right to elect mode of trial — Whether appellate court can overturn trial verdict on procedural fairness grounds alone without proof of prejudice. Notes (Newfoundland & Labrador) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0051:352022-03-16
In the Court of Québec, the respondent, Daniel Brunelle, was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose. The offences arose out of an episode of road rage. The trial judge found that the respondent had not acted in self defence. With regard to the second condition for self defence, she did not believe the respondent’s claim that he had used force for the purpose of defending himself. She found that he had instead retaliated and taken revenge.The Quebec Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty verdicts and ordered a new trial. In the majority’s view, the trial judge had erred in analyzing the second condition for self defence by finding that the accused had sought to take revenge and had done more than defend himself. The judge had not taken account of how quickly everything happened and had not considered all the evidence. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that there was no reason to intervene. In his view, the issue was whether the trial judge’s finding that the respondent had acted out of vengeance was sufficiently supported by the evidence and involved no palpable and overriding error. He found that this was the case. Argued Date 2022-03-15 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence, Unreasonable verdict, Defences, Self-defence - Criminal law — Appeals — Evidence — Unreasonable verdict — Defence — Self defence — Whether majority erred in law in holding that verdict was unreasonable even though trial judge’s findings of fact were supported by evidence. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0053:022022-02-28
In June 2008, Roger Matern consulted the appellant, Mitra Javanmardi, a naturopath. Ms. Javanmardi administered an intraveous injection treatment. Mr. Matern died not long after the treatment. Ms. Javanmardi was charged, in connection with his death, with criminal negligence causing death and manslaughter.The Court of Québec found on the basis of the evidence that the cause of Mr. Matern’s death was the injection administered by Ms. Javanmardi. But it acquitted her on both counts on the basis that, amoung other things, Ms. Javanmardi’s conduct had not involved a marked departure and her actions had not been objectively dangerous.The Court of Appeal was of the opinion that errors of law had been made at trial. It found that all the essential elements of the offence of manslaughter had been established beyond a reasonable doubt and found Ms. Javanmardi guilty on that count. As for the count of criminal negligence, it found that a reassessment of the whole of the evidence was necessary and ordered a new trial for that purpose. Argued Date 2019-05-15 Keywords Criminal law - Criminal law - Manslaughter - Criminal negligence causing death - Naturopath charged with manslaughter of patient and with causing patient’s death by criminal negligence - Patient dying as result of endotoxic shock caused by bacterium in substance injected into him by naturopath during treatment - Whether ss. 234 and 236 of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, infringe rights guaranteed by ss. 6, 7 and 15 of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, if so, whether infringements justified under s. 1 of Charter - Whether Court of Appeal made legal errors. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right / By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:22:092022-02-26
Charter of Rights - Constitutional law - Right to life, liberty and security of person - Fundamental justice - Fair hearing - Immigration law - Evidence - Security certificate issued against Mohamed Harkat stating that he is inadmissible to Canada on grounds of security - Whether sections 77(2), 78, 83(1)(c) to (e), 83(1)(h), 83(1)(i), 85.4(2) and 85.5(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act breach section 7 of the Charter and if so, whether the provisions are justified under s. 1 of the Charter - Whether the designated judge’s conclusion that there was no abuse of process and no violation of s. 7 of the Charter should be restored - Whether the designated judge properly assessed the evidence - Whether CSIS informers in security certificate proceedings benefit from a class privilege Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 7 - Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 77(2), 78, 83(1)(c) to (e), 83(1)(h), 83(1)(i), 85.4(2) and 85.5(b).In 2008, a security certificate naming Mohamed Harkat as a person inadmissible to Canada on grounds of national security was signed by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. It is alleged that Mr. Harkat is inadmissible on security grounds for engaging in terrorism, being a danger to the security of Canada, and being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in terrorism. Mr. Harkat challenged the constitutionality of the security certificate regime, but it was upheld by the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal. The Federal Court also held that a class privilege applied to CSIS human sources, which decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Appeal. The Federal Court was of the view that the destruction by CSIS of originals of conversations did not breach Mr. Harkat’s s. 7 Charter rights, but the Federal Court of Appeal disagreed and ordered the exclusion of the evidence derived from these originals. Finally, the Federal Court upheld the reasonableness of the security certificate, but the Federal Court of Appeal overturned this decision in view of its above mentioned decision to exclude evidence, sending the matter back to the designated judge for a new determination as to the reasonableness of the certificate. Argued Date 2013-10-10 Keywords Canadian charter - civil - Constitutional law, Right to life, liberty and security of person, Fundamental justice (s. 7), Immigration Law, Evidence, Remedy, Standard of review. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:37:522022-02-24
Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Criminal law – Charge to jury – Right to silence – Consideration of s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act - Whether Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge was not required to specifically caution the jury on the improper use of the Applicant’s decision not to testify at trial – Charter of Rights and Freedoms ss. 7, 11(c) and 11(d).The Applicant and his co-accused, Peter Solty, were charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and one count of defrauding the Government of Canada of about $3.25 million. The Crown alleged that both accused participated in a fraudulent scheme involving the fictitious sale of heavy equipment to generate harmonized Sales Tax (“HST”) that was then not remitted to the federal government as required. The fraudulent nature of the scheme was never challenged. The involvement of the applicant and Mr. Solty in the scheme was also conceded. The question for the jury was whether either or both accused were aware of the fraudulent nature of the scheme. The applicant did not testify. The applicant was convicted and sentenced and his appeals were dismissed. Argued Date 2011-11-08 Keywords Criminal law. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:47:132022-02-16
Annapolis Group Inc. seeks to develop lands that it owns. The lands lie within the boundary of Halifax Regional Municipality. Council of Halifax Regional Municipality declined to commence a planning process and to amend a by-law, both of which are required to permit development of the lands. Annapolis Group Inc. alleges Halifax Regional Municipality encourages members of the public to use the lands as a public park. It commenced an action seeking damages for alleged de facto expropriation, abuse of public office and unjust enrichment. Halifax Regional Municipality filed a motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim of de facto expropriation. The motions judge dismissed the motion. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal and dismissed the claim of de facto expropriation. Argued Date 2022-02-16 Keywords Expropriation - Municipal law - Expropriation - Municipal law - Municipal council declines to initiate planning process required by developer to develop lands - Public uses lands as a park - Whether exercise of a zoning power which deprives a landowner of the reasonable uses of its land in favour of creating a public park carries an implied obligation to pay compensation - Whether test for de facto expropriation should be revisited - Whether motive of government authority is a relevant consideration in considering whether a de facto taking occurred?. Notes (Nova Scotia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:30:112022-02-15
The appellants were convicted of manslaughter in relation to the death of their roommate. After being initially detained by officers at the scene under a non-existent law, they were arrested by detectives for murder two hours later at the police station. Following a lengthy interview, Lambert confessed to their involvement in the death of the roommate; when confronted with the confession, Beaver admitted his participation as well. At trial, the appellants sought the exclusion of all evidence which derived from alleged violations of their rights protected by ss. 7, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They also alleged that the detective who arrested them at the station did not have reasonable and probable grounds to do so. The Crown conceded that the appellants’ Charter rights had been breached when they were detained under a non-existent law, but argued that the arrest at the station constituted a “fresh start” which insulated the confessions from the previous breaches. The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for murder at the police station, and that the arrests constituted a “fresh start” which cured the previous breaches. He concluded that the appellants’ subsequent confessions had not been tainted by the breaches. Nevertheless, the trial judge conducted a s. 24(2) analysis as set out in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, and concluded that the confessions would have been admitted, in any event. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appellants’ appeals. Argued Date 2022-02-14 Keywords Criminal law - Charter of Rights, Evidence, Admissibility - Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Evidence - Admissibility - Reasonable and probable grounds for arrest - Under what circumstances can police attempts at a “fresh start” insulate evidence from admissibility consideration pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter - Should judicial scrutiny of reasonable and probable grounds be more stringent in circumstances where the arrestee was unlawfully detained and police have no notes regarding the grounds for arrest or the information relied upon - What information must be imparted to a detainee to permit them to make a meaningful choice about whether or not to speak with police?. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was adapted from one prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:22:032022-02-11
Following an investigation into cocaine trafficking, the appellant was arrested and subjected to a strip search, which yielded three small bags of cocaine. At trial, the appellant applied to exclude the evidence on the basis that the strip search had not been justified at law. The trial judge concluded that the police had the requisite reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search and admitted the evidence, and the appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.A majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta dismissed the appellant’s appeal, holding that the trial judge had not erred in concluding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search, in accordance with R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679. In dissent, Veldhuis J.A. was of the view that the appellant’s s. 8 Charter right had been breached. She would have allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal. Argued Date 2022-01-14 Keywords Criminal law - Search and seizure (s. 8) - Criminal law — Search and seizure — Search incident to arrest — Strip search — Whether the trial judge considered the correct test for a strip search — Whether the trial judge was permitted to consider hearsay evidence in her assessment of the grounds for conducting a strip search — Whether the trial judge erred in finding no violation of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — Whether acquittal proper relief. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:04:222022-02-11
The respondents, Mélanie Ste Marie, Michel Ste Marie, Dax Ste Marie and Richard Felx, were charged with conspiracy to launder proceeds of crime, laundering proceeds of crime, and commission of an offence for a criminal organization. In the Court of Québec, the respondents moved for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay. The Court of Québec found that s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed but declined to stay the proceedings. It convicted the respondents of the offences charged. On appeal from the guilty verdicts, the Quebec Court of Appeal had to determine whether the Court of Québec had erred in declining to stay the proceedings after finding unreasonable delay. The Court of Appeal allowed the respondents’ appeals, quashed the convictions and ordered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2022-02-10 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law, Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Remedy - Charter of Rights Criminal law Right to be tried within a reasonable time Remedy Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in granting final stay of proceedings without addressing point of law validly raised by Crown, respondent in Court of Appeal, namely proper attribution of delay relating to extraordinary recourses exercised by defence Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in reviewing only part of legal framework of decision on motion for stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, though framework ill defined by trial judge. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:27:262022-02-10
The respondent, Marc-André Boulanger, faced four charges laid under, among other things, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. The Court of Québec granted the respondent’s motion for a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and entered a stay of proceedings on the four charges. The trial judge found a net delay of 32 months and 10 days, which was therefore above the presumptive ceiling of 30 months.The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution’s appeal from the Court of Québec’s decision. Although the majority’s analysis differed from that of the trial judge with regard to the delay related to the unavailability of the respondent’s lawyer, the majority was of the view that the trial judge had correctly stayed the proceedings and agreed with the judge’s overall assessment of the main cause of the delay in the progress of this case: the absence of a carefully crafted prosecution plan. Chamberland J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Québec’s decision, dismissed the respondent’s motion for a stay of proceedings, and referred the case back to the same judge for a decision on the outcome of the trial. In his view, 84 days had to be added to the defence delay, resulting in a net delay below the applicable 30 month ceiling. Argued Date 2022-02-09 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)), Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Right to be tried within a reasonable time - Criminal law - Whether majority erred in law in refusing to subtract 84 day delay for which respondent admitted being responsible and which was attributable to his conduct - Whether majority erred in law in interfering with trial judge’s decision to attribute to respondent 112-day delay caused by fact that his lawyer was unavailable, even though that finding was within judge’s discretion. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:20:222022-02-10
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)In 2002, G was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder on charges of sexual assault and other charges. In 2003, G was given an absolute discharge by the Ontario Review Board. However, pursuant to Christopher’s Law ( Offender Registry), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 1, G was obliged to register under the provincial offender registry and report to provincial authorities for life. G was also required to register and report under the federal registry, pursuant to the Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10 (“SOIRA”). In 2014, G commenced legal proceedings seeking a declaration that the application of the federal and provincial offender registries to persons found not criminally responsible who are then granted a subsequent absolute discharge infringes their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed G’s application. The application judge found that despite some negative impact resulting from the offender registry requirements, there was no s. 7 or s. 15 Charter breach. The Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously allowed G’s appeal and concluded that the provincial and federal offender registries infringe G’s s. 15 Charter rights (and those of individuals in his situation), and that such infringements cannot be saved under s. 1. In terms of remedy, the Court of Appeal declared Christopher’s Law and SOIRA to be of no force or effect in their application to individuals in G’s situation. It suspended the effect of the declaration for 12 months; however, it exempted G from this suspension.The Attorney General of Ontario is appealing the portion of the Court of Appeal’s judgment granting an individual exemption from the period of suspension to G. Argued Date 2020-02-20 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Right to equality, Discrimination based on mental or physical disability, Remedy, Criminal law, Mental disorder, Constitutional law - Charter of rights - Right to equality - Discrimination based on mental or physical disability - Remedy - Criminal law -Mental disorder - Respondent found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder in respect of sexual assault and other charges - Respondent granted absolute discharge but required to register under provincial offender registry and report to authorities for life, and required to register and report under federal registry - Application judge finding no breach under ss. 7 or 15 of Charter - Court of Appeal finding breach of s. 15 and declaring operation of offender registry legislation unconstitutional - Declaration of invalidity suspended for 12 months but respondent exempt from period of suspension - Whether offender registry legislation infringes right to equality without discrimination based on absence of individualized exceptions - If so, whether infringement is reasonable limit demonstrably justified in free and democratic society - Whether s. 15 of Charter requires individualized assessment before requiring persons found not criminally responsible who are granted absolute discharge to register and report under offender registry - Whether Court of Appeal erred in declining to follow R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 489 and in granting individual relief to respondent during period of suspension of declaration of invalidity - Christopher’s Law ( Offender Registry), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 1 - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7, 15. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Sealing order) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Ca 0:002:42:462022-01-27
Ashley Suzanne Barendregt v. Geoff Bradley Grebliunas The parties were married in 2013 and separated in 2018 and have two children, ages 7 and 5. In December 2019, the trial judge granted the appellant’s application for primary residence of the children and to relocate with them to a town a thousand kilometres away from the former matrimonial home where the respondent resided. This decision was overturned on appeal but the order was stayed. Tiffany Jo Kreke v. Amro Abdullah M Alansari The parties separated after ten years of marriage. They had one child together and the applicant had two children from a previous marriage. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision that awarded joint custody of the one child, with primary care to the applicant and allowed her to relocate within the province with that child. It also reduced the amount of spousal support awarded to her. A new trial was ordered on the issues of custody, access, primary care and relocation. B.J.T. v. J.D. The father and mother were married in 2012 in Alberta and separated less than a year later when the mother returned to Prince Edward Island. The father was unaware that the mother was pregnant when she left. Shortly after the child was born, the applicant grandmother came to reside with the mother and child. When the child was four years of age, and residing only with his mother, he was apprehended by the Director of Child Protection. He was eventually placed in the care of the applicant. The Director subsequently alerted the father of the child’s existence then supported his contested application for permanent custody. The trial judge held that the child should be permanently placed with the grandmother in Prince Edward Island. On appeal, the majority held that the child should be permanently placed in his father’s custody in Alberta. Argued Date 2021-12-01 and 2021-12-02 Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was excerpted from material prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:51:052022-01-27
Ashley Suzanne Barendregt v. Geoff Bradley Grebliunas The parties were married in 2013 and separated in 2018 and have two children, ages 7 and 5. In December 2019, the trial judge granted the appellant’s application for primary residence of the children and to relocate with them to a town a thousand kilometres away from the former matrimonial home where the respondent resided. This decision was overturned on appeal but the order was stayed. Tiffany Jo Kreke v. Amro Abdullah M Alansari The parties separated after ten years of marriage. They had one child together and the applicant had two children from a previous marriage. The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision that awarded joint custody of the one child, with primary care to the applicant and allowed her to relocate within the province with that child. It also reduced the amount of spousal support awarded to her. A new trial was ordered on the issues of custody, access, primary care and relocation. B.J.T. v. J.D. The father and mother were married in 2012 in Alberta and separated less than a year later when the mother returned to Prince Edward Island. The father was unaware that the mother was pregnant when she left. Shortly after the child was born, the applicant grandmother came to reside with the mother and child. When the child was four years of age, and residing only with his mother, he was apprehended by the Director of Child Protection. He was eventually placed in the care of the applicant. The Director subsequently alerted the father of the child’s existence then supported his contested application for permanent custody. The trial judge held that the child should be permanently placed with the grandmother in Prince Edward Island. On appeal, the majority held that the child should be permanently placed in his father’s custody in Alberta. Argued Date 2021-12-01 and 2021-12-02 Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was excerpted from material prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:57:272022-01-20
The parties entered into a partnership agreement and a guarantee and cross indemnity agreement. The partnership, Peace River Hydro Partners, commenced work. It subcontracted some work to Petrowest Corporation and its affiliates pursuant to purchase orders and it entered into a subcontract agreement with Petrowest Civil Services LP. Petrowest Corporation and its affiliates became insolvent. Ernst and Young Inc. was appointed as their receiver. Ernst & Young Inc. assigned Petrowest Corporations’s affiliates into bankruptcy and thereafter acted as both a trustee in bankruptcy and a receiver. Petrowest Corporation and its affiliates commenced a civil claim alleging amounts are owed to them under the general partnership agreement, the guarantee and cross-indemnity agreement, the purchase orders, and the subcontract agreement. These agreements contain arbitration clauses. The appellants applied under s. 15 of the Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996, c. 55, to stay the proceedings so that the matters could be referred to arbitration. The Supreme Court of British Columbia dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2022-01-19 Keywords Bankruptcy and insolvency - Receiver, Commercial law, Contracts, Arbitration agreement - Bankruptcy and Insolvency — Receivership — Commercial law — Contracts — Arbitration agreements — Receiver and trustee in bankruptcy of debtor companies claims contracting parties owe amounts to debtor companies — Receiver commences action — Agreements in issue contain mandatory arbitration clauses — Contracting parties seek stay of proceedings and arbitration — Whether receiver bound by arbitration clauses — Whether doctrine of separability allows receivers to disclaim arbitration clauses within agreements while pursuing rights under same agreements — Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996, c. 55, s. 15. Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:45:032022-01-19
The Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada (“SOCAN”) administers the right to “communicate” musical works on behalf of copyright owners. It filed proposed tariffs for the communication to the public by telecommunication of work in its repertoire through an online music service. However, before the Board considered the proposed tariffs, the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, amended the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. In particular, it added three “making available” provisions in ss. 2.4(1.1), 15(1.1)(d) and 18(1.1)(a). Section 2.4(1.1) provides that, for the purposes of the Copyright Act, “communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public by telecommunication includes making it available to the public by telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to have access to it from a place and at a time individually chosen by that member of the public”. A few days after the Copyright Modernization Act was enacted but before it came into force, Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 (“ESA”), was released. It held that the transmission of a musical work over the Internet that results in a download of that work is not a communication by telecommunication, so royalties were not available for those downloads.In relation to SOCAN’s proposed tariffs, the Board decided to consider the interpretation of the “making available” provisions separately from the tariff. It invited written submissions from anyone with an interest in the interpretation of the “making available” provisions and received submissions from more than 30 organizations. It found that s. 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act deems the act of making a work available to the public a “communication to the public” within s. 3(1)(f) of that Act and, thus, an act that triggers a tariff entitlement. The Federal Court of Appeal quashed the Board’s decision regarding the meaning of the “making available” provisions. Argued Date 2022-01-18 Keywords Intellectual property - Copyright - Intellectual property - Copyright - Right to communicate work to public by telecommunication - Making available - Communication to public by telecommunication defined as including making work or other subject matter available to public by telecommunication such that public may have access to it at place and time chose by them in Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 42, s. 2.4(1.1) - Whether s. 2.4(1.1) makes the act of making a work available to the public for on-demand access a communication to the public by telecommunication attracts a licence fee, whether the work is subsequently transmitted as a stream, a download, in another format, or not at all - Whether s. 2.4(1.1) expands the meaning of “communication” to include the initial act of making available to the public, regardless of the means of transmission, or whether it is transmitted at all, and any subsequent transmission - Whether any subsequent transmissions merge with the initial act of making available - Whether the expanded communication right is first triggered by the initial act of making content accessible and extends to all subsequent transmissions, if they occur, irrespective of the timing or technological means of transmission - How s. 2.4(1.1) affects Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the 0:002:38:342022-01-16
The respondent, a private company, was issued a statement of offence under the Quebec Building Act for carrying out certain construction work as a contractor without holding a current licence for that purpose. Under s. 197.1 of the Act, the penalty for such an offence is a mandatory fine for a minimum amount that varies depending on who the offender is, that is, whether the offender is a natural person or a legal person. The respondent filed a notice of intention to question the constitutionality of the fine provided for in s. 197.1, arguing that the fine violated its right to be protected against “any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” under s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.At trial, the Court of Québec held that it was not necessary to rule on the issue of the application of s. 12 of the Charter to legal persons, because the minimum fine at issue was at any rate not cruel and unusual. The respondent was found guilty, and a fine of $30,843 was imposed. On appeal, the Quebec Superior Court affirmed that decision and added that legal persons such as the respondent could not benefit from the protection of s. 12 of the Charter. A majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the decisions of the lower courts and held that s. 12 of the Charter can in fact apply to legal persons. The matter was returned to the trial court to rule on the specific issue of the fine provided for in s. 197.1 of the Act. Argued Date 2020-01-22 Keywords Canadian charter (Non-criminal) - Constitutional law, Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment (s. 12) - Charter of Rights - Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment - Application of Charter rights to legal persons - Statement of offence issued against business corporation for carrying out construction work as contractor without holding current licence - Provincial building legislation providing for mandatory minimum fine of $30,843 - Whether legal person can benefit from protection of section 12 of Charter - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 12 - Building Act, CQLR, c. B 1.1, ss. 46, 197.1. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:38:012022-01-14
(PUBLICATION BAN)The appellant was charged in August 2013 with a number of sexual offences. In November 2017, he sought a stay of proceedings due to a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable delay. The trial judge found that the total expected delay for the proceedings would be 57 months, and he subtracted a period of 25 months which he attributed to two discrete exceptional events: a re-election by the accused, and an underestimate of the time required for the trial. The remaining delay of 32 months was still above the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, but the trial judge concluded that the additional delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstance, and dismissed the application. The appellant was found guilty at the conclusion of his trial.The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in dismissing his stay application. A majority of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions. It held that the trial judge had erred in excluding the period attributable to the appellant’s re-election from the overall delay, and found the net delay to be 43 months. The majority held that the 43-month delay was nevertheless justified by the transitional exceptional circumstance. In dissent, Butler J.A. found that the transitional exceptional circumstance did not apply, and would have allowed the appeal and entered a stay of proceedings. Argued Date 2021-12-08 Keywords Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Right to trial within a reasonable delay - Discrete exceptional events - Transitional exceptional circumstance - Whether the delay of 43 months is justified as a transitional exceptional circumstance under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:02:222022-01-14
(PUBLICATION BAN)The respondent, Mr. Goforth, and his wife were jointly charged with the second-degree murder of a four-year-old child they had been fostering (“older child”), and with unlawfully causing bodily harm to a second two-year-old foster child (“younger child”). The predicate offence underlying both charges was failing to provide the necessaries of life, contrary to s. 215 of the Criminal Code. A jury convicted both accused of unlawfully causing bodily harm to the younger child, and found Ms. Goforth guilty of the second-degree murder of the older child. The jury found Mr. Goforth guilty of the lesser and included offence of manslaughter in relation to the death of the older child. Mr. Goforth appealed his convictions.A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan allowed the appeal, set aside Mr. Goforth’s convictions, and ordered a new trial. The majority did not find error in the trial judge’s charge to the jury in relation to the actus reus of the offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life, but concluded that the trial judge’s explanation of mens rea contained material legal error and that the charge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the mens rea requirements of s. 215. In dissent, Caldwell J.A. would have dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions. Argued Date 2021-12-07 Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Charge to jury, Offences - Criminal law - Appeals - Charge to jury - Offences - Failure to provide necessaries of life - Elements of mens rea - Whether the Court of Appeal erred by finding the trial judge failed to provide adequate directions to the jury when relating the evidence to the mens rea of the predicate offence of failing to provide the necessaries of life - Whether the Court of Appeal erred by finding tthe respondent’s personal characteristics were relevant factors in the objective mens rea analysis - Whether the Court of Appeal erred by finding the trial judge’s mens rea instructions may have confused the jury - Whether the Court of Appeal erred by applying an incorrect standard to its review of the jury instructions - Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 215. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:06:102022-01-14
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)In February 2011, the respondent, J.F., was charged with several offences involving sexual acts committed between 1986 and 2001. While judgment was reserved, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631. Following the first trial, J.F. was acquitted in February 2017. The total delay between the charges and the verdict was 72 months and 2 days. In June 2018, the Quebec Court of Appeal ordered a new trial because of errors of law in the trial judgment. The delay between that order and the anticipated end of the new trial was 10 months and 5 days. J.F. filed a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter in December 2018. The trial judge found that the delay for the first trial was unreasonable and that J.F. had never waived his right to be tried within a reasonable time. She granted the motion and ordered a stay of proceedings in February 2019. In a unanimous judgment, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s order, but for reasons that differed from those of the trial judge. Argued Date 2021-11-30 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Criminal law - Tried within reasonable time - Trial delay - Ceilings - Whether failure to raise, at first trial or on appeal, possible infringement of right to be tried within reasonable time amounts to waiver of right to raise it during subsequent trial - Whether Jordan framework should be used to consider trial delay for previous trial, delay that is completely over and can no longer be remedied - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b). Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:39:012022-01-12
The Council of Canadians with Disabilities and two plaintiffs commenced an action claiming that provisions of mental health legislation in British Columbia infringe s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and ss. 1, 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The two individual plaintiffs discontinued their claims and withdrew from the litigation. The Council of Canadians with Disabilities filed an amended statement of claim removing the particulars pleaded by the individual plaintiffs and setting out generalized allegations of constitutional infringements. The Attorney General of British Columbia applied for summary judgment dismissing the action. The application judge granted summary judgment and dismissed the action on the basis that the Council of Canadians with Disabilities lacks public interest standing to pursue the claim on its own. The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal, set aside the summary judgment, and remitted the matter of public interest standing for reconsideration. Argued Date 2022-01-12 Keywords Civil procedure - Parties, Standing - Civil procedure - Parties - Standing - Public interest standing - Public interest group and individual plaintiffs commence action claiming mental health legislation infringes Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Individual plaintiffs discontinue their claims - Public interest group seeks standing to continue without co-plaintiffs - Whether legality and access to justice components of the test for public interest standing are key components that must be accorded particular weight - Whether factual context is sufficient to grant public interest standing. Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:02:432022-01-12
Two corporations implemented a plan devised by a tax professional to protect corporate assets from future creditors. The plans were intended not to incur income tax liability. In part, the plans involved each corporation issuing dividends to a newly-created family trust. The effectiveness of the plan depended on a widely-accepted interpretation of s. 75(2) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). At the time the plans were implemented, the interpretation was shared by Canada Revenue Agency. Sommerer v. Canada, 2011 TCC 21, affirmed 2012 FCA 207, subsequently adopted a narrower interpretation of s. 75(2). Canada Revenue Agency issued notices of reassessment to each family trust for the taxation years in which dividends were paid. Objections to the reassessments were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court of British Columbia granted equitable recission of the payments of dividends. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal. Argued Date 2022-01-11 Keywords Taxation - Equity, Remedy (s. 24), Remedies - Taxation - Equity - Remedies - Equitable rescission - Tax professionals devise plans to shelter corporations’ assets from potential future creditors - Corporations implement plan and each in part issues dividends to family trusts - Plans consistent with Canada Revenue Agency’s interpretation of s. 75(2) of Income Tax Act -Tax Court of Canada adopts narrower interpretation of s. 75(2) - Dividends to family trusts trigger unanticipated income tax liabilities - Whether equitable remedy of rescission available to unwind transactions - What is the test for equitable recission - Whether equitable relief should be granted when alternative remedies are available?. Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:04:242022-01-10
Mr. Chhina was placed in immigration detention pending deportation from Canada. The Immigration and Review Board held 12 reviews of his detention and each time ordered continued detention. After 10 months, Mr. Chhina applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his detention was lengthy and indeterminate, therefore illegal. He invoked his right under s. 10(c) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to have the validity of his detention determined and to be released if the detention was not lawful, under s. 7 of the Charter to life, liberty and security of the person and not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, and under s. 9 of the Charter not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta declined to exercise jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus application. The Court of Appeal Appeal allowed an appeal and remitted the applicaiton to the Court of Queen’s Bench for a rehearing on its merits. Argued Date 2018-11-14 Keywords Courts - Jurisdiction, Habeas corpus, Immigration, Procedure - Courts - Jurisdiction - Habeas corpus - Immigration - Immigration and Refugee Board reviews respondent’s immigration detention and orders continued detention - Respondent applies to Court of Queen’s Bench for writ of habeas corpus - Whether courts should decline habeas corpus jurisdiction in immigration matters - Whether reviews of immigration detention decisions under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, are more limited and less favourable than reviews by way of habeas corpus - Whether reviews of immigration detention decisions for Charter compliance can only occur on habeas corpus applications - Whether reviews of immigration detention decisions do not require expertise in immigration matters?. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:15:012022-01-07
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Right to be tried within a reasonable time – How is the issue of institutional delay to be weighed in a s. 11(b) application? – Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(b).Between March and December 2008, the applicant was the subject of a police investigation into a dial-a-dope operation selling cocaine and heroin. The police executed a search warrant at the applicant’s residence which yielded 42.3 grams of heroin, 1463.5 grams of cocaine and crack cocaine, $6640 in cash and an employee “shift calendar” for the dial-a-dope line. The applicant was charged with several drug trafficking related offences in 2008. In September 2012 the applicant brought an application for judicial stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging his rights under s. 11(b) had been infringed due to an unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial. The trial judge found that 32.5 months of delay in this case was due to institutional delay. Argued Date 2015-10-07 Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Right to be tried within a reasonable time (s. 11(b)). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:005:18:552021-12-30
Legislation - Interpretation - Constitutional law - Supreme Court of Canada - Appointment of judges - ReferenceThe Honourable Justice Marc Nadon was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada on October 3, 2013, to fulfill the requirements of s. 6 of the Supreme Court Act which requires that three of the judges of this Court be drawn from the province of Quebec. He was sworn in on October 7, 2013. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Nadon was a judge of the Federal Court of Appeal.Third parties brought an application for judicial review in Federal Court challenging (i) Justice Nadon’s appointment on the basis that sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act do not permit the appointment of Federal Court or Federal Court of Appeal Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada, and (ii) Parliament’s ability to legislate with respect to the criteria set out at sections 5 and 6 of the Act. Pending the resolution of this challenge to his appointment, Justice Nadon announced that he would not to participate in matters before the Supreme Court of Canada.On October 22, 2013, a bill was introduced in the House of Commons proposing to add two declaratory provisions to the Supreme Court Act so as to expressly permit the appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada of a person who currently is, or was at any time, a member of a provincial bar with at least 10 years standing. That same day, the Governor in Council referred two questions to the Court by way of Order in Council P.C. 2013-1105:1. Can a person who was, at any time, an advocate of at least 10 years standing at the Barreau du Québec be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada as a member of the Supreme Court from Quebec pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act?2. Can Parliament enact legislation that requires that a person be or has previously been a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province as a condition of appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada or enact the annexed declaratory provisions as set out in clauses 471 and 472 of the Bill entitled Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No.2?The proceedings before the Federal Court were stayed pending the determination of the questions submitted to this Court. Argued Date 2014-01-15 Keywords Courts - Interpretation, Constitutional law. Notes (Canada) (Civil) (Reference) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:14:122021-12-23
Constitutional law - Charter of Rights - Right to life, liberty and security of person - Fundamental justice - Remedy - Crown prerogative in matters of foreign relations - Interviews conducted in Guantanamo Bay by Canadian officials who knew that Canadian child had been subjected to sleep deprivation techniques - Refusal of the Canadian Government to repatriate its national - Whether the courts below erred in finding that the Respondent’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter were breached - If such a breach occurred, whether the remedy was appropriate and just in the circumstances.Mr. Khadr, a Canadian citizen, was taken prisoner in Afghanistan when he was 15 years old and has been detained by U.S. Forces since 2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he is currently facing murder and other terrorism-related charges. During his detention, Mr. Khadr was given no special status as a minor. He was not allowed to communicate with anyone outside Guantanamo Bay until November 2004, when he met with legal counsel for the first time. The Canadian Government has asked, through diplomatic channels, for consular access and other assurances, but it is its policy not to request his repatriation until the conclusion of the prosecution. In 2003, Canadian officials questioned Mr. Khadr, still a minor, at Guantanamo Bay, with respect to matters connected to the charges he is now facing, and shared the product of these interviews with U.S. authorities. In 2006, after formal charges were laid against him, Mr. Khadr sought disclosure in Canada of, notably, the records of the interviews conducted at Guantanamo Bay. The Supreme Court of Canada ordered the disclosure (“Khadr 2008”). After the information was disclosed, it became clear that when the officials interviewed Mr. Khadr, they were aware that he had been subjected to a form of sleep deprivation, known as the “frequent flyer program”, to make him more amenable and willing to talk. Mr. Khadr asked the Canadian Government to repatriate him, but to no avail. He sought judicial review of the policy and decision of the Canadian Government not to seek his repatriation. The Federal Court granted his application and ordered the Government to seek his repatriation from the U.S. as soon as practicable. In a majority decision, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the Government’s appeal. Argued Date 2009-11-13 Keywords Canadian charter - civil. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:00:472021-12-17
Following their separation, Isabelle Bisaillon and Michel Bouvier attended five mediation sessions and then signed the standard agreement proposed by the Association de médiation familiale du Québec at the start of the process, which provided in part that the content of the process was to remain confidential. At the end of the process, the mediator prepared a summary of the matters agreed upon in mediation and sent it to the parties, who did not sign it or have a formal agreement drawn up.On an application filed by Ms. Bisaillon for judicial partition into equal shares of an immovable held in undivided co-ownership through sale by judicial authority, Mr. Bouvier argued in defence that a settlement existed: the summary of the matters agreed upon in mediation amounted to an agreement. In the Superior Court, Ms. Bisaillon argued that the mediation process was subject to a fundamental principle of confidentiality, which meant that evidence of the summary of the matters agreed upon and of anything arising from the mediation was inadmissible. The summary was not a contract and was not enforceable or binding if not signed or homologated, which was the case here. Moreover, the cashing of the cheques written by Mr. Bouvier did not amount to the acceptance or implementation of an agreement.The Superior Court, among other things, confirmed the existence of the parties’ agreement on the partition of the immovable and ordered its implementation. It found the summary of the matters agreed upon and any other related document or discussion to be admissible in evidence. Although the parties had agreed in their mediation contract that the summary of the matters agreed upon was privileged, they had implicitly waived the privilege by implementing and relying on the agreement they had reached. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Bisaillon’s appeal. Argued Date 2021-03-18 Keywords Family law - Family law - Mediation - Settlement privilege - Exception - Summary of matters agreed upon in family mediation - Legal and binding nature of summary - Admissibility in evidence - Whether principles for exception to settlement privilege outlined in Union Carbide Canada Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., 2014 SCC 35, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, apply in context of family mediation - Whether summary of matters agreed upon in mediation and any other related document or statement, including testimony, arising from family mediation can be admissible in evidence for purpose of proving that agreement was reached during family mediation and to prove terms of that agreement. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:06:112021-12-10
Following a jury trial, the respondent, William Victor Schneider, was convicted of second degree murder and interfering with a body after death, contrary to ss. 235(1) and 182(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.Before the Court of Appeal, the respondent submitted that the murder conviction should be set aside and a new trial ordered. He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting statements made during a telephone conversation overheard by his brother; erred in her instructions to the jury; and mishandled a question posed by the jury. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the count of second degree murder. The majority dismissed the second and third grounds of appeal but held that the trial judge erred in admitting the overheard conversation. In its view, no properly instructed jury could conclude that the overheard statements were an admission. Accordingly, they were not relevant and it was an error to admit them into evidence and put them before the jury.In dissent, DeWitt-Van Oosten J.A. would have dismissed all three grounds of appeal and therefore the appeal from conviction. In her view, the overheard telephone conversation statements were properly admitted into evidence. The trial judge correctly determined that the overheard statements were logically relevant to an issue at trial and the respondent did not demonstrate error in the trial judge’s exercise of discretion on legal relevance or the weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect. To the dissenting judge, the trial judge properly left the meaning of the impugned words and their weight with the jury. A functional review of the charge to the jury revealed the instructions sufficiently cautioned the jury on use. Argued Date 2021-12-10 Keywords Criminal law - Evidence, Admissibility - Criminal law - Evidence - Admissibility - Relevancy - Overheard telephone conversation - Whether the trial judge erred in admitting statements made by the accused during a phone conversation, overheard by the accused’s brother. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:03:092021-12-09
At trial before judge alone, the appellant, Mr. Sundman, was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of the included offence of second degree murder. The trial judge found that Mr. Sundman could not be convicted of first degree murder pursuant to s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code because, at the time of the shooting, the victim’s confinement had come to an end.The Crown appealed the acquittals of first degree murder and Mr. Sundman appealed the conviction for second degree murder. A unanimous Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Sundman’s appeal but allowed the Crown’s appeal from the acquittal of first degree murder, set aside the conviction for second degree murder and entered a verdict of guilty for first degree murder. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law in addressing the scope of the offence of unlawful confinement. It went on to explain that even assuming that the trial judge’s conclusion that the act of confinement to which Mr. Sundman was a party had ended moments before the killing did not give rise to an appealable error in law, the trial judge nonetheless erred in law by requiring proof that the confinement and the killing occurred simultaneously. By doing so, the trial judge committed an error of law in applying R. v. Paré, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 618. The court held that on the factual findings made by the judge, Mr. Sundman was guilty of first degree murder and the judge erred in law by failing to come to this conclusion. Argued Date 2021-12-09 Keywords Criminal law - Elements of offence - Criminal law - Elements of offence - First degree murder - Unlawful confinement - Whether the trial judge’s finding that there was an insufficient temporal-causal nexus between the unlawful confinement and murder is a finding of fact which the Crown could not appeal - Whether the trial judge erred in law by implicitly importing a requirement that a person be physically restrained before being unlawfully confined under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:06:492021-12-07
The body of a murdered man was discovered in a ditch. He had been fatally shot in the head. The police determined that Mr. Tessier was a friend and business associate of the deceased. They asked him for an interview with intent to ascertain the victim’s last known movements and to establish a victimology. After voluntarily attending at a police station for an interview, Mr. Tessier took the interviewing officer to a truck to retrieve items that belonged to the deceased. Later that day, he returned to the police station and requested a second interview to provide more information. He asked the police to accompany him to his apartment to confirm his rifle was still there. At the apartment, it was determined that the rifle was missing. The police then suspected Mr. Tessier committed the murder and, for the first time, Mr. Tessier was cautioned and instructed on his right to counsel. The trial judge admitted Mr. Tessier’s statements to the police before he was cautioned into evidence. A jury convicted Mr. Tessier of first degree murder. He appealed from the conviction. The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. Keywords Criminal law - Evidence - Criminal law - Evidence - Common-law confessions rule - Admissibility of a witness’s statements to the police uttered before the police suspect that the witness committed the offence under investigation and caution the witness - Does the confessions rule require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused actually knew he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him in evidence - Are police required to caution persons who are not suspected of an offence before questioning and if so, what is the impact of the presence or absence of the caution on the voluntariness of any statements made - Was the Court of Appeal wrong to interfere with the trial judge’s finding of voluntariness of accused’s statements to the police prior to being cautioned?. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:31:432021-12-07
Beaver Lake Cree Nation filed a claim against Alberta and Canada in 2008, seeking various declarations of rights, injunctions, and damages for the cumulative effects of resource developments allowed on their traditional lands protected by Treaty 6. The trial is currently scheduled for 2024. Thus far, Beaver Lake has spent approximately $3 million in legal fees, of which approximately one half has been paid from its own funds; it presently pays $300,000 in legal fees per year.Beaver Lake filed an application for advance costs in the amount of $5 million to allow them to proceed with their claim. The case management judge at the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench found that Beaver Lake met the test for advance costs, including the “financial means” branch of the test, The case management judge awarded partial advance costs to Beaver Lake, ordering Alberta and Canada to each pay $300,000 per year towards Beaver Lake’s legal fees, until such time as the trial is concluded or the litigation is resolved, in addition to the $300,000 that Beaver Lake was spending annually on the litigation.The Alberta Court of Appeal reversed this decision and set aside the order for partial advance costs. It found that the case management judge had committed an error of law with respect to the manner in which the test for advance costs was applied to the facts of this case, and that Beaver Lake had failed to satisfy the “financial means” branch of the test for advance costs. In particular, based on fresh evidence adduced by Canada, the Court of Appeal found that Beaver Lake in fact had access or potential access to several million dollars in order to continue funding the litigation, including having received $2.97 million in December 2019 from a resolved Specific Claim. As a result of Beaver Lake’s available resources, the Court of Appeal concluded that the original order for advance costs was unreasonable.Beaver Lake now appeals the Court of Appeal decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. Keywords Civil procedure - Costs, Advance costs - Civil procedure - Costs - Advance costs - First Nation pursuing claim against provincial and federal Crown for infringement of treaty rights - First Nation seeking advance costs to fund litigation - Case management judge finding criteria for partial advance costs order satisfied - Court of Appeal overturning order as unreasonable, and finding impecuniosity branch of test not met - Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in interpreting financial means branch of test by considering only whether funds available and excluding consideration of unique social, political, and economic context of impoverished First Nations, and consideration of reasonable financial choices - If answer to Issue 1 is ‘no”, whether Court of Appeal erred in holding that Beaver Lake did not satisfy test based on findings made by case management judge, including that Beaver Lake could not both fund the litigation and meet basic needs - Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that case management judge’s discretionary order was unreasonable by including defined annual cap, and failing to require repayment of award. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:01:152021-12-07
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)The appellant, Mr. Kirkpatrick, was charged with sexual assault. The complainant told the appellant that she insisted on condom use during sexual intercourse. They engaged in intercourse on two occasions, but on the second occasion, unbeknownst to the complainant, the appellant did not wear a condom. The complainant testified that she had not consented to intercourse without a condom, and her evidence was that she would not have done so if asked.At trial, following a successful no evidence motion, the appellant was acquitted of sexual assault. Relying on R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 346, the trial judge found that under s. 273.1 of the Criminal Code, there was no evidence that the complainant had not consented to the sexual activity in question. Turning to s. 265(3)(c) of the Code, the trial judge concluded that there was also no evidence to show that the appellant had acted fraudulently.The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Crown’s appeal and remitted the matter for a new trial. On the issue of consent, Groberman J.A. (with Saunders J.A. concurring) held that the majority decision of the Court in Hutchinson allowed a person to limit their consent to sexual intercourse on the condition that their partner wear a condom. He held that sexual intercourse with a condom is a different physical act than sexual intercourse without a condom. The complainant had therefore not consented to the sexual activity in question under s. 273.1 of the Criminal Code. Bennett J.A. was instead of the view that the majority in Hutchinson clearly stated that the use of a condom was to be determined under s. 265(3) of the Code - whether consent was vitiated by fraud. She therefore agreed with the trial judge that there was no evidence to suggest that the complainant had not voluntarily agreed to the sexual activity in question.On the issue of fraud, Bennett J.A. (Saunders J.A. concurring in the alternative) ruled that the complainant’s consent was vitiated by fraud as the appellant had been dishonest when he did not disclose that he had not worn a condom and that there had been deprivation. Groberman J.A. held that the trial judge did not err in holding that there was no evidence to support that the appellant had acted fraudulently. Keywords Criminal law - Offences - Criminal law - Offences - Sexual assault - Consent - Whether the use of a condom and/or contraceptives forms part of the sexual activity a person is consenting to pursuant to s. 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code - Whether the failure of a party to advise a sexual partner that a condition or quality of the sexual activity they have agreed to is absent constitutes some evidence of fraud under s. 265(3) of the Criminal Code - Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 265(3)(c), 273.1(1). Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:45:072021-12-06
The respondent was found guilty by a jury of second-degree murder. Shortly after the killing of the victim, police obtained a warrant to search the respondent’s house, and he was asked to voluntarily provide a statement to police while the search was being executed. The respondent agreed to do so, and he was interviewed in March 2015. He was not arrested at that time and was not provided with his Charter rights. Following the interview, the respondent consented to giving his fingerprints and a blood sample for DNA analysis, and he turned over his cell phone and some of his clothing. The respondent was subsequently arrested for murder in April 2015. He was given his Charter rights and the opportunity to contact legal counsel. After speaking to a lawyer, the respondent was interviewed and confessed to the murder. At trial, he brought an application seeking the exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the interviews, alleging his s. 10(b) Charter right had been breached on both occasions. The trial judge dimissed the application.The respondent appealed his conviction. A majority of the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed the appeal, set aside the respondent’s conviction and ordered a new trial. It found that the respondent’s s. 10(b) rights had been breached during both interviews, and held that the evidence obtained as a result of the interviews should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. In dissent, Wakeling J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. Keywords Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Right to counsel (s. 10(b)) - Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Detention - Right to counsel - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the respondent’s rights under s. 10 of the Charter were breached - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 10(b). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:27:182021-12-06
The respondent, Patrick Dussault, was arrested for murder and arson. Before his trial, he moved to exclude from the evidence an incriminating statement he had made to the police while being questioned; the reason he gave was that the statement had been obtained as the result of a violation of his right to counsel protected by s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A voir dire was held. The trial judge dismissed the motion and found that the respondent’s statement was admissible in evidence. At his trial, the jury then found the respondent guilty of second degree murder.The respondent appealed the verdict. He argued that the trial judge had erred in dismissing the motion to exclude the incriminating statement and in finding that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) had not been violated. The respondent submitted that, in his telephone conversation with his lawyer, the latter had started to advise him but had not finished doing so, and that the refusal of the police to allow the respondent to continue that consultation when his lawyer arrived at the police station was a violation of the police duty to ensure the application of s. 10(b) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty verdict and ordered a new trial. Keywords Criminal law - Criminal law — Charter of Rights — Right to counsel — Appeal — Power of intervention — Palpable error — Whether Court of Appeal erred regarding scope of its power of intervention by making its own assessment of facts even though it had identified no palpable error made by trial judge — Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in establishing principle of “continuous” right to counsel that departs from principles from this Court’s decision in R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310, by allowing second consultation despite absence of objective facts that would make it necessary — Whether Court of Appeal erred in law in determining whether legal assistance obtained was sufficient from perspective of counsel without regard to testimony of accused and to findings of fact of trial judge, who noted that accused had understood. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:15:342021-12-06
Charter of Rights - Criminal law - Right to counsel - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not require the police to suspend further questioning a detainee who has exercised his right to counsel prior to the interrogation but requests a second consultation during the interrogation - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that s. 10(b) of the Charter does not require the police to respect a detainee’s request to have his lawyer present during a custodial interrogation.Sinclair was convicted of manslaughter in the killing of Garry Grice on December 18, 2003. After being arrested, he was advised of his right to counsel and was taken to the police detachment. There, he twice spoke by telephone with a lawyer of his choice, each time for approximately three minutes. He was later interviewed by Sergeant Skrine for approximately five hours, who confirmed that Sinclair had exercised his right to counsel. During the interview, Sinclair stated on five occasions that he did not want to talk to the officer, wished to speak with his lawyer again and wanted his lawyer present during the interview. However, the officer deflected the requests, advised Sinclair that he did not have the right to have his counsel present, and continued with the questioning, gradually revealing more of the evidence against Sinclair as the interview wore on. Eventually, Sinclair implicated himself in Grice’s death. Later, the police placed him into a cell with an undercover officer, where he made similar incriminating statements to that officer. Sinclair also accompanied the police to where Grice had been killed and participated in a re-enactment. A voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of his statements. Keywords Canadian charter - criminal. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:31:262021-12-06
Charter of Rights - Criminal law - Right to counsel - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not require the police to suspend further questioning a detainee who has exercised his right to counsel prior to the interrogation but requests a second consultation during the interrogation - Whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that s. 10(b) of the Charter does not require the police to respect a detainee’s request to have his lawyer present during a custodial interrogation.Sinclair was convicted of manslaughter in the killing of Garry Grice on December 18, 2003. After being arrested, he was advised of his right to counsel and was taken to the police detachment. There, he twice spoke by telephone with a lawyer of his choice, each time for approximately three minutes. He was later interviewed by Sergeant Skrine for approximately five hours, who confirmed that Sinclair had exercised his right to counsel. During the interview, Sinclair stated on five occasions that he did not want to talk to the officer, wished to speak with his lawyer again and wanted his lawyer present during the interview. However, the officer deflected the requests, advised Sinclair that he did not have the right to have his counsel present, and continued with the questioning, gradually revealing more of the evidence against Sinclair as the interview wore on. Eventually, Sinclair implicated himself in Grice’s death. Later, the police placed him into a cell with an undercover officer, where he made similar incriminating statements to that officer. Sinclair also accompanied the police to where Grice had been killed and participated in a re-enactment. A voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of his statements. Keywords Canadian charter - criminal. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:24:162021-11-29
The issue in dispute is whether, during the 2001 to 2005 and 2008 and 2010 taxation years, the income of Glenhuron Bank Limited (“GBL”), a bank licenced in Barbados, was foreign accrual property income (“FAPI”) pursuant to ss. 91 and 95 of the Act. If so, the taxable income of Loblaw Financial Holdings Inc. in Canada must include a percentage of its affiliate’s FAPI equivalent to the participating percentage of the respondent’s shares in GBL. FAPI includes income from an investment business. The definition of investment business in s. 95(1) of the Act exempts a business, other than a business conducted principally with non-arm’s length persons, of a regulated foreign bank with greater than five full-time employees. The respondent appealed its tax reassessments on the basis that as GBL was a regulated foreign bank that met the added conditions, its income for the taxation years in question was not FAPI. The appellant argued that GBL was not a foreign bank, did not have greater that five full time employees and was not conducting business principally with non-arm’s length persons, since it was not in competition with anyone. The Crown also argued that the general anti-avoidance rule applied to a series of transactions by the respondent and GBL to give the appearance of compliance with the “investment business” exception.The Tax Court allowed the respondent’s appeals in part, holding that the foreign exchange gains or losses arising on GBL’s investment in short term securities should be on income account. However, the Court determined that while GBL is a regulated foreign bank with more than the equivalent of five full time employees, it was conducting business principally with related persons and therefore could not benefit from the financial institution exemption from investment business. It found, in obiter, that there had been no tax avoidance transactions. The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal, set aside the decision of the Tax Court, and referred the reassessment back to the Minister for reconsideration and reassessment on the basis that GBL’s FAPI consists only of income from investment management services provided to non-arm’s length parties. In its view, the receipts side of banking should not be considered when determining whether the investment business was conducted principally with non-arm’s length parties. Keywords Taxation - Income tax, Legislation, Interpretation - Taxation - Income tax - Tax avoidance - Legislation - Interpretation - Interpretation of foreign accrual property income provisions - Whether the business of the respondent’s foreign affiliate as a foreign bank was conducted principally with persons with whom it does not deal at arm’s length - Did the Federal Court of Appeal err in its interpretation of the definition of “investment business” in s. 95(1) of the Income Tax Act, particularly the phrase other than any business conducted principally with persons with whom the affiliate does not deal at arm’s length in the financial institution exception- Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp) ss. 91 and 95. Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:20:422021-11-24
Charter of Rights - Criminal law - Search and seizure - Reasonable expectation of privacy - Digital recording ammeter - Exclusion of evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that police actions in asking the electrical service provider to measure the Respondent’s electrical consumption with a digital recording ammeter (“DRA”), and in reviewing the results produced by the DRA, involved a search subject to the requirements of s. 8 of the Charter - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that requesting the installation of the DRA and reviewing the DRA data constituted an unreasonable search.The Respondent’s home became suspicious to Calgary police when they were in his neighbourhood investigating an unrelated matter. The police observed condensation on the Respondent’s home windows, considerable moisture being vented through the chimney and under the deck, and unusual ice buildup around the vents. The officers also noticed a smell of “growing” marihuana from the public roadway and therefore suspected that the Respondent had a marihuana grow operation in his home. The police then requested an electrical service provider in the area to install a digital recording ammeter (“DRA”) which would create a record of when the electrical power was consumed on the Respondent’s property. No judicial authorization for the DRA installation was obtained. With the information provided by the DRA and the earlier observations, the police obtained a search warrant to search the Respondent’s home. The trial judge dismissed the Respondent’s application to exclude the DRA evidence, although she did find that the Respondent’s s. 8 Charter rights had been breached. The Respondent was convicted of two drug offences. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the use of the DRA amounted to a form of surreptitious surveillance of an individual by the police which, without prior judicial authorization, constituted unreasonable search and seizure. O’Brien J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. Keywords Canadian charter - criminal. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:53:232021-11-22
The respondent, a resident of Luxembourg, claimed an exemption from Canadian income tax under Article 13(5) of the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Convention 1999 (Treaty) for a large capital gain arising from the sale of the shares of its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary, Alta Energy Partners Canada Ltd. (“Alta Canada”). Alta Canada carried on an unconventional shale oil business in the Duvernay shale oil formation of Northern Alberta, controlling a net acreage of 67,891 and drilling six horizontal and vertical wells in the relevant period. An issue arose as to the application of Article 13(4) of the Treaty, under which Canada retains the right to tax capital gains arising from the disposition of shares whose value derives principally from immovable property. The respondent relied upon an exclusion to that provision that applies when the business of the company was carried on in the property. The appellant denied the exemption on the ground that substantially all Alta Canada’s interest remained Immoveable Property because it drilled and extracted in only a small portion of the area it controlled and had allegedly acquired the leases and licenses with an intention of selling them in the short-term. Alternatively, the appellant argued that the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”) under s. 245 of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp) (the “Act”) operated to deny the tax benefit. The parties agreed that there was a “tax benefit” and an “avoidance transaction” but disagreed on whether an “abuse” or “misuse” triggered the application of GAAR.The Tax Court of Canada allowed the respondent’s appeal of the reassessments for the 2013 taxation year and referred the matter back to Minister for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with its reasons for judgment. It held that the respondent’s interest in the property constituted Excluded Property and that the GAAR did not prevent the respondent’s entitlement to the exemption under Article 13(5) of the Treaty. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s appeal. Keywords Legislation - Interpretation, Taxation - Legislation - Interpretation - Taxation - International Tax Treaties - Did the Federal Court of Appeal err in law in equating the object, spirit and purpose of the relevant treaty provisions with their textual meaning - Did the Federal Court of Appeal err in law and in fact in concluding that the avoidance transactions in this case did not result in an abuse of the relevant treaty provisions - Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp), ss. 2(3), 115(1) and 248(1) - Convention between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Articles 1, 4, 13(4) and 13(5). Notes (Federal Court) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:11:572021-11-18
Steven Devecseri was insured by the respondent Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada (“RSA”) under a standard motor vehicle policy. Under this policy, Mr. Devecseri was prohibited from operating a motorcycle with any alcohol in his bloodstream. To do so would constitute a policy violation. In 2006, Jeffrey Bradfield, Mr. Devecseri and another were riding their motorcycles. Mr. Devecseri drove onto the wrong side of the road and collided with an automobile. Mr. Devecseri was killed. Mr. Bradfield the automobile driver were injured. RSA engaged an adjuster to investigate the accident. The adjuster obtained the police report, which made no mention of alcohol. The adjuster noted that the coroner’s report would confirm whether alcohol had been a factor in the accident, but neither he nor RSA took steps to obtain the report. Mr. Bradfield commenced and later settled an action against Mr. Devecseri’s estate and his own insurer for uninsured and underinsured coverage. The other motorcyclist brought a personal injury action against Mr. Devecseri and Mr. Bradfield. RSA retained counsel to defend Mr. Devecseri’s estate in both actions.Three years after the accident, RSA became aware that Mr. Devecseri had consumed beer before the accident. It then took steps to obtain the coroner’s report, which confirmed that Mr. Devecseri’s blood alcohol level was above zero at the time of death. RSA then took the position that the matter was off-coverage and it stopped defending Mr. Devecseri’s estate. Mr. Bradfield commenced an action against RSA alleging that it was too late for RSA to take an off-coverage position. He argued that, having defended Mr. Devecseri’s estate to the point of examinations for discovery even though it was or should have been aware of the policy breach, RSA had waived Mr. Devecseri’s policy breach, or was estopped for denying the coverage.The chambers judge granted the application, finding that RSA’s failure to take an off-coverage position after June 2006, and its defence of the claim amounted to a waiver by conduct of Mr. Devecseri’s breach of the insurance policy. The Court of Appeal allowed RSA’s appeal and dismissed Mr. Bradfield’s action. Keywords Insurance - Automobile insurance, Contracts, Estoppel - Insurance - Automobile insurance - Exclusions - Contracts - Waiver - Estoppel - Reasonable investigation of policy breach - Insured caused vehicular accident insured by defendant insurer - Plaintiff injured in accident - Policy prohibited operating vehicle with blood alcohol level above zero - Insurer retained counsel to defend insured’s estate - Insurer later obtained coroner’s report indicating insured’s blood alcohol level was above zero at time of accident - Insurer took off-coverage position - Whether the Court should decide case despite mootness - Whether insurer could use insured’s policy breach as a defence to injured party’s action - How the Insurance Act scheme interacts with waiver and estoppel with respect to rights under insurance contract - When insurer’s assumption and continuation of defence of action is assurance of coverage for purposes of estoppel - If so, what amounts to “detrimental reliance”. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:49:082021-11-15
(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)On December 22, 2016, the appellant, Mr. Albashir, was charged with several offences related to his operation of a commercial trade, including living on the avails of prostitution contrary to s. 212(1)(j) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, between March 15 and December 5, 2014. Despite finding factual guilt on all counts, the trial judge quashed the s. 212(1)(j) counts on the indictment as unconstitutional, relying on Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101. On December 20, 2013, in Bedford, the Court held that s. 212(1)(j) was overbroad and could not be saved under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of one year.The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal and ordered that convictions be entered for the s. 212(1)(j) counts, finding that the trial judge fell into error when he quashed them. Since Parliament replaced s. 212(1)(j) with a new offence that largely mirrors its predecessor in substance but carves out a number of exceptions intended to address concerns over security of the person raised in Bedford within the period of the suspension, conduct captured by the former iteration of the offence during the suspended declaration of invalidity is prosecutable. During the suspension period, s. 212(1)(j) was constitutionally valid. The retroactive effect of a suspended declaration of invalidity is pre-empted by the passing of remedial legislation: the declaration of invalidity never came into effect to render the provision a nullity ab initio. Keywords Constitutional law - Criminal law, Legislation - Constitutional law - Criminal law - Legislation - Declaration of invalidity - Living on avails of prostitution - Temporary suspension of declaration of invalidity - Parliament repealing and replacing legislation before expiration of suspended period - What is the effect of a suspended declaration of invalidity if Parliament repeals and replaces the legislation found to be constitutionally invalid prior to the expiry of the suspended declaration?. Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:11:262021-11-12
In 2016, the respondent, Mr. Vallières, was convicted by a jury of offences relating to fraud, trafficking and theft of maple syrup from the Fédération des producteurs acéricoles du Québec. The proceeding that led to this appeal concerned the sentencing for those offences.The Superior Court was of the view that the various criteria applicable to fines in lieu, established both by the Criminal Code and by the case law, were met in this case. As a result, it found that it had no choice but to impose a fine in lieu, given that the stolen property could not be recovered. With regard to determining the value of the property (s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code), it noted that judicial discretion was limited and that the amount of the fine had to be equal to the value of the property the accused had in his possession or under his control. It held that the evidence in this case showed beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Vallières had received $10,000,000 from the theft, and it therefore found that it had no choice but to order the payment of a fine of $9,393,498 ($10,000,000 minus US$606,501 claimed under the restraint order, which was not in issue).The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal on this point. In its view, the amount of the fine in lieu — $10,000,000 minus the amount of the restitution order — seemed exorbitant. It found that the proper approach was the one taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Dieckmann (2017 ONCA 575): where there is sufficient evidence, a court may exercise its discretion to set a fine that reflects the profit the offender received from the criminal activity, provided that the dual objectives of depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and deterring criminal organizations and accomplices are met. It found that the trial judge had erred in stating that he had no choice but to order the payment of $9,393,498.44 and that this error in principle had led to the imposition of a fine that was demonstrably unfit and was a substantial and marked departure from the fine imposed on the other co accused who had the stolen syrup in their possession. The Court of Appeal held that the fine in lieu should be $1,000,000 minus the amount of the restitution order (US$606,501) based on the foreign currency conversion suggested by the Crown, for a total of $171,397.57. Keywords Criminal law - Sentencing - Criminal law - Sentencing - Fine in lieu - Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in determining and applying proper legal framework for calculating fine in lieu of forfeiture of proceeds of crime - Whether Court of Appeal erred in law by failing to allow parties to be heard regarding change to quantum of fine in lieu even though Mr. Vallières had not raised this issue in his appeal - Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C 46, s. 462.37. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:22:112021-11-12
The appellant attended a party where he consumed alcohol and magic mushrooms. While intoxicated, he broke into two homes. In the first, he beat the lone occupant with a hard object, causing her serious injuries. In the second, he caused damage to property. At trial, the appellant brought a constitutional challenge to s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which precluded him from availing himself of the defence of non-mental disorder automatism to the charge of breaking and entering with commission of an aggravated assault. The application judge held that s. 33.1 infringes both ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and declared s. 33.1 to be of no force or effect. The trial judge accepted expert evidence that the appellant was in a state of automatism at the time of the offences, and acquitted him of all charges. The Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal for Alberta allowed the appeal, set aside the declaration of invalidity, set aside the acquittal on the charge of breaking and entering with commission of an aggravated assault, and entered a conviction on the lesser and included offence of aggravated assault. Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law - Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Defence of non-mental disorder automatism not available if accused’s state of automatism due to self-induced intoxication pursuant to s. 33.1 of Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 - Whether s. 33.1 infringes ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter - If so, whether the infringement justified under s. 1 of the Charter. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:19:522021-11-09
This case arises from disciplinary proceedings pursued by the appellant, the Law Society of Saskatchewan (“LSS”), against the respondent lawyer, Peter V. Abrametz. Those proceedings, which began with an audit investigation initiated in 2012, resulted in a January 10, 2018, decision in which a Hearing Committee of the LSS found Mr. Abrametz guilty of four counts of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. The convictions were for breaches of the Law Society of Saskatchewan Rules and the version of the Code of Professional Conduct that was then in effect.On January 18, 2019, the Hearing Committee ordered Mr. Abrametz disbarred, with no right to apply for readmission as a lawyer prior to January 1, 2021. In its November 8, 2018, stay decision, the Hearing Committee dismissed Mr. Abrametz’s application to stay the proceedings as a result of undue delay constituting an abuse of process.Mr. Abrametz appealed his conviction and the penalty decision to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 56(1) of The Legal Profession Act, 1990, S.S. 1990-91, c. L-10.1. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part; it stayed the Law Society proceedings; set aside the imposed penalty and costs awards but findings of professional misconduct were maintained. Keywords Administrative law - Abuse of process - Administrative law — Abuse of process — Delay — Disciplinary proceedings pursued by Law Society against lawyer — Hearing Committee dismissing lawyer’s application to stay proceedings as a result of undue delay constituting an abuse of process — Court of Appeal allowing appeal in part — What is applicable standard of review — What are principles applicable to administrative delay — Whether Court of Appeal erred in its Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 analysis — Whether law in respect of administrative delay should be changed in light of R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631 and Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. Notes (Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:17:112021-11-08
A police search of Mr. Parranto on arrest and searches of his residence found fentanyl, other drugs, cash, weapons and drug paraphernalia. Mr. Parranto pleaded guilty to 8 offences including two counts of wholesale trafficking in fentanyl. On the two counts of wholesale trafficking in fentanyl, he was sentenced to 4 years and 5 years consecutive. In six transactions, Mr. Felix sold fentanyl and cocaine to an undercover police. Mr. Felix pleaded guilty to four offences including two counts of wholesale and commercial trafficking in fentanyl. On the counts of trafficking in fentanyl, Mr. Felix was sentenced to two 7-year terms concurrent. On appeals from the sentences, the Court of Appeal established a starting point of 9 years for sentences for wholesale trafficking in fentanyl. It sentenced Mr. Parranto to two 7-year terms consecutive for trafficking in fentanyl and Mr. Felix to two 10-year terms concurrent for trafficking in fentanyl. Keywords Criminal law - Sentencing - Criminal law - Sentencing - Standard of review on sentence appeal - Whether Court of Appeal erred in setting a starting-point for sentencing for wholesale fentanyl trafficking - Whether starting point approach to sentencing improperly emphasizes parity of sentence at the expense of individualization of sentence - Whether Court of Appeal erred in reversing sentencing judge because sentencing judge refused to adopt a starting-point approach- Whether Court of Appeal misapplied standard of appellate review for sentencing decisions?. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:003:02:572021-11-05
The appellant was jointly charged and tried by a jury with his co-accused of possession of a loaded restricted firearm. It was alleged that the appellant had brought the firearm to a nightclub and used it to threaten a security guard (“witness”) at the club’s entrance, and that the co-accused took possession of the weapon shortly thereafter. The witness’s credibility was central to the Crown’s case. The trial judge made a number of mid-trial rulings which had the effect of preventing the appellant’s counsel from cross-examining the witness on his prior statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry, and she disallowed a line of questioning related to alleged discreditable conduct by the co-accused. The trial judge also directed the jury that the witness had made prior consistent statements, but did not require those statements to be put into evidence. Both the appellant and his co-accused were found guilty.The appellant appealed his conviction, alleging that the trial judge erred in limiting the witness’s cross-examination by the appellant’s counsel and in misdirecting the jury on the witness’s prior consistent statements. He also argued that the errors undermined the fairness of the trial. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rulings were trial management decisions within the discretion of the trial judge which are entitled to deference. The rulings did not deprive the appellant of material evidence necessary for his defence and did not impact the fairness of the trial. In dissent, Paciocco J.A. would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In his view, the trial judge’s rulings deprived the appellant of important evidence related to the witness’s credibility, and the fairness of the trial was undermined by the trial judge’s errors. Keywords Criminal law - Evidence - Criminal law - Trial management powers - Evidence - Admissibility of evidence - Cross-examination - Credibility - Prior inconsistent statements - Prior consistent statements - Trial fairness - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the trial judge’s mid-trial rulings were a proper exercise of her trial management powers and subject to deference - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in finding that the mid-trial rulings did not render the trial unfair by depriving the appellant of the ability to make full answer and defence. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:02:562021-11-05
Following a trial before a judge sitting alone Mr. Cowan was acquitted of armed robbery and having his face masked with intent to commit robbery. The Crown’s theories at trial were that Mr. Cowan was the masked robber and, as such, he was guilty as a principal offender, or that Mr. Cowan was guilty as party to the offence because, by providing instruction to the men he named in his warned statement on how to commit a robbery, he encouraged and/or counselled them to commit that offence. The trial judge found that the Crown had failed to prove Mr. Cowan’s guilt on the basis of either theory.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal from the acquittal on the charge of armed robbery, set aside Mr. Cowan’s acquittal, and ordered a new trial proceeding from the footing that the question to be determined is whether Mr. Cowan is guilty of robbery, as a party, on the basis of abetting or counselling. Although it dismissed the Crown’s arguments under the principal theory, the majority was satisfied that the trial judge made a legal error in the application of s. 21(1)(c) and s. 22(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, by restricting himself to consideration of whether the Crown had proven that Mr. Cowan abetted or counselled the principal offender(s). That error had a material bearing on Mr. Cowan’s acquittal, because it led the trial judge to overlook relevant and probative evidence which strongly supported a finding of guilt.Jackson J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the Crown’s appeal in its entirety. She agreed with the majority that the Crown had not discharged the burden upon it to justify a new trial on the basis that the trial judge made an error of law when he concluded Mr. Cowan had not personally committed the offence of robbery. However, she also concluded that the trial judge did not err by limiting himself to considering two named individuals only as being principals only to the offence, as he was responding to the evidence and submissions. If the trial judge did commit an error of law, Jackson J.A. was of the view that it was not of sufficient materiality for the court to overturn the acquittal and order a new trial. Keywords Criminal law - Appeals - Criminal law - Appeals - Appeal by Crown against acquittal - Error of law - Parties to offence - Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in determining the trial judge committed an error in law by limiting himself to considering two named individuals only, apart from the accused, as being principals only to the offence? - Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err in determining that if the trial judge had so erred, the Crown had discharged the burden upon it to demonstrate that the error might reasonably be thought, in the concrete reality of the case at hand, to have had a material bearing on the acquittal? - Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 21(1)(c), 22(1). Criminal law - Appeals - Powers of Court of Appeal - Appeal by Crown against acquittal - Error of law - Parties to offence - Order of Court of Appeal limiting scope of new trial - Did the majority of the Court of Appeal err by ordering a trial limited to the issue of party liability?- Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 686(8). Notes (Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right / By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:36:532021-11-03
The appellant, Matthew Stairs, was charged with assault, breach of probation, and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking. At trial, he brought a ss. 8, 9 and 24(2) Charter application. He argued that he was the subject of cascading Charter breaches, starting with an unlawful entry into his home and ending with an unlawful search. The application was dismissed and the appellant was convicted of the three charges.The appellant appealed his conviction of possession for the purpose of trafficking only. The appeal rested on a challenge to the Charter ruling. A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the trial judge did not err in concluding that the police had sufficient grounds to arrest him and in concluding that a Feeney warrant was not required to make the arrest inside of the home. The majority also held that the trial judge was right to conclude that the discovery and seizure of the methamphetamine was not a s. 8 Charter breach. The fact that the methamphetamine was sitting out in plain view meant that it could be seized.The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal for the count of possession in issue. He agreed with the majority’s analysis and conclusion concerning the police entry into the residence, that the police had valid grounds to arrest the appellant, and that the police did not require a Feeney warrant. He disagreed with the majority’s s. 8 Charter breach analysis. In his view, the officers did not have sufficient objectively reasonable grounds to conduct a safety search of the basement living area. The warrantless search breached the s. 8 rights of the appellant and he would have therefore excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter. As there was no other evidence on the drug charge, he would have set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal for the count in issue. Keywords Criminal law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Search and seizure (s. 8) - Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Search and seizure - Application of doctrine of search incident to arrest - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario erred in law in upholding the trial judge’s ruling that the search of the accused’s home was lawful and did not violate his right against unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Whether the doctrine of search incident to arrest applies, without modification, to searches conducted in a home following a warrantless arrest - What is the standard justifying a warrantless search of a residence as an incident of an arrest?. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:20:592021-11-01
(publication ban) (sealing order)The respondent, J.J., was charged with sexual assault, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. His lawyer is in possession of communications between J.J. and the complainant. His lawyer wants to use those communications on cross-examination of the complainant; however, he says those communications meet the definition of a record in s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and as a result he must apply to have the communications admitted as relevant to an issue at trial pursuant to ss. 278.92, 278.93 and 278.94. The application must be made on seven days’ notice to the Crown, unless the trial judge permits a shorter period. Duncan J. held that the seven-day notice requirement in s. 278.93(4) of the Criminal Code violated s. 7 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1. Duncan J. “read down” s. 278.93(4) of the Code to: (1) remove the seven day notice requirement in s. 278.93(4) only as it applies to s. 278.92 applications; and (2) provide that s. 278.92 applications should be made “at the conclusion of the complainant’s examination in chief, or as otherwise required by the judge, provincial court judge or justice in the interests of justice”. On October 5, 2020, J.J.’s trial on a single count of sexual assault commenced before a judge and jury in the B.C. Supreme Court. On October 9, 2020, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. The Crown has not appealed the verdict. Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Constitutional law - Criminal law - Admissibility and use of third party records in the possession of the accused for certain enumerated sexual offences - Interlocutory constitutional ruling - Whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the seven-day notice requirement in s. 278.93(4) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Charter and does not constitute a reasonable limit pursuant to s. 1 - Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 and 7 - Does the “records screening regime” in ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the Criminal Code violate s. 7, 11(c), and/or 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms such that it should be declared of no force or effect? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:25:142021-11-01
(publication ban) (sealing order)The respondent, J.J., was charged with sexual assault, contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code. His lawyer is in possession of communications between J.J. and the complainant. His lawyer wants to use those communications on cross-examination of the complainant; however, he says those communications meet the definition of a record in s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and as a result he must apply to have the communications admitted as relevant to an issue at trial pursuant to ss. 278.92, 278.93 and 278.94. The application must be made on seven days’ notice to the Crown, unless the trial judge permits a shorter period. Duncan J. held that the seven-day notice requirement in s. 278.93(4) of the Criminal Code violated s. 7 of the Charter and could not be saved under s. 1. Duncan J. “read down” s. 278.93(4) of the Code to: (1) remove the seven day notice requirement in s. 278.93(4) only as it applies to s. 278.92 applications; and (2) provide that s. 278.92 applications should be made “at the conclusion of the complainant’s examination in chief, or as otherwise required by the judge, provincial court judge or justice in the interests of justice”. On October 5, 2020, J.J.’s trial on a single count of sexual assault commenced before a judge and jury in the B.C. Supreme Court. On October 9, 2020, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. The Crown has not appealed the verdict. Keywords Canadian charter (Criminal) - Constitutional law, Criminal law - Charter of Rights - Constitutional law - Criminal law - Admissibility and use of third party records in the possession of the accused for certain enumerated sexual offences - Interlocutory constitutional ruling - Whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the seven-day notice requirement in s. 278.93(4) of the Criminal Code infringes s. 7 of the Charter and does not constitute a reasonable limit pursuant to s. 1 - Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 and 7 - Does the “records screening regime” in ss. 278.92 to 278.94 of the Criminal Code violate s. 7, 11(c), and/or 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms such that it should be declared of no force or effect? Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:10:382021-10-28
As part of a stand-up routine, comedian Mike Ward used dark humour to “deflate” what he called the “sacred cows” of Quebec’s artistic milieu in reference to a number of prominent public figures. One of his subjects was Jérémy Gabriel, a young man with Treacher Collins Syndrome who had become famous by singing for well-known public figures. In his routine, Mr. Ward made a number of comments relating to physical characteristics of Mr. Gabriel caused by his handicap. Mr Gabriel and his parents filed a complaint of discrimination with the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse (the “Commission”). The Commission submitted an application to the Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”). The Tribunal concluded that Mr. Ward’s comments were discriminatory under Quebec’s Charter of human rights and freedoms. It held that the comments violated Mr. Gabriel’s right to dignity and that the violation was not justified by Mr. Ward’s right to freedom of expression. The Tribunal awarded damages for moral injury and punitive damages to Mr. Gabriel and to his mother. The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Ward’s appeal in part. It held that in balancing Mr. Gabriel’s right to dignity with Mr. Ward’s right to freedom of expression, the Tribunal was reasonable in concluding that Mr. Ward’s comments surpassed what could reasonably be tolerated by Mr. Gabriel. However, it quashed the order awarding damages to Mr. Gabriel’s mother, finding that she was not subjected to discrimination. A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal in full. She did not agree that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the comments were discriminatory was reasonable. Keywords Human rights - Right to equality, Right to dignity - Human rights - Right to equality - Right to dignity - Right to freedom of expression - Young person with handicap among public figures who were subject of jokes in comedy routine - Human Rights Tribunal finding that comments were discriminatory and were not justifiable on basis of freedom of expression - Tribunal awarding damages for moral injury and punitive damages to complainant and complainant’s mother - Court of Appeal upholding finding of discrimination but quashing order awarding damages to complainant’s mother - Whether political or artistic speech mentioning or mocking personal characteristics amounts to discrimination, thereby giving Human Rights Tribunal jurisdiction to grant redress - Whether appellant’s comedy routine is justified as free speech under Quebec’s Charter of human rights and freedoms - Whether freedom of expression provides same protection to artistic expression as it does to political expression - Whether punitive damages could be awarded in this case - Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, ss. 3, 4, 10. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:53:542021-10-28
Mr. Sullivan attempted suicide by ingesting a prescription drug known to cause psychosis as a side effect. In a psychotic state, he stabbed his mother. Mr. Chan consumed magic mushrooms. In a psychotic state, he fatally stabbed his father and then he stabbed his father’s partner. At their trials, each accused sought to raise non-mental disorder automatism as a defence but the trial judges applied s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, which sets out conditions in which the defence is not available. In Mr. Chan’s case, the trial judge also held that s. 33.1 infringes ss. 7 and s. 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms but it is not unconstitutional because the infringements are justified under s. 1 of the Charter. Mr. Sullivan was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon. Mr. Chan was convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals. It found s. 33.1 unconstitutional. It acquitted Mr. Sullivan on both counts and ordered a new trial for Mr. Chan. Keywords Constitutional law - Constitutional law - Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Fundamental justice - Presumption of innocence - Assaults occurring during states of psychosis caused by ingesting intoxicants - Accused raising defence of non-mental disorder automatism - Defence not available if accused’s state of psychosis caused by self-induced intoxication pursuant to s. 33.1 of Criminal Code - Whether s. 33.1 infringes ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter - If s. 33.1 infringes ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter, is the infringement justified under s. 1 of the Charter - Whether normal rules of stare decisis apply to declarations of invalidity made by superior court judges pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982?. Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:004:25:222021-10-27
The appellant was charged with second-degree murder, aggravated assault and breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence. A group of at least five men, including the appellant, entered an apartment and began assaulting the occupants. Four occupants were stabbed, one of whom died of a single stab wound. The trial judge found that the members of the group, including the appellant, had a common purpose to assault the occupants of the apartment and to assist each other in that purpose, and she found the appellant guilty of three counts of aggravated assault as a party to those offences under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code. Concerning the murder charge, the trial judge reasoned that an accused cannot be found liable as a joint principal under s. 21(1)(a) of the Code where the cause of death could have only been inflicted by one person. The trial judge acquitted the appellant of both second-degree murder and manslaughter, and also acquitted him of break and enter with intent.The Crown appealed the manslaughter acquittal, and the appellant cross-appealed his convictions for aggravated assault. The Court of Appeal for Alberta found that the trial judge had erred in her application of the law on joint participation and allowed the Crown’s appeal, set aside the acquittal, and entered a conviction for manslaughter. The appellant’s cross-appeal was dismissed, and his convictions for aggravated assault were upheld. Keywords Criminal law - Criminal law - Parties to offences - Joint participation - Whether the trial judge erred in her application of the law on joint principals in acquitting the appellant of manslaughter - Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 21. Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:0052:102021-10-27
The respondent, Liam Reilly, was charged with robbery and firearms-related offences. Police attended at Mr. Reilly’s residence after he was identified as one of four perpetrators involved in two armed robberies. Mr. Reilly was on probation at the time and when he did not present himself at the door of his residence for his curfew check, one of the officers entered through an unlocked rear sliding door, knocked on Mr. Reilly’s bedroom door and arrested him. The officers then performed a clearing search of the residence and observed evidence related to the robberies. An information to obtain (“ITO”) was subsequently drafted by the police and a search warrant was obtained based in part on observations from the clearing search.Before trial, a voir dire was held. Mr. Reilly was unsuccessful in seeking an order, pursuant to ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to exclude the evidence seized in his residence on the basis that the ITO was facially invalid and the search warrant should not have been issued. Following the voir dire ruling, Mr. Reilly invited the judge to convict him of six counts of robbery and firearms-related offences.Mr. Reilly appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in finding that reasonable grounds existed for the issuance of the search warrant, and in not excluding the evidence seized pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter. A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, excluded the evidence, quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial. The majority held that the trial judge did not err in law or in principle in upholding the search warrant, but did err by considering the Charter-compliant conduct of the police as mitigating the seriousness one of the officer’s Charter breaches and by improperly weighing the factors in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353. The majority conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis and held that despite a compelling interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In dissent, Willcock J.A. would have dismissed the appeal. In his view, the majority should have deferred to the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis instead of engaging in a fresh and independent analysis. Willcock J.A. disagreed that the trial judge erred in law in his s. 24(2) assessment of whether the admission of the evidence thus obtained would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Keywords Constitutional law - Canadian charter (Criminal), Search and seizure (s. 8), Remedy - Constitutional law - Charter of Rights - Search and seizure - Remedy - Exclusion of evidence - Whether the majority of the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial judge erred in law by considering some Charter-compliant police conduct to be mitigating - Whether the majority erred in concluding that the trial judge erred in law in his s. 24(2) assessment by improperly weighing the factors considered in that assessment - Whether the majority erred by conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, as they ought to have deferred to the trial judge’s assessment under s. 24(2) - Whether the majority erred in their fresh s. 24(2) analysis by attributing no weight to the fact that the evidence linking the accused to the robberies was obtained by a lawfully issued search warrant, and there was no causal connection between the Charter breaches and the issuance of the search warrant. . Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original v 0:001:10:532021-10-27
The parties were married in 2003 and divorced in 2015. They have both since remarried. Their daughter was born in 2005 and they had a son in 2011. They all resided in the Niagara region until 2017. In 2015, the parties participated in an assessment pursuant to s. 30 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12. Ms. Richardson was seeking to have the children move with her to Ottawa, where she planned to relocate. The assessor recommended that the children stay in the Niagara region and that the parties have joint custody. The parties accepted this recommendation and settled the matter pursuant to a consent order in 2016. At the time both parties had residences in the Niagara region and Ms. Richardson was dividing her time between the Niagara region and the Ottawa area, where she had a home with her new spouse.In July 2017, Ms. Richardson sold her Niagara residence and moved to Ottawa. She brought a motion to change the consent order on the basis that it would be in the children’s best interests to reside primarily with her in Ottawa. The parties could not settle the matter and it proceeded to trial. On the third day of the trial, counsel for the parties presented a proposed settlement to the trial judge that provided that the children would move from their home in the Niagara region to Ottawa to live primarily with their mother. The trial judge did not accept the terms of the minutes of settlement and stated that he wanted to hear all of the evidence. The trial proceeded. The trial judge concluded that the children would not relocate to Ottawa. This decision was upheld by a majority of the Court of Appeal. Keywords Family law - Custody, Judgments and orders - Family law - Custody - Judgments and orders - Reasons - Trial judge making custody order contrary to terms of minutes of settlement signed by parties during course of trial - In family law proceedings involving parenting issues, when is it appropriate for courts to reject parties’ reasonable settlement agreements, and what are the standards for rejecting such settlements? - When, if ever, is it appropriate for a trial judge to continue to sit on a trial after being privy to the parties’ settlement positions? . Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:002:04:252021-10-27
The three appellants, Ms. Dingwall, Mr.Russell, and Mr. Richet, were convicted of aggravated assault and various firearm offences in connection to a drive-by shooting occurring outside a residential house in British Columbia. At trial, the Crown’s case was based on circumstantial evidence. The trial judge concluded that Mr. Russell and Mr. Richet were guilty as principals or aiders or abettors for all charges. Ms. Dingwall was found guilty as an aider or abettor for the charges relating to the drive-by shooting and as a principal or aider or abettor for the charges related to the burning of a truck. The three appellants appealed their respective convictions. The majority at the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. It held that the verdicts were not unreasonable. There was agreement with the trial judge that no inference other than guilt was available given the evidence and absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense.In dissent, Butler J.A. disagreed with the disposition of Ms. Dingwall’s appeal relating to the drive-by shooting charges. He would have allowed her appeal with respect to counts 3 to 6 and directed acquittals for those offences. He would have dismissed Ms. Dingwall’s appeal from her other convictions and dismissed the appeals of Mr. Russell and Mr. Richet. In his view, the trial judge erred in concluding that the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence was that Ms. Dingwall aided or abetted in the offences described under those counts. To Butler J.A., the trial judge failed to properly consider the lack of any evidence about Ms. Dingwall’s activities before and during the shooting offences, and failed to consider the absence of evidence given her potential liability as a party, rather than a principal, to those offences. As Ms. Dingwall’s participation in the offences was not the only rational inference on the evidence, the Crown could not be taken to have met its burden of proof and the trial judge’s verdict was therefore unreasonable. Keywords Criminal law - Appeals, Evidence - Criminal law - Appeals - Unreasonable verdict - Circumstantial evidence -Parties to offence - Whether the trial judge erred in law in his determination that the appellants’ guilt on counts 3, 4, 5 and 6 was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence. . Notes (British Columbia) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:11:412021-10-27
The appellant was charged with offences related to the possession of a handgun, possession of fentanyl, and breach of an undertaking. He had been involved in a single-vehicle collision, and an intervening police officer observed a small bag containing a single yellow pill in his car. The officer identified the pill as gabapentin, a substance which he erroneously believed to be a controlled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, and placed the appellant under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. Further searches of the appellant and his vehicle yielded fentanyl and a loaded firearm. At trial, the appellant sought exclusion of the evidence pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter on the basis that he had been arrested for a non-existent offence, resulting in a violation of his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights. The trial judge concluded that the arrest and subsequent searches were lawful, and dismissed the application.A majority of the Court of Appeal of Alberta dismissed the appellant’s appeal, holding that while the officer had been mistaken in his belief that gabapentin is a controlled substance, he had not been enforcing a non-existing law, and his belief that the appellant had been committing an offence was both subjectively and objectively reasonable. In dissent, Veldhuis J.A. would have allowed the appeal, excluded the evidence, and entered acquittals on all counts. Keywords Criminal law - Constitutional law, Canadian charter (Criminal) - Criminal law - Constitutional law - Charter of Rights - Right to not be arbitrarily detained - Right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure - Reasonable and probable grounds for arrest - Non-existent offence - Whether the police officer’s mistake of law rendered the appellant’s arrest unlawful and therefore arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter - If so, whether the subsequent searches of the appellant were authorized by law under s. 8 of the Charter - If the searches were not authorized by law, whether the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter - Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8, 9, 24(2). Notes (Alberta) (Criminal) (As of Right) Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch). 0:001:05:25